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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Theme
In recent years, two monetary regimes have gained great importance, namely currency
board arrangements and monetary unions: Currency boards reemerged in the 1990s and
the European Monetary Union started in 1999.
Both exchange-rate systems have in common that the participating countries give up
monetary independence, but retain fiscal independence. Therefore, fiscal policies remain
the only instruments to offset idiosyncratic shocks and to follow country-specific targets.
The arising conflict for fiscal authorities is whether to exercise a more aggressive fiscal
policy in order to reach the domestic output goals, or to be disciplined to help monetary
policy to achieve its objectives.
The main objective to operate a currency board system is to establish credibility and
stability during transition periods and to overcome hyperinflations and currency crises by
adopting an exchange-rate regime based on a strict rule. The objective of the monetary
policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) is to ensure a stable money within the
European Monetary Union and to ease market integration and political integration for
the thirteen countries that have already abandoned national monetary discretion and
joined the Euro-area.
The main theme of this dissertation is whether currency boards achieve their objectives
and how fiscal policy will and should operate under both monetary systems, a currency
board and a monetary union. The dissertation is divided into two parts. In the first part,
we examine:
• the credibility and stability of currency boards, and compare the credibility of cur-
1
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rency board arrangements to the credibility of standard fixed exchange-rate systems,
• fiscal policy under currency boards, and analyze whether currency boards induce
more fiscal discipline compared to standard fixed exchange-rate systems, and
• how fiscal variables, i.e. the budget deficit and public debts, affect the stability of
currency board systems.
In the second part, we consider a heterogeneous monetary union and analyze:
• which target function is socially optimal for individual fiscal authorities and for the
common central bank in a microeconomic model,
• the interplay between fiscal and monetary policies, while we allow for non-cooperative
and cooperative behavior, as well as for simultaneous and sequential decision-making
of fiscal and monetary authorities.
We give a detailed outline of the thesis in the following.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
1.2.1 Part I: Credibility and Stability of a Currency Board
Functioning of Currency Boards (Chapter 2)
In chapter 2, we characterize a currency board system and highlight the main differences of
a currency board and a standard peg. We also sum up the advantages and disadvantages
of operating a currency board system and elaborate the prerequisites for success in the
intermediate-term.
The Credibility of Currency Boards (Chapter 3)
In chapter 3, which is based on Feuerstein and Grimm (2006b), we compare the cred-
ibility of currency boards and standard fixed exchange-rate regimes.1 Abandoning a
currency board requires a time-consuming legislative process and an abolition can, thus,
never catch the public by surprise. A currency board, therefore, solves the time inconsis-
tency problem of monetary policy. Policy can, however, react to unexpected shocks only
1The thesis is structured cumulatively and, therefore, repetitions cannot be excluded, completely.
Especially, in chapter 4 the reader will come across several recapitulations.
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with a time lag and, thus, the threat of large shocks makes the abolition necessary. We
show in a theoretical model that currency boards are more credible than standard pegs if
the time inconsistency problem dominates. In contrast, standard pegs, which can be left
at short notice, are more credible if exogenous shocks are highly volatile and constitute
the dominant problem.
Fiscal Policy and Stability of Currency Boards (Chapter 4)
Chapter 4 analyzes fiscal policy under a currency board. We give an overview of past and
present currency systems and show that modern currency board systems have been stable
arrangements associated with low inflation, stable economic growth and fiscal discipline.
We claim that this was also true for Argentina in the first years operating the currency
board system. In this context, we discuss the possible causes for the Argentinean crisis
and the abandonment of the currency board system in 2001. We, furthermore, give a
brief survey of several empirical studies that confirm a central finding of our theoretical
analysis that currency boards are associated with higher fiscal discipline compared to
standard peg regimes.
In the theoretical part we analyze, first, fiscal policy under a currency board system
and under a standard fixed exchange-rate system, and show that a currency board induces
higher fiscal discipline.
Second, we examine the stability of a currency board system. To relate this to empiri-
cism, modern currency board systems have proven to be rather stable: Hong-Kong has
been operating a currency board since 20 years, Estonia and Lithuania for more than ten
years, and Bosnia and Bulgaria for almost ten years without a realignment of the central
rate.2 In our theoretical framework, we determine the factors which increase or lessen the
stability of a currency board. We also compare the credibility of a currency board and a
standard peg with respect to the probability that the particular system is maintained in
the future period. We use a similar proceeding as in chapter 3, but incorporate the role
of government expenditure and public debts into our analysis.
2Lithuania switched from pegging its currency against the dollar to peg its currency against the Euro
in 2002. This was necessary for participating in the (Exchange Rate Mechanism) ERM II which belongs
to the Maastricht criteria that have to be fulfilled to adopt the Euro.
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1.2.2 Part II: Monetary and Fiscal Policies in a Monetary Union
Part II of the thesis examines strategic interactions of fiscal and monetary policies in a
monetary union; it consists of four interdependent chapters and is based on Grimm and
Ried (2006).
After the introduction in chapter 5, the basic framework for the policy analysis is
derived by using a microeconomic model in chapter 6. For a monetary union which com-
prises two regions, we determine the region-specific output and inflation equations. More-
over, we derive the region-specific and union-wide welfare function from microeconomic
foundations. In particular, we show that fiscal policies should aim at regional inflation
and output targets, whereas the common monetary policy should focus on maximizing
union-wide welfare.
In chapter 7, we analyze the interplay between fiscal and monetary policies for sev-
eral scenarios: We distinguish whether monetary and fiscal authorities decide upon their
policies simultaneously, or whether one policy moves first. We, furthermore, distinguish
between independently acting fiscal and monetary policies, cooperation of fiscal policies
and joint cooperation of all policy makers. We analyze the different scenarios for two
types of fiscal policies, namely supply-side and demand-side fiscal policies.
The results are obtained by using a simulation approach. We show that the more
heterogeneous the monetary union is, the higher are the welfare losses. Heterogeneities
also hamper cooperation of all policy makers. Cooperation, however, leads to the lowest
welfare losses, if all policy makers agree upon inflation and output targets which are close
to or equal the socially optimal levels. We discuss that such an agreement seems to be
implausible in a heterogeneous monetary union and show that monetary leadership is the
second-best solution for both types of fiscal policies. Chapter 8 concludes the second part
of the thesis.
Part I
Credibility and Stability of Currency
Board Systems
5
Chapter 2
Functioning of Currency Boards
This chapter gives an overview of the features and characteristics of currency board sys-
tems. First, we show the characteristics of an orthodox currency board system, and identify
briefly how modern currency board systems differ from the orthodox type. Second, we
examine the pros and cons of a currency board system. Third, we highlight which pre-
requisites a country should have for operating a currency board arrangement. Fourth, we
give a summary and state under which conditions a currency board system may be an
adequate exchange-rate system.
2.1 Features of a Currency Board System
A currency board is a fixed exchange-rate system, where the exchange rate is pegged
extremely tight to the anchor currency, i.e. it belongs to the classification of a “hard-
peg”-regime.1 The first currency board was introduced in the British colony Mauritius in
1849. Further British colonies introduced currency board systems in the second half of the
19th century. They reached their peak in the middle of the 20th century. The purpose was
that the colonies have an own stable currency, which was fully backed by reserves of the
anchor currency, the British Pound Sterling. Thus, the costly transport of Pounds from
Britain to its colonies to issue money in the colonies and to replace destroyed notes and
coins was no longer necessary to guarantee smooth payment transactions (Williamson,
1A hard peg regime is a fixed exchange-rate system with a credible commitment to vary the exchange
rate within a very narrow margin or even a “zero-margin” to its anchor currency. Hence, it denies its
monetary policy to access to devaluation as a policy instrument. Hard pegs comprise currency board
systems, dollarization and monetary unions. See Fatas and Rose (2000) for a detailed discussion of hard
peg regimes.
6
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1995). At the same time, there was no room for any kind of independent monetary policy
in the British colonies, meaning that the monetary base could only be changed by buying
or selling the British Pound.2 Furthermore, the colonies gained interest rate revenues from
the liquid foreign reserve assets that were held in London. After the Second World War,
currency boards disappeared as the former colonies became independent and established
own central banks.3
Currency board systems reemerged at the beginning of the 1990s. The main motives
for the countries, which introduced a currency board system were, on the one hand, to
(re)gain stability after times of economic turmoil and hyperinflation and, on the other
hand, to generate credibility during the transition process (Ho, 2002). A question which
arises is, wherefrom a currency board system derives its credibility. To answer this ques-
tion, we focus on its features in the following.
A clear definition of a currency board system is difficult to give, as the design of
the existing currency board systems is quite different among each other. Williamson
(1995) defines a currency board “as a monetary institution that issues base money solely
in exchange for foreign assets, specifically the reserve currency (p.2)”. We use a more
specific definition and state that a currency board is an establishment by law, which covers
the following issues:4
• The exchange rate is pegged to the anchor currency without the existence of a certain
fluctuation band.
• The monetary base is covered with at least 100% of foreign reserves (of the anchor
currency).
• The currency board guarantees full convertibility.
In this context, full convertibility means that the currency can be used for transactions
with foreign countries without any restrictions. Furthermore, full convertibility contains
2Britain, furthermore, favored to introduce currency board systems in her colonies, because this
exchange-rate regime gives not much autonomy away.
3Among economists there is a controversy whether a currency board “is a central bank or not”. We do
not want to unroll this question here. In this dissertation, a currency board is classified as a special form
of a central bank, by pointing out that modern currency boards have also a limited leeway for making
use of monetary policy instruments.
4Note that this definition is given by Feuerstein (2000) and is also used in Feuerstein and Grimm
(2006b), a joint work to which chapter 3 is mainly referred to.
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Figure 2.1: T-Accounts of a Currency Board and a Central Bank
Orthodox Currency BoardA P
Liquid reserve-currency assets Cash
(Deposits of Commercial Banks)
Net worth
A P(Common) Central Bank
Liquid reserve-currency assets Cash
Domestic assets
(Government Debts)
(Deposits of Commercial Banks)
Net worth
Source: Williamson (1995), p. 3.
also the right to exchange the domestic currency for units of the anchor currency at the
currency board for the official exchange-rate parity.5
We, henceforth, distinguish between an orthodox currency board system, which is de-
fined by a strict, conservative interpretation of the rules, and a modified currency board,
which contains some deviations from the classical blueprint (Ho, 2002). All modern cur-
rency board systems differ from the orthodox interpretation by allowing some flexibility
in certain aspects.6
To elaborate the differences of an orthodox currency board system and a common
central bank, we compare the T-accounts of both institutions in figure 2.1. A currency
board holds liquid reserve-currency assets to cover the issued amount of cash, i.e. the
5For a detailed overview of the criterion of convertibility and the criterion of reserve backing see e.g.
Jansen (2000).
6In theoretical examinations an orthodox currency board is usually considered. This is also done in
chapter 3 and 4 of this dissertation.
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notes and coins in circulation. Under an orthodox currency board assets comprise solely
liquid reserves. In principal, a currency board can also hold deposits from commercial
banks. However, in an orthodox currency board commercial banks hold usually their
reserves completely in liquid assets denominated in the reserve currency. The monetary
base exclusively depends on buying or selling foreign currency at the fixed rate. Hence,
there is no room for independent monetary policy under a currency board, and the money
supply is exogenously determined.
In contrast, a common central bank includes also domestic assets which comprise assets
from domestic banks and government debts. Money supply under a common central
bank is mainly controlled by open market operations, i.e. through buying assets from
the commercial banks (with reverse transactions).7 On the liability-side, we see that
commercial banks hold their reserves at the central bank.
To summarize, a common central bank can do discretionary monetary policy, which is
also possible to a certain degree when operating a standard peg regime.8 On the contrary,
under an orthodox currency board system no independent monetary policy is possible due
to its strict rule-based definition.
Feuerstein (2000) points out that one important role that monetary authorities
occupy is to act as a lender of last resort. This means that the central bank grant loans
on illiquid but solvent banks to prevent a bank run. This is, of course, not possible under
an orthodox currency board system.
Therefore, modern currency board systems deviate in their design from the ortho-
dox type to establish some political leeway. Feuerstein (2000) shows that all modern
currency boards take a minimum reserve from commercial banks, which leaves some re-
stricted room to use independent monetary policy. Furthermore, a modified currency
board can grant loans to solvent but illiquid banks if the 100% reserve-backing of the
monetary base is maintained, which means that a limited intervention as lender of last
resort is also possible under a currency board. Monetary reserves can also comprise loans
granted from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).9
7To explain the difference of a common central bank and a currency board system, we give here only a
very rough exhibition about the functioning of money supply under a common central bank. For details
see European Central Bank (2004).
8The term standard fixed exchange-rate system comprises all fixed-exchange rate systems which do not
belong to the classifications of a hard peg regime. Examples for standard pegs are fixed exchange-rate
systems with a certain fluctuation band or crawling pegs.
9For details see Feuerstein (2000), p.230, and figure 2 on p.231.
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2.2 Pros and Cons of a Currency Board System
The pros and cons of currency board systems are widely discussed in the economic liter-
ature. Thereby, currency boards are assessed quite differently. The reason for that may
be found in the different experiences with currency board systems. On the one hand, Es-
tonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria have performed well on their way to the European Union
and the European Monetary Union so far. On the other hand, the breakdown of the Ar-
gentinean currency board in 2002 raised some negative aftertaste.10 We begin this section
by showing the advantages of operating a currency board system.11
2.2.1 Advantages
a) Convertibility and 100%-Reserve Backing
The features of full convertibility and the backing of the monetary base by at least
100% reduces strongly the risk of a speculative attack and increases the stability and
credibility of the exchange-rate peg: A currency board cannot break down because
it is running out of reserves, but only if the economic cost of maintaining it exceeds
the costs which arise when the currency board is reneged. We take up this point
when analyzing the credibility of a currency board in a theoretical model in chapter
3.
b) Fiscal Discipline
A currency board induces fiscal discipline, as the currency board cannot finance
government debts: The T-account shown in figure 2.1 implies that the central bank
cannot buy government bonds, because the monetary base has to be fully backed
by liquid foreign reserves. Furthermore, the strict rule of monetary policy under
a currency board implicates that government deficits also cannot be devalued by
creating inflation through open market operations and via other channels. There-
fore, the government must finance its deficits by tax income and/or from borrowing
10We discuss the economic performance of modern currency board systems in chapter 4.
11Note that the borderline between the pros and cons differs among economists. Hanke (2002), for
example, contradicts most of the negative arguments by using the unworthy notation of “straw man
arguments”, (p.100). We point out that there exist drawbacks associated with operating a currency
board system, but concede that in some cases the arguments can also be interpreted in the opposite
direction if certain conditions hold.
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abroad. This suggests that fiscal policy is likely to be disciplined, because excessive
deficits are costly in real economic terms if financed by high taxes, and because the
possibility of borrowing from abroad may be constrained in the case of excessive
deficits (Schweikert, 1998).
In chapter 4 of this dissertation, we compare fiscal policies under a currency board
system and a standard fixed exchange-rate regime using a theoretical model and
confirm that a currency board system leads to more fiscal discipline than a standard
peg.
c) Establishment by Law
A further important feature of a currency board system is its establishment by
law. Brockmann and Keppler (2003) claim that the embodiment of the cur-
rency board mechanisms in the law implies that the cost of modifying some features
or abandoning the currency board is relatively high compared to a standard peg.
Hence, a currency board derives much of its credibility from this feature. Ho (2002)
adds that the the written law makes a “valuable contribution via its role as an in-
formation device” (p.20), which means that the rules of the game become clear and
transparent, and this contributes also to the credibility of a currency board system.
In our theoretical analysis in the chapters 3 and 4, we go one step ahead and assume
that the anchorage of the main currency board mechanisms by law makes a surpris-
ing abandonment implausible and solves, thus, the time inconsistency problem of
monetary policy. This accounts for a sound environment to achieve low inflation
rates and stable economic growth.
d) Balance of Payments Equilibrating Effect
A trade balance deficit leads to a reduction of money supply and induces an increase
of the interest rates. This leads to a reduction of private demand (consumption and
investments) and to falling prices under the fixed exchange rate, which contributes
to an increase of exports as domestically produced goods become relatively more
competitive. At the same time imports are reduced. Both effects improve the
current account.
The mechanism is almost the same as the well-known adjustment mechanism under
the gold-standard. Williamson (1995) associated this effect with a currency board
system. We decided to mention this effect at the end of the list of advantages, as we
state that if wage rigidities and price stickiness exist, the adjustment process to a
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balanced current account can possibly lead through an intermediate-term recession,
which may even put some pressure on the currency board.
2.2.2 Disadvantages
a) Lender of Last Resort
When acting under an orthodox currency board system, the policy maker cannot
act as a lender of last resort. This means that the banking sector is potentially
vulnerable to a liquidity crisis: monetary policy cannot grant loans to solvent but
illiquid banks to prevent bank runs which may induce high economic costs.
This is the reason for modern currency board systems to implement some political
leeway as discussed in the previous section. Therefore, currency boards can also act
as a lender of last resort, but only as long as the 100% coverage of the monetary
base by foreign reserves is not violated.
Note that the limited possibility to act as a “lender of last resort” has also a silver
lining: unfortunate bailouts of insolvent institutions are avoided and moral hazard
is restricted (Dornbusch, 2001). Under a currency board a sound banking system
is a necessary requirement for intermediate-term success. Furthermore, an open
banking sector with international players is helpful, as subsidiary companies from
international banks can usually access the liquidity of their mother banks. In this
context, however, Caprio et al. (1996) annotated the problem that foreign banks
are generally considered as disadvantaged compared to domestic banks in monitoring
domestic investments, which may lead to slightly higher interest rates due to an
increase of the risk premia.12
b) Asymmetric Shocks
A further disadvantage of a currency board is that the strict rules do not allow
for monetary policy to react to asymmetric shocks. Honohan (1994) argues that
asymmetric shocks will affect directly the prices and money demand, as policy mak-
ers cannot anticipate and offset economic shocks. If price rigidities and labor market
frictions are present, it can take several periods until the shock is completely abated.
12A detailed discussion of the lender of last resort function under a currency board, which also includes
a case study of Argentina, is found in Caprio et al. (1996).
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In contrast, Dornbusch (2001) states that the importance of the nominal exchange
rate to offset asymmetric shocks is overdone: “Most disturbances are temporary
rather than permanent”, (p.239). This may be true for countries like e.g. Hong-
Kong where prices and wages are relatively flexible in both directions. However, if
price rigidities exist shocks may happen to persist for several periods. We take up
this point in our model in chapter 3 and show that the degree of shock persistence,
which can be interpreted as a certain degree of price stickiness, has a negative impact
on the credibility of a currency board system.
c) Procyclical Money Supply
In the previous subsection we have already mentioned that money supply is exoge-
nous under a currency board system. A problem which is likely to appear under a
currency board is that the money supply behaves procyclical: In good times money
flows in and the interest rate falls, which leads to more private consumption and
investments and may contribute to an overheating of the economy. In bad times,
the opposite is true: Money flows out, interest rates rise and private demand is
crowded out, which makes a recession more severe (Williamson, 1995).
d) Real Appreciation
When the inflation rates after fixing the exchange rate under a currency board do
not converge quickly and completely to the inflation rates of the anchor currency,
the country experiences a real appreciation, which induces a loss of competitiveness.
This problem occurs when the currency board is not completely credible (i.e. when
the private sector assumes that it is repealed with a certain probability) or when
the tax system is inefficient.13
e) Start-up Problem
Another problem, which is frequently discussed is the start-up problem, i.e. how
to solve the question where the foreign reserves come from to issue the own cur-
rency and fulfill the 100% reserve-backing criterion. The present currency board
arrangements did not have such problems: the former Soviet Republics, Estonia
13The inflation rates in the present currency board systems were strongly reduced within a short period
after the introduction of the systems. However, a full convergence was reached only after several months.
The performance of the present currency board systems is demonstrated in chapter 4.
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and Lithuania, received gold transfers from wealth, which was transferred to Lon-
don and Stockholm before the beginning of the Second World War. The rest of
the currency board countries suffered from hyperinflations before the adoption of
their currency boards, which reduced the real money supply strongly and increased,
thereby, automatically the cover ratio (Feuerstein, 2000).
f) Seigniorage Problem
The last problem we highlight is the seigniorage problem: the currency board’s
100% backing-rule requires that the monetary base is completely backed by liquid
reserve-currency assets. The revenues of these assets are usually lower compared to
that of a common central bank, which also holds higher interest-bearing domestic
assets and government bonds as reserves.
Dornbusch (2001), however, considers this problem as subordinated. He states
that the savings on debt services through lower interest rates due to the credible
commitment of the currency board may compensate or even overcompensate the
missed earnings from seigniorage.
2.3 Prerequisites for Success under a Currency Board
The discussion of the pros and cons of currency board systems has shown that a currency
board can contribute to a gain in credibility by its strict rule-based monetary policy (also
under a modified currency board system). This is especially helpful during a transition
period where the policy makers do not have any reputation from a tough past. Cur-
rency board systems have also proven to be a useful remedy to overcome currency crises.
However, the credibility of a currency board does not come per se and there exist many
disadvantages from which a currency board country will possibly suffer. In this section,
we name and discuss the requirements a country has to fulfill to operate a currency board
system successfully in the intermediate-term or in the long-run.
We begin with the degree of openness which is an important feature that a currency
board country should exhibit. An open economy is characterized by a relatively large
relation of tradeable goods to all domestically produced goods. Therefore, it participates
with a large fraction of its domestic production in the world market. Hence, exchange-rate
uncertainty imposes large costs which can be reduced by operating a fixed exchange-rate
system. This is particularly true with respect to currency boards due to their establish-
ment by law and the strict rules. The reduction of exchange-rate uncertainty facilitates
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a lower price variability.
Furthermore, labor market stickiness and inflation inertia tend to be lower under an
open economy compared to a relatively closed economy. This implicates that the nominal
exchange rate is less important as a stabilization tool, meaning that asymmetric shocks
have a lower persistence because they can be offset or mitigated more quickly by an
adjustment of domestic prices and wages. As in most cases small countries are more
open than larger countries, currency board systems are typically found in small, open
economies.
To avoid large and frequent asymmetric shocks, the country to which the domestic
currency is pegged has to show similar business cycle movements. Usually the business
cycles of a country move very much synchronous to the business cycles of the country
most traded with. Hence, it seems to be logical to peg one’s currency to that of the
most important trading partner. This idea is referred to Mundell’s “theory of optimum
currency areas” (Mundell, 1961).14 For the reasons explained above, this criterion
becomes even more important when price and wage rigidities exist.
One main motive of introducing a currency board system is to reduce inflation and
interest rates to create a sound economic environment through a (re)gain of credibility.
At the initial stage, however, inflation may possibly not converge immediately to the
levels of the anchor currency and the domestic currency appreciates in real terms. This
makes domestic products relatively more expensive compared to foreign goods and, thus,
decreases competitiveness. Kopcke (1999) proposes to fix the initial exchange rate (in
price-notation) at a level somewhat above the estimates of the equilibrium exchange rate
to reduce or totally circumvent this problem. Hence, the currency approaches to its real
equilibrium level by the real appreciation during the initial stage.
A further aspect required for success under a currency board system is that fiscal policy
has to be willing to accept the importance of fiscal discipline. In chapter 4, we show that
fiscal policy is more restrictive under a currency board system when its target function
contains output, inflation and debts. However, if policy makers focus on other goals, like
e.g. the maximization of the re-election probability by an excessive provision of public
goods or tax-cuts which are financed by foreign debts, the interest rates will rise and crowd
out private investment. Such a behavior “endangers the sustainability of government
14We argue in chapter 4 that the choice of the US-$ as the anchor currency contributed to the breakdown
of the Argentinean currency board in 2002. Argentina was far away from constituting an optimum
currency area with the United States
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finances, and eventually of the whole currency board arrangement” (Stukenbrock, 2004,
p.49). For guaranteeing long-term success, fiscal policy must accept the rules of the game
and must endorse that monetary policy is independent from financing government debts.
Due to the missing or restricted lender of last resort-function, a sound and liberalized
banking sector with the participation of foreign banks is also an important prerequisite.
We have discussed this point already in the previous section.
2.4 Summary
So far, we have discussed the characteristics and the pros and cons of operating a currency
board arrangement and we have highlighted the essential prerequisites for a country to
run a currency board successfully over an intermediate or longer time-horizon.
We suggest that a currency board can be an eligible exchange-rate system for small,
open transition countries to achieve high credibility and, thus, low inflation rates, which
is a precondition for sustainable growth. In this context Dornbusch and Giavazzi
(1999) claim that the central and eastern European countries lose nothing in giving up
their monetary sovereignty. They even recommended that all accession countries should
introduce a Euro-based currency board.
The introduction of a currency board arrangement can also be very effective to stabilize
an economy suffering from a currency crisis or hyperinflations. In this context by its strict
rule of monetary policy and its establishment by law, a currency board arrangement
signals great commitment and helps to restore confidence. The small requirement of skills
and staff also increases the attractiveness of currency boards further. This argument is
especially applicable for transition countries without much experience in central banking.
Admittedly, a currency board system is no panacea as demonstrated by the prerequi-
sites and by the disadvantages in the previous sections. In general, a successful implemen-
tation of the system needs to be combined with reforms and liberalization of labor and
goods markets to increase flexibility, with reforms of the tax system, with establishing a
sound banking regulation, and with a cooperative and disciplined fiscal policy.
Kopcke (1999) sees a currency board system as an interim solution: “Currency
Boards represent a start, more than a destination for the design of monetary authori-
ties. They can offer economies a temporary shield for cultivating reputable central banks
and financial institutions”, (p.36). We agree on this point and add that a currency board
system seems to be an eligible transitory system. An unsolved question remains: How to
make a smooth exit? This would only be possible if a government can credibly signal that
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it has done its homework and created a sound economic environment, so that there is no
incentive to misuse monetary policy for the creation of surprise inflation or to devalue
government debts. However, a case in which a country abandoned its currency board
during good times does not exist.15
A currency board may also be acceptable in the long-run if it fulfills nearly all pre-
requisites at the same time. This can be seen from Hong-Kong, which have operated a
currency board since 1983. The credibility of currency board systems is analyzed theoret-
ically in chapter 3 and chapter 4 and an overview of the performance of modern currency
boards is given in chapter 4.
15Estonia and Lithuania will adopt the Euro in the near future, but this is just a transformation from
an unilateral ultimate fixed exchange-rate system pegged to the Euro to directly adopting the Euro.
Therefore, this will not deliver further insights into our question.
Chapter 3
Credibility of Currency Boards
3.1 Introduction
During the crisis-prone decade of the 1990s, currency boards proved to be remarkably
robust. Even in the case of the 2002 Argentinean currency board collapse, both the event
itself and the durability of the arrangement in the face of such large strains, require an
explanation. In this context, the question arises as to what constitutes the difference
between a currency board and a standard peg system and under what circumstances does
a currency board possess a credibility advantage.1
As demonstrated in chapter 2 a currency board is characterized by a fixed exchange
rate to a stable anchor currency and full coverage of the monetary base by foreign reserves.
It requires a long-term commitment by policy makers and is usually introduced by law
(which also specifies the fixed exchange rate). The main advantage of a currency board is
the gain in credibility. The monetary base is changed only through buying and selling the
anchor currency at the fixed rate. Thus, the trilemma that it is not possible to maintain
a fixed exchange rate, free movement of capital and an independent monetary policy at
the same time is solved by clearly abstaining from monetary independence. Moreover,
the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy is solved, as it is not possible for
the monetary authorities to create surprise inflation. Calvo (2000, p.4) strengthens that
view by suggesting that in emerging markets when sudden stops are possible, the emphasis
should be on credibility, “where the central banker may have to tie himself to the mast
or a currency board to command any respect”.
1On Argentina’s experience with the currency board see De la Torre et. al. (2003), Gurtner
(2004) and chapter 4.
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The anti-inflationary effects of currency boards have been confirmed empirically. Ghosh
et al. (2000) find that countries with a currency board experienced lower inflation com-
pared both with floating regimes and with simple pegs. Other econometric studies that
investigate the relevance of exchange rate regimes for economic performance pool currency
boards and countries with a shared currency into the group of hard pegs. The result that
countries with hard pegs have lower inflation rates than countries with soft pegs or other
regimes is found unequivocally (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001; Ghosh et al.,
2003; Bleaney and Francisco, 2005). There is, however, mixed evidence whether soft
pegs are also associated with lower inflation than floating regimes and whether the gain in
stability comes at the cost of lower growth. While Ghosh et al. (2000) find that countries
with a currency board experienced a higher growth, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2001) conclude that there is a trade-off between inflation and growth also for hard pegs.
In the study of Bleaney and Francisco (2005), the result of lower growth of hard
peg countries vanishes when regional dummies are introduced. The reason is that a large
share of the hard peg countries is located in Sub-Saharan Africa, the region with the
lowest growth. The cited studies do not only vary in the period and the countries covered
in the sample, but also in the exact classification of soft pegs and so-called intermediate
regimes.
A new strand of the literature considers the transition between different exchange rate
regimes Masson (2001), Masson and Ruge-Murcia (2005) and Husain et al. (2005).
Obviously, the gain in credibility of monetary policy relies on the credibility of the
currency board itself, which is, of course, not complete. Following the seminal work of
Drazen andMasson (1994), the credibility of an exchange rate regime is defined as the
probability that it is maintained. A currency board does not break down because it runs
out of reserves necessary to intervene on the foreign exchange market, as may be the case
in a standard peg system. Nevertheless, it can be abolished if the costs of maintaining it
– for example in case of a recession, a debt crisis or problems within the banking sector
– exceed its advantages.
Although currency boards have been discussed thoroughly, there is little literature
which analyzes the difference between a currency board and a standard fixed exchange-
rate regime from a theoretical point of view.2 One of the few papers which try to model
2Spiegel and Valderrama (2003) and Chan and Chen (2003) theoretically discuss specific aspects
of currency boards. However, they do not distinguish between a normal peg and a currency board system.
Spiegel and Valderrama (2003) characterize a currency board system by assuming that the costs of
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this difference is Chang and Velasco (2000). They characterize a currency board by
the full coverage of the monetary base, which excludes a run on the central bank’s reserves
that is possible in a standard peg. As Chang and Velasco consider opportunity costs of
holding reserves, but do not model any possible disadvantages of flexible exchange rates,
their conclusion that a flexible exchange rate is the optimal regime comes as no surprise.
A different approach to capture the difference between a currency board and a standard
peg is used by Oliva et al. (2001) who analyze whether monetary authorities can signal
their preferences on price stability by choosing between these two exchange rate systems.
They emphasize that a currency board constitutes a long term commitment and assume
that it can only be abolished in the second period of their two period model, whereas with
a standard peg, a realignment in response to a supply shock is possible in either period.
In contrast, Irwin (2004) assumes that the policy maker can abolish a currency board
without any time lag, and he characterizes a currency board only by its high exit costs.
The central result is that “the combination of incomplete information and persistence
of unemployment can lead to a build up of pressure on a currency board system to the
extent that it does collapse, even where the true devaluation cost is very high”.
In this model, we take up the idea of Oliva et al. (2001) that a currency board cannot
be abolished overnight, but we model this feature more consequently. A currency board
is established by law, and leaving it requires a political process including preceding public
discussion. While Oliva et al. allow for a sudden exit out of the system in the second
period, our model captures that it is hardly possible to generate a surprise, as repealing
a currency board takes time. In this context, we claim that when Argentina finally left
its currency board, this had been largely expected (see also chapter 4). The models also
differ in the assumption on the exchange rate regime with respect to abandoning the
system. Whereas Oliva et al. assume that the currency will devalue by an exogenously
given amount after giving up the fixed exchange rate, in our model, the exchange rate
will become flexible.
Therefore, in our model the currency board is characterized by the assumption that
abandoning the fixed exchange rate decrease over time, being high in the first period, whereas the system
is always abolished in the second period. In this framework, they study the effect of dollarized liabilities
on monetary policy and compare the results to the case of a free float. Chan and Chen (2003) consider
the possibility of increasing the credibility of a currency board by introducing irrevocable commitments
to sell foreign currency at the prespecified exchange rate up to its commitment level even if the currency
board is abandoned. Such a commitment could be achieved by depositing part of the currency board’s
foreign reserves with a third party.
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it can only be abandoned with a one period delay, in contrast to the case of a standard
peg. The currency board can only be left if this was – at least implicitly – announced
earlier. Of course, this is not to be understood literally in the sense that in the real world
the exact date of the abolition will be announced. The point is, that the breakdown of
the currency board will be expected and no surprise inflation can be created. Thus, when
expectations on inflation are formed, it is public information whether the currency board
will still be in place in the next period. Hence, the currency board completely solves the
time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. Nevertheless, announcing the abolition
of the currency board may make sense in case of a lasting misalignment.
Pressure to change the exchange rate emerges from asymmetric shocks that require an
adjustment of the real exchange rate, i.e. from stochastic shocks on the purchasing power
parity (PPP) (Berger et al., 2001). These shocks may for example arise from differing
business cycles. They may also reflect exchange rate movements between the anchor cur-
rency and third countries. Although the Argentinean currency board ultimately collapsed
because of unresolved budgetary problems, the sharp devaluation of the Brazilian Real
in 1999 and the strength of the US-$ in the years 2000 until mid 2002 contributed to
Argentina’s difficulties and help to explain the timing of the breakdown.
The PPP -shocks are assumed to be autocorrelated, meaning that a shock has lasting
effects. After observing the shock of the first period, the policy maker will decide whether
to initiate the process of repealing the currency board. If the shock is large, he knows that
the misalignment will continue with a high probability in the following period. However,
if the currency board is abolished, the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy
reemerges. In contrast, in a standard peg regime the policy maker can make use of an
escape clause after observing the shock in each period. He can respond to a large shock,
but he is also tempted to create surprise inflation. As a result, a currency board arrange-
ment is more credible than a standard-peg regime, if the time inconsistency problem is
dominant, whereas the peg is maintained with a higher probability, if the ability to react
to future shocks is more important.
This chapter is organized as follows: in the next section we develop our two-period
model. In section 3.3 we consider the regime of a floating exchange rate, which will be in
operation if the fixed exchange rate is abolished. Section 3.4 analyzes the policy options
under a currency board. We derive conditions under which the currency board will be
maintained and show in which situations it will be abandoned. In section 3.5, the behavior
of the policy maker in a standard fixed exchange-rate system is considered. Section 3.6
compares the credibility of the two fixed exchange-rate regimes, that are introduced in
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the previous sections. Section 3.7 summarizes the essential results of this chapter.
3.2 Basic Model
We consider a two-period model of a small open economy that has a time inconsistency
problem of monetary policy modeled as in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and in
Barro and Gordon (1983). In each period t, output yt is given by a standard Lu-
cas supply function
yt = γ(pit − piet ), γ > 0. (3.1)
Output depends on unanticipated inflation (pit− piet ), where pit denotes inflation in period
t and piet is the inflation rate expected by the private sector. Expectations are formed
rationally. Strictly speaking, yt denotes the deviation of output from its natural level, i.e.
the natural output level is normalized to zero. The inflation rate and the exchange rate
are linked by the stochastic purchasing power parity (PPP)
pit = pi
∗
t + et + φt , (3.2)
where pi∗t denotes foreign inflation, et the percentage change of the nominal exchange rate
in period t, and φt is a random shock (Berger et al., 2001).
The shock φt is autocorrelated
3
φt = ηφt−1 + ut , η ∈ (0, 1) , (3.3)
and it is assumed that initially there is no inherited shock, i.e. φ1 = u1.
φt represents an asymmetric shock that changes the equilibrium real exchange rate
reflecting for example differing business-cycles or exchange rate movements between the
anchor currency and third countries. A positive φt corresponds to the necessity of a real
appreciation, which can either be realized by an inflation rate exceeding foreign inflation
or by a falling exchange rate. New shocks ut are i.i.d. with E(ut) = 0 and Var(ut) = σ
2
u
for all t. In the sections 3.5 and 3.6, we will assume in addition that ut is uniformly
distributed on the interval [−A,A].
Normalizing the foreign inflation pi∗ to zero, equation (3.2) can be rewritten as
pit = et + φt . (3.4)
3Equivalently, we could assume that shocks φt are uncorrelated, but prices are sticky instead. This
would mean that inflation reflects the current shock only partially, leaving some of the required adjustment
for future periods. In this sense, the parameter η can be interpreted as a degree of price stickiness.
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The monetary authorities’ loss in period t is given by the function
Lt = (yt − k)2 + θpi2t + δc , (3.5)
and depends on the deviation of output from its target level k > 0 and the actual inflation
rate. The assumption that the policy makers’ target output k is above the natural level
can be interpreted as capturing distortions on goods and factor markets that lead to too
low a natural level. The relative weight on inflation in the loss-function is given by θ.
In addition, there are political costs c that arise when the fixed exchange rate is given
up under a peg regime or when the currency board arrangement is abandoned. These
political costs can either be interpreted as reputation costs or as costs caused by political
institutions in society (Lohmann, 1992). δ is a dummy variable, which equals one when
leaving the peg or the currency board and equals zero otherwise. Inserting the supply
function and the PPP (equation 3.1 and 3.4) into the loss function (3.5) yields4
Lt = (γ(pit − piet )− k)2 + θpi2t + δc
= (γ(et + φt − piet )− k)2 + θ(et + φt)2 + δc . (3.6)
The first term shows that the positive k leads to an incentive to create surprise inflation
in order to push output above its natural level. According to the assumption of rational
expectations, the private sector will take this incentive into account when forming its
expectations. Therefore, the policy maker cannot generate a surprise and a time incon-
sistency problem of monetary policy arises, that is the larger the larger the target output
k is. A high weight on inflation in the loss function θ, i.e. a high preference for price
stability, mitigates the time inconsistency problem. The effect of these two parameters on
the time inconsistency problem will be discussed again in section 3.3, where the results
for a free float, i.e. for the case of unrestricted discretion of monetary policy, are derived.
In our model, the essential difference between a currency board and a standard peg
lies in the procedure of abolishing the particular system. A currency board, characterized
by its establishment by law and the complete renunciation of individual monetary policy,
4This type of loss function, i.e. the policy maker’s objective to create a certain amount of surprise
inflation although she dislikes inflation itself, can also be derived from public finance considerations. In
Sachs et al. (1996), the policy maker is tempted to create unanticipated inflation to deflate the real
value of outstanding government debt. An alternative interpretation given by Sachs et al. (1996) is that
the inflation tax increases with actual inflation but falls with anticipated inflation, again giving rise to
aiming at surprise inflation.
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Figure 3.1: Sequence of the Model
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can only be repealed, if this was announced one period in advance, i.e. before the private
sector made its expectations on inflation. In contrast, monetary authorities can leave
the fixed exchange rate in a far more flexible way after the shock was observed. The
sequence of the model is depicted in figure 3.1. Expectations piet have to be formed before
the shock φt is observed. Actual inflation is determined by the purchasing power parity
(equation 3.4) if the exchange rate is fixed, and it is optimally set by the policy maker
in response to the shock if the exchange rate is flexible or the fixed exchange rate is
abandoned. In our two-period model, the decision whether to repeal the currency board
in the second period or not is announced in the first period at time ♦ before the private
sector forms expectations pie2. In the case of a standard peg, the fixed exchange rate can be
abandoned after observing the shock which would actually be possible in the first as well
as in the second period. However, we assume that the fixed exchange rate is maintained
in the first period and the decision whether to defend it or not is considered at time
4 in the second period. This could be justified by the fact that a standard peg has
some commitment value, too, and cannot be abolished immediately after its adoption.
The more important reason for making the assumption is, however, that a meaningful
comparison of the credibility of a currency board and a standard peg has to be based on
a single decision whether to give up the fixed exchange rate or not in both systems. If
the currency board can only be abolished at one point of time, but for the standard peg
abolition is considered both in period 1 and period 2, a statement that an abolition of
the standard peg is more probable will be irrelevant.
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3.3 Free Float Regime
In our model the process of repealing a currency board system takes time and has to be
announced one period in advance. In this case, the policy maker will set the inflation
rate (and thus the exchange rate) in period 2 optimally, and this policy will be taken into
account when expectations are formed. This regime amounts to a free float in period 2
that will briefly be analyzed in this section.
Consider the loss in period 2 (equation 3.6)
L2 = (γ(pi2 − pie2)− k)2 + θpi22 .
The monetary authorities can freely choose inflation. By minimizing L2, inflation in
period 2 equals
pi2 =
γ(γpie2 + k)
γ2 + θ
. (3.7)
As the private sector’s expectations are rational, it follows that
pie2 = E(pi2) =
γ2pie2 + γk
γ2 + θ
,
and thus
pie2 = γ
k
θ
. (3.8)
Using equations (3.1), (3.4) and (3.7) yields the equilibrium values for period t
pif2 = γ
k
θ
, ef2 = γ
k
θ
− φ2, yf2 = 0 . (3.9)
The superscript f denotes “free float”. With flexible exchange rates, the PPP -shock φ2
is fully absorbed by the change of the exchange rate ef2 and by the inflation rate pi
f
2 being
independent of φ2. The actual inflation rate is proportional to k, which is the difference
between the targeted and the natural output level. Although the policy maker wants to
push output above its natural level, output y2 is not affected. Obviously, the loss would
be smaller if actual and expected inflation equaled zero. However, a zero-inflation policy
would be time inconsistent, as with pie = 0 a higher inflation rate would actually be
chosen. Thus in case of a free float, when there is unrestricted discretion of monetary
policy, the inflation rate will be inefficiently high, and this problem is the larger, the
larger the parameter k. In contrast, a high weight θ on inflation in the policy makers’
loss function makes the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy smaller. The
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two parameters k and θ will therefore be interpreted as determining the size of the time
inconsistency problem in the remainder of this analysis. Of course, the size of the time
inconsistency problem also depends on γ. But it is natural to focus the interpretation on
the parameters occurring in the policy makers’ loss function in this context. The aim to
increase output above its natural level — reflected in k > 0 — is the basic cause for the
time inconsistency problem, and θ measures the degree of inflation aversion.
The resulting loss in period 2 is given by
Lf2 =
1
θ
k2(γ2 + θ) . (3.10)
Note that Lf2 does not depend on the shock φ2, but only on k, hence E(L
f
2) = L
f
2 .
3.4 Policy Options under a Currency Board
The policy maker has to announce one period in advance (at time ♦, see figure 3.1)
whether to maintain or to abolish the currency board in the next period. Thus, the
decision depends on the expected second period loss of the two cases, which are compared
to each other in the following analysis.
3.4.1 Currency Board Maintained over Both Periods
First, we consider the case of a currency board regime that is kept over both periods;
i.e. the monetary authorities do not announce the abolition of the currency board in
period 1, implying that e2 = 0 irrespective of the shock in period 2. Using equations (3.3)
and (3.4), the second period’s inflation rate is given by
pi2 = φ2 = ηφ1 + u2 , (3.11)
meaning that inflation depends only on the shock φ2. Thus the expected inflation pi
e
2
equals5
pie2 = E1(φ2) = ηφ1 . (3.12)
5In the following analysis, we use E1 as the abbreviation for the expectation contingent on available
information in the first period I1, i.e. E1 = E(·|I1).
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Expected and actual inflation differ by the new shock u2. Substituting ηφ1 for pi
e
2 in
equation (3.6) yields a second period loss of 6
Lcc2 = (γ(φ2 − ηφ1)− k)2 + θφ22 . (3.13)
Equilibrium values are given by
ecc2 = 0
picc2 = φ2 = ηφ1 + u2 ,
ycc2 = γ(pi
cc
2 − pie2) = γ(ηφ1 + u2 − ηφ1) = γu2 . (3.14)
As the exchange rate cannot be changed, ecc2 equals zero. Thus, pi
cc
2 is independent of k
and the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy is solved at the cost of having
no policy option to counteract φ2. Equilibrium output depends on the realization of the
unexpected part of φ2, the new shock u2. The expectation of period 2 loss, contingent on
first period information, is given by
E1(L
cc
2 ) = E1
(
(γu2 − k)2 + θφ22
)
= γ2E1(u
2
2) + k
2 + θE1(ηφ1 + u2)
2
= (γ2 + θ)σ2u + k
2 + θ (ηφ1)
2 . (3.15)
The threat of a large expected second period shock, represented by a high variance σ2u
and a high inherited shock φ1, leads to a high expected second period loss, as the policy
maker has no options to counteract the shock. This effect is reinforced by a large time
inconsistency problem of monetary policy, represented by a high level of k.
3.4.2 Currency Board Abolished after the First Period
In this subsection, we consider the case that the government has adopted a currency board
regime, but announces its abolition at the end of the first period and introduces a free
float system for period 2. Note that e1 equals zero and the monetary authorities can set
pi2 (and therefore e2) optimally after observing φ2.
The monetary authorities optimize the period 2 social loss according to the flexible
exchange rate case. The equilibrium values of ecf2 , y
cf
2 and pi
cf
2 are identical to those of a
6The superscript cc stands for the case in which the currency board is maintained over both periods
and cf denotes the situation of abolishing the currency board in the second period.
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flexible exchange rate system. Hence, Lcf2 and also E1(L
cf
2 ) are given by equation (3.10)
plus the political costs ccf of abandoning the currency board, yielding
E1(L
cf
2 ) = L
cf
2 =
1
θ
k2(γ2 + θ) + ccf . (3.16)
3.4.3 Maintaining or Leaving the Currency Board Arrangement
The decision whether to maintain or abandon the currency board takes place in the first
period before the private sector forms its inflation expectations for the second period. The
policy maker will decide to maintain the currency board, if the expected second period
loss of leaving it exceeds the expected second period loss of perpetuating the currency
board, i.e. if
E1(L
cf
2 )− E1(Lcc2 ) > 0 . (3.17)
Using equation (3.15) and (3.16), this condition is equivalent to
φ21 <
1
θη2
(
1
θ
k2γ2 − (γ2 + θ)σ2u + ccf
)
. (3.18)
The inequality shows that the decision whether to keep the currency board after the first
period or not depends on the absolute value of the shock realization φ1. The currency
board is maintained for small shocks, whereas a large shock φ1 prompts the policy maker
to announce its abolition. A high target output k and a low weight θ of inflation in the
loss function – both reflecting a large time inconsistency problem of monetary policy –
make the inequality more likely to hold.7 The policy maker will continue the currency
board in spite of a large shock requiring an adjustment of the real exchange rate, as an
abolition of the currency board will revive a huge inflation bias. This effect is reinforced
by the political costs ccf of abolishing the currency board.
In contrast, a high variance σ2u of the PPP -shock makes the interval in which the fixed
exchange rate is defended smaller, and it is possible that the right hand side of inequality
(3.18) becomes negative which would mean that the currency board would be abolished
irrespective of the shock (or it would not be a suitable system from the very beginning and
would never be introduced). The higher σ2u, the more important it is for the policy maker
to be able to react to a large possible shock φ2. A high autocorrelation of the shocks φt,
7If the right hand side of equation (3.18) is positive, it depends negatively on θ. If it is negative, the
inequality does not hold anyway
CHAPTER 3. CREDIBILITY OF CURRENCY BOARDS 29
represented by a large η, decreases the range of shock realizations for which the currency
board is maintained. In this case, the first period shock contains much information about
the second period shock, implying that a large first period shock makes the need for large
further adjustments in the second period more likely. If η is interpreted as the degree
of price stickiness (see footnote 3), a currency board is more likely to be maintained in
the case of high price flexibility, whereas a relatively large η increases the probability of
announcing its abolition.
3.5 Standard Peg
To ensure an unbiased comparison of a standard peg and a currency board, we only
consider the policy makers’ decision of the second period (see section 3.2). After observing
the shock φ2, monetary authorities decide whether to maintain or to abandon the peg. In
this section, the range of realizations of φ2 in which monetary authorities would defend
the peg is derived. Multiple equilibria for pie2 may occur in this case. However, we will
derive sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
3.5.1 Policy Decisions under a Peg
The second period loss when leaving the peg Lpf2 is given by the term
8
Lpf2 = θ
(γpie2 + k)
2
γ2 + θ
+ cpf , (3.19)
which equals the second period loss in a free float system (equation 3.10) plus the political
costs cpf . If the monetary authorities decide to maintain the peg after observing φ2, L
pp
2
equals
Lpp2 = (γ(φ2 − pie2)− k)2 + θφ22 . (3.20)
The fixed exchange rate is defended if the second period loss in case of leaving the peg
exceeds the loss in case of maintaining the peg, i.e. if
Lpf2 − Lpp2 =
(
θ
(γpie2 + k)
2
γ2 + θ
+ cpf
)
− (γ(φ2 − pie2)− k)2 − θ(φ2)2 > 0 . (3.21)
8The superscript pf denotes the situation of leaving the peg in the second period and pp stands for
the case of maintaining the peg in both periods.
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Isolating φ2 in the above equation yields the result that the exchange rate remains fixed
if and only if
Γ(pie2, k)−
√
cpf
γ2 + θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
φl2
< φ2 < Γ(pi
e
2, k) +
√
cpf
γ2 + θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
φu2
, (3.22)
where Γ(pie2, k) = γ
(γpie2 + k)
γ2 + θ
.
The peg is maintained if the shock φ2 lies in an interval of length 2
√
cpf
γ2+θ
, which is
increasing in the political costs cpf . Without political costs, this interval vanishes and
monetary authorities will always abandon the fixed exchange rate and respond optimally
to shocks. If φ2 < φ
l
2, the monetary authorities will devalue; if φ2 > φ
u
2 , they will revalue.
Using equation (3.3), the lower and upper boundary of the interval in which the peg is
defended can be expressed in terms of the new shock u2,
ul2 = −ηφ1 + Γ(pie2, k)−
√
cpf
γ2 + θ
(3.23)
uu2 = −ηφ1 + Γ(pie2, k) +
√
cpf
γ2 + θ
. (3.24)
The policy maker devalues, if the new shock u2 is below u
l
2 and revalues the currency if
u2 > u
u
2 . In the following, it is assumed that the new shock ut is uniformly distributed
with ut ∼ U [−A,A]. Note that for certain parameter values, the boundaries uu2 and ul2
may lie outside the support of u2.
It is assumed that political costs cpf are small enough to ensure that
√
cpf
γ2+θ
≤ A,
i.e. the (maximum) length of the interval in which the policy maker maintains the fixed
exchange rate is smaller than the length of the support of u2. Thus, independent of the
realization of φ1, the probability of abandoning the peg is always positive. The probability
of defending the fixed exchange rate is a measure of the credibility of the exchange rate
system. In case that the whole interval [ul2, u
u
2 ] is contained in the support [−A,A], the
probability of maintaining the peg equals 1
A
·
√
cpf
γ2+θ
, which is an upper boundary of the
credibility of the fixed exchange-rate system in all cases.
We use this upper boundary for the comparison of the credibility of a currency board
and a standard peg in section 3.6. This way, the standard peg appears in a favorable light,
and the credibility gains of a currency board can only be underestimated. Therefore,
when pointing out situations in which a currency board has a credibility advantage, we
will remain on the safe side.
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3.5.2 Unique and Multiple Equilibria
The focus of this subsection is the position of the interval in which the peg is defended.
The center of that interval depends on pie2, which is determined by rational expectations,
i.e. pie2 = E1(pi2).
The expected value of pi2 is given by
E1(pi2) = P(u2 < u
l
2)E1(pi2|u2 < ul2) + P(ul2 < u2 < uu2)E1(pi2|ul2 < u2 < uu2)
+P(u2 > u
u
2)E1(pi2|u2 > uu2) , (3.25)
which is of course a function of the expected inflation pie2.
As in Obstfeld (1996), the existence of an equilibrium is ensured, but multiple
equilibria may occur when determining pie2 from equation (3.25).
9 However, multiplicities
can be excluded for certain parameter sets (see appendix A). The condition θ > γ
2
2
, which
means that the weight on inflation θ in the policy makers’ loss function is high relative
to γ, the parameter in the Lucas supply function, is sufficient for a unique equilibrium
to exist. Moreover, if there is a solution for equation (3.25) for which [uu2 , u
l
2] ⊂ [−A,A]
(corresponding to case (iii) in the appendix A), the equilibrium is unique.
In this case
pie2 = E1(pi2|ul2 > −A ∧ uu2 < A) = Γ(pie2, k), (3.26)
implying that10
pie2 =
γk
θ
. (3.27)
The same expected inflation pie2 =
γk
θ
would result, if the interval [ul2, u
u
2 ] lay completely
outside the support of [−A,A], meaning that the peg would be abolished in any case (case
(i) and (v) in the appendix A). If the interval [ul2, u
u
2 ] lies partly in the support of u2 and
partly outside of the left boundary (case ii), it follows that pie2 >
γk
θ
, whereas pie2 <
γk
θ
if a
part of [ul2, u
u
2 ] lies outside [−A,A] on the right hand (case iv). In the latter case it is not
excluded that expected inflation pie2 is negative. However, a non-negative inherited shock
9Obstfeld (1996) discusses the possibility of multiple equilibria in the private sector’s expectations
under fixed exchange-rate regimes. In contrast to our model, the random shock occurs in the Lucas
supply curve.
10The inflation rate expected by the private sector is the same as in the free float system. This result
is a consequence of the assumption of a uniform distribution.
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ηφ1 continues to ensure that the expected inflation rate is positive. A negative pi
e
2 may
occur if φ1 is sufficiently negative, the persistence parameter η is high, the target output
k is small, and case (iv) is the relevant one. In this situation the conditional expectation
on the inflation rate given that the peg is defended may be negative (reflecting that on
average, a real depreciation is required), and due to the small k, inflation will be low if
the peg is abandoned.
If pie2 is negative, Γ(pi
e
2, k), the center of the interval of period 2’s shocks φ2 in which the
peg is defended (equation 3.22) may also be negative.11 Nevertheless, a positive Γ(pie2, k)
should be considered as the normal case.
3.6 Comparison of Peg and Currency Board
In the previous sections, we derived the ranges of the PPP -shock in which the particular
regimes are maintained. In section 3.4 (see equation 3.18), the condition to keep the
currency board was derived as
φ21 <
1
θη2
(
1
θ
k2γ2 − (γ2 + θ)σ2u + ccf
)
.
Assuming as in section 3.5, that the new shock ut is uniformly distributed on [−A,A],
the length of the interval is proportional to the probability of maintaining the currency
board and can also be interpreted as a measure of credibility. This probability is given
by12
P (maintain CB) =
1
A
√
1
θη2
(
1
θ
k2γ2 − (γ2 + θ)σ2u + ccf
)
. (3.28)
From section 3.5 (equation 3.22 and 3.27), we know that the fixed exchange rate is de-
fended in the second period, if
Γ(pie2, k)−
√
cpf
γ2 + θ
< φ2 < Γ(pi
e
2, k) +
√
cpf
γ2 + θ
,
leading to the upper boundary for the probability of defending the peg given by
P (maintain peg) ≤ 1
A
√
cpf
γ2 + θ
, (3.29)
11The case of pie2 < 0 and Γ(pi
e
2, k) < 0 occurs for example for the parameter values A = 1, η =
−0.3, φ1 = 0.9, k = 0.05, γ = 0.3, c = 0.5 and θ = 0.6.
12Of course, the probability must be an element of [0,1]. If the expression exceeds one, the probability
equals one; if the term under the square root is negative, the probability equals zero. Note that σ2u = A
2.
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where equality holds for [ul2, u
u
2 ] ⊂ [−A,A].
A comparison of the intervals in which the particular exchange rate system is main-
tained shows that the interval is symmetric around zero in the case of a currency board
but shifted by Γ(pie2, k) =
γ2pie2+γk
γ2+θ
in the case of a peg. When Γ(pie2, k) is positive, which
can be considered as the normal case,13 this shift amounts to an inflation bias under a
standard peg that does not exist in a currency board system. A standard peg will rather
be abolished in case of a negative φ2 requiring a real depreciation than in case of φ2 > 0
which leads to a positive inflation when the exchange rate remains fixed.
Moreover, the credibility of the peg hinges on the political costs cpf of abandoning it,
as without these costs, the probability of maintaining the peg shrinks to zero (equation
3.29). In contrast, the credibility of a currency board system is not exclusively based on
the political cost ccf (equation 3.28). A large target output k (or a low degree of inflation
aversion θ), reflecting a large time inconsistency problem that would lead to a high future
inflation in case of leaving the currency board system, may prevent the policy maker from
announcing its abolition even if ccf = 0. Conversely, the probability of maintaining the
currency board may be zero in spite of positive political costs ccf of abolishing it if σ2u is
large and the expression under the square root in equation (3.28) becomes negative. In
this case, the ability to offset shocks promptly is more important for the policy makers
than avoiding the inflation that results from the time inconsistency problem.
In addition, the credibility of the currency board depends negatively on η, the param-
eter representing the autocorrelation of the PPP -shocks as the decision of abolishing the
currency board is based on the expectation on the second period shock E1(φ2) = ηφ1. In
contrast, the credibility of a standard peg does not depend on η, as the decision whether
to abolish the peg is made after observing φ2 and does not depend on the degree of shock
persistence.
For further comparison of the credibility of the two exchange rate regimes, it is assumed
that the political costs are equal in both regimes14 which means that c = ccf = cpf .
A currency board system is more credible if P (maintain CB) > P (maintain peg),
13See the discussion at the end of section 3.5.2. In particular, Γ(pie2, k) is always positive if there is no
inherited shock or if φ1 is positive. The case Γ(pie2, k) < 0 may occur only if φ1 is sufficiently negative.
14Intuitively, the political costs of giving up the fixed exchange rate are higher under a currency board
than under a standard peg as assumed by Irwin 2004. Higher political costs would give the currency
board an additional credibility advantage.
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which is the case if
1
A
√
1
η2θ
(
1
θ
(γk)2 − (γ2 + θ)σ2u + c
)
>
1
A
√
c
γ2 + θ
, (3.30)
i.e., if the length of the interval of maintenance is larger in the case of a currency board
than under a fixed exchange-rate regime.15 The expression can be rewritten as
γ2k2
θ
− σ2u(γ2 + θ) + c
(
1− θη
2
γ2 + θ
)
> 0 . (3.31)
This inequality shows that a currency board is more credible than a standard peg regime
when the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy is large (as represented by a high
k or a low θ). In the case of a currency board arrangement, the monetary authorities
are tied by law to keep the fixed parity, when its abolition was not announced in the
previous period. Hence, it is not possible to create surprise inflation. Thus, the time
inconsistency problem of monetary policy is solved, which is not the case in a standard
peg system. High political costs c also increase the credibility of a currency board relative
to a standard peg, as 1− θη2
γ2+θ
> 0.
The peg regime achieves a credibility advantage vis-a-vis a currency board, when σ2u
becomes so high that the ability to react to shocks is more relevant than solving the
time inconsistency problem of monetary policy – higher shock variances lead to a higher
probability that large shocks may hit the economy, and hence it can be important to be
able to react immediately to the shock by choosing an optimal e2 (and thus pi2), instead
of having to keep a misalignment over one period.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have addressed the issue of whether a currency board arrangement is
indeed more credible than a standard peg system, and what exactly may make it more
credible. The essential feature of a currency board captured in our model is its longer-
term nature. The currency board can only be abolished if this has been announced one
period in advance – reflecting the fact that a currency board can only be abandoned
after a time-consuming political process. As a result, it is not possible to create surprise
inflation, and the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy is solved completely. In
15As discussed at the end of section 3.5.2, we use the upper boundary of P (maintain peg) for the
comparison of the two regimes. Therefore the credibility of the standard peg appears in a favorable light.
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contrast, a standard peg does not solve the time inconsistency problem, because of the
permanently existing escape clause from the fixed exchange rate. The policy maker can
abandon the peg overnight, and he is only deterred from doing so by the political costs
of exiting the exchange rate system.
The comparison of both exchange rate regimes in section 3.6 shows that the currency
board is more credible – in the sense of having a higher probability of being maintained – if
the time inconsistency problem is dominant in the economy considered. The threat of high
future inflation will prevent the policy maker from starting the process of abolishing the
currency board unless there is a large persisting misalignment. In contrast, the currency
board is more likely to be abandoned than a standard peg if shocks with a high volatility
constitute the dominant problem, i.e. if the flexibility to be able to react immediately
to future shocks is of paramount importance. In summary, its capability of solving the
time inconsistency problem makes the currency board credible, but only as long as this
advantage is not outweighed by the need for stabilization of shocks occurring with a high
volatility.
Chapter 4
Fiscal Policy and Stability of
Currency Boards
4.1 Introduction
Despite the successful reappearance of currency board regimes since the beginning of the
1990s, only few of researchers have addressed to model the differences between a currency
board regime and a standard fixed exchange-rate systems: Chang and Velasco (2000),
Oliva et al. (2001), Irwin (2004) and Feuerstein and Grimm (2006b).
All these papers have in common that the effects of fiscal policy and the role of
public debts are neglected or are captured by realizations of stochastic shocks. However,
although hardly analyzed in theoretical literature, the economic performance of currency
board countries, especially those in Europe and Hong-Kong, but also Argentina during
the period of 1991 to 1995, was good and accompanied by a sound fiscal policy and a
sustainable development of public debts. This has also been subject to many econometric
studies, like for example Ghosh et al. (2000), Fatas and Rose (2001), Sun (2003) and
Grigonyte (2003) to mention only a few of them.
In this chapter, the focus will be laid on the stability and credibility of currency board
systems by additionally taking fiscal policy into account. The central questions of our
analysis are (i) whether and under what circumstances a currency board guarantees more
fiscal discipline and a more sustainable growth of debts compared to a standard peg, and
(ii) which factors contribute to higher or less stability of a currency board system.
The chapter is structured as follows. First, related empirical literature and the few
existing theoretical papers on that topic are summarized. Second, we look at the economic
36
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performance of recent and present currency board systems by also taking fiscal aspects
into account, i.e. the budget deficit and the development of debts. Within this section,
we discuss also the main reasons for the abandonment of the Argentinean Convertibility
Plan and the default of sovereign debts. We state that, despite the breakdown of the
Argentinean Convertibility Plan, a currency board system can be a proper exchange
rate system to (re)gain credibility and stability after a financial turmoil or during a
transition process. This point of view is also supported by the theoretical results of this
chapter. Third, we develop a two-period model, which integrates fiscal policy and public
debts. Fourth, we show that optimal debt levels and the optimal amount of government
expenditure are lower under a currency board compared to a standard fixed exchange-rate
regime, when assuming at the same time that both exchange rate systems are maintained.1
Hence, we state that a currency board increases the discipline of fiscal policy. Fifth, we
examine the stability of a currency board system by using two numerical scenarios. We
define the stability of a currency board as the difference between the expected policy losses
occurring in the cases that the currency board is maintained and that it is abandoned.
Then, we examine which factors drive the stability of a currency board system and which
factors contribute to less stability. Sixth, we finish our theoretical analysis by comparing
a currency board system and a standard peg regime. In this context, we use again the
concept of the “credibility of an exchange rate system” which denotes the probability
that the current exchange rate system is maintained in the next period. We derive the
conditions under which a currency board gains a higher credibility compared to a standard
peg and vice versa. Seventh, we conclude and highlight the main results of our analysis
and give a brief outlook on further research.
4.2 Empirical and Theoretical Background
In the existing literature and in economic discussions, the effect of the introduction of a
fixed exchange-rate regime on fiscal policy is discussed differently.
On the one hand, there is a broad view that fiscal policy is the only remaining stabi-
lization instrument when large asymmetric shocks occur in a fixed exchange-rate regime.
This may suggest that fiscal policy tends to be more expansionary in times of a recession.
1Maintaining the standard fixed exchange-rate system means in this context that the exchange rate
remains pegged to its initial level and no realignment takes place, i.e. both the currency board and the
standard peg survive the first period and are not replaced in period 2.
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On the other hand, a country operating a fixed exchange-rate system aims at a gain in
credibility and stability to achieve sustainable levels of the inflation rate and, thereby, to
create a sound environment for economic growth. Unsound fiscal policy and high debts,
however, can be interpreted by the private sector as an increasing risk of leaving the
exchange rate peg in the future. As policy makers realize that a collapse of the exchange
rate would induce high economic and political costs, they have an incentive to exercise a
more restrictive fiscal policy. This argument becomes even stronger in case of a hard peg-
regime like a monetary union or a currency board, as the political costs of repealing such
a system are higher compared to a realignment under a soft peg. This is demonstrated by
Fatas and Rose (2001) and it is also an essential assumption in the theoretical analysis
of currency board arrangements by Irwin (2004).
In the following, we give an overview of the theoretical models and empirical findings,
analyzing the impact of a fixed exchange-rate regime – and especially for the case of a
currency board arrangement – on fiscal policy. We begin with the work of Tornell and
Velasco (1995a, 1995b, 1995c and 1998). In the theoretical parts of their models the
effect of a fixed exchange-rate regime on fiscal policy is not uniquely determined, which
is against conventional wisdom. They distinguish in their model between two systems:
(i) money-based stabilization, where the central bank sets the money growth rate to some
constant and the exchange rate is obtained endogenously, and
(ii) exchange-rate stabilization, where the nominal devaluation rate is treated as a constant
(and could also be set equal to zero e.g. for the currency board case) and the money supply
is determined endogenously.
They show that fiscal discipline is in both systems influenced by the fiscal authority’s
intertemporal discount factor and by the level of the interest rate. Their main findings
are that money-based programs induce more fiscal discipline if the fiscal policy makers
are impatient, i.e. if the policy maker puts a greater weight on present utility than on
future utility. In contrast, exchange-rate based programs lead to a higher discipline of
fiscal policy, if the fiscal authorities are patient.
The intuition behind is that the choice of each system can be considered as a certain
rule to distribute the burden of the inflation tax intertemporally. Operating under a peg
system, the real exchange rate is determined by the central bank. Thus, fiscal authorities
can execute higher expenditures financed by an increasing level of debt or a reduction
of foreign reserves in the short-run. Resulting from the fact that indicators like e.g.
foreign reserves are not transparent enough under a fixed exchange-rate system to reveal
significant fiscal imbalances, especially for the case of transition and developing countries,
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the punishment of an unsound fiscal policy may be delayed to some future point in time
where the situation becomes “more unsustainable” and the peg collapses. In contrast,
under a flexible exchange rate system an unsound fiscal imbalance is recognized by the
private sector in the short run, which leads to an expectation of higher future money
growth and thus to an immediate rise in the inflation rate.
These results are confirmed empirically by several studies of Tornell and Velasco
(1995a, 1995b, 1995c and 1998). However, the authors do not distinguish between soft and
hard fixed-exchange rate regimes and focus on Sub-Saharan countries during the 1980s
and Latin American Countries from 1960 to 1994, a time horizon where currency board
systems played no major role in the geographical regions.2
In a similar examination, Hamann (2001) compares exchange-rate based stabilization
programs to the broader class of other stabilization programs. The data used comprises
143 countries over the years 1960-1997 and includes stabilization via the adoption of a
hard peg in Ecuador (dollarization) and Argentina (currency board). The author draws a
conclusion which is in line with the results of Tornell et al.: The key argument in favor
of an exchange-rate based stabilization, to gain fiscal discipline by reducing the inflation
bias, is not confirmed in the data. However, Hamann does not distinguish between
currency boards and other fixed exchange-rate systems.
In contrast, in their empirical analysis on this topic Fatas and Rose (2001) split up
countries with fixed exchange-rate regimes classified as hard pegs into countries belonging
to a currency area, dollarized countries and countries operating a currency board. They
show that belonging to a currency area – as for example to the European Monetary Union
– or dollarization are not automatically accompanied by a greater fiscal discipline. For a
monetary union, the results depend on the number of participating countries. Though,
they find that currency board countries are associated with a more restrained fiscal policy
compared to the rest of the countries considered in their sample, also relative to countries
operating under other fixed exchange-rate regimes. Furthermore, they show that the bud-
get in currency board countries is shifted to components providing more social insurance
like transfers, subsidies and social security taxes, which contribute to a sound domestic
environment, too.
A further examination of the linkage between exchange rate regimes and fiscal re-
2In the Latin America sample only the very early years of the Argentinean currency board arrangement
are observed (1991-1994). As the time series of that sample starts from 1960, the currency board effect
may be negligible when considering the performance of Argentina relative to other countries.
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straints is done by Alberola andMolina (2002). In a theoretical model which analyzes
the financing of government expenditure, the authors consider two instruments, namely
monetary and fiscal seigniorage. Monetary seigniorage is defined as the process of money
creation and fiscal seigniorage as the increase in public debt holding by the central bank.
Based on an estimation using a broad IMF data set, it is shown that monetary seigniorage
has no significant influence on the fiscal deficit, whereas fiscal seigniorage by its nature
has. As sketched in their model, a standard fixed exchange-rate regime does not increase
fiscal discipline as there is no prevention from creating fiscal seigniorage. However, under
a currency board system claims of the government disappear (or are reduced significantly)
from the balance sheet due to the strict features of the currency board, which are fixed by
law (see chapter 2). Therefore, fiscal seigniorage is strongly decreased under a currency
board arrangement or even completely impossible in an orthodox system.3 They come
to the conclusion that a currency board arrangement creates fiscal discipline and cement
their results by an empirical investigation.
Grigonyte´ (2003) analyzes the impact of currency boards on fiscal discipline in
ten central and eastern European countries. By estimating cross country regressions the
author exhibits that the three currency board countries Estonia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria
show a certain degree of fiscal discipline. The econometric studies suggest that a currency
board arrangement decreases government expenditure and improves the public balance.
The result can also easily be seen from the raw data, where the three countries show a
level of debt relative to GDP clearly below the average level of the rest of the countries
belonging to the European Union. Furthermore, Estonia and Lithuania attained fiscal
surpluses in the recent years and were also far above the average of the sample. We will
come back to this point again in the next section.
3The notion “orthodox currency board” describes a very strict interpretation of a currency board
system, where the policy makers have no opportunity to make use of monetary policy instruments. This
interpretation is mainly used for the theoretical analysis of currency board systems and was introduced
in chapter 2.
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4.3 Experience from Recent and Present Currency
Board Systems
Before attending to the theoretical analysis of a currency board arrangement, it is useful to
ask how the currency board countries have fared so far. Therefore, we give a brief survey
of present and recent currency board systems. We discuss the motivation of operating
under a currency board and lay our focus, again, on the development of the fiscal deficit
and the debt level of the single countries by also taking the development of further key
indicators as inflation and economic growth into account. The background and some
features of the particular systems are summarized in table 4.1, to which we will also refer
in the following.4
4.3.1 Baltic Experience: Estonia and Lithuania
We begin our survey with the experience in the two Baltic currency board countries,
namely Estonia and Lithuania. Both countries decided to introduce a currency board
system early after the breakdown of the Soviet Union to escape from the instabilities that
emerged within the ruble area. At first, Estonia established a currency board system in
1992 and was followed by Lithuania two years after. The success of both systems has been
noteworthy: Inflation was stabilized quickly and came down from three digit levels at the
beginning of political independence to a one digit level within a short period of time. Low
inflation rates have been maintained without severe fluctuations since 1997. Over the last
ten years, inflation rates have on average been clearly below the level of CPI inflation
achieved by almost all other central and eastern European transition countries. The
superior performance is also empirically confirmed by Gulde et al. (2000). The success
of the systems in Estonia and Lithuania has also been shown in the proceedings on the
road to the European Monetary Union. Both countries show stable economic growth and
an outstanding development of the budget deficits and total government debts: Estonia
is actually the top performer of all EU member-states by attaining a budget surplus over
the last five years and showing the smallest total government debt relative to GDP of
4.9%. Lithuania also belongs to the top-performing countries with having realized small
budget deficits over the recent years and showing a debt ratio to GDP of around 20%.
4A broad survey of modern currency board systems can be found in Stukkenbrock (2004).
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Therefore, both countries seem to be prepared to an early adoption of the Euro.5
4.3.2 Bulgarian Currency Board
To regain credibility and to overcome the twin crisis – a combination of a debt and banking
crisis – Bulgaria introduced a currency board in 1997 (Berlemann and Nenovsky,
2004). Immediately after the introduction, inflation was pinned down from hyperinflation
to a stable level and reached a one digit rate within the first year. Bulgaria returned
to solid growth rates with exception of the year 1999, when the Kosovo crisis put some
pressure on the Bulgarian economy. On the way to the accession to the EU on 1 January
2007, Bulgaria showed a high degree of fiscal discipline with a fiscal surplus of currently
2.3% of GDP and a total debt level around the average level of the Central and Eastern
European transition countries of about 30% of GDP. In this context it should be mentioned
that that the fiscal surplus was favorably affected by earnings resulting from privatization,
but this should not detract from the success of the currency board arrangement.
4.3.3 Bosnian Currency Board
The Dayton Peace Agreement enforced the creation of a currency board system in Bosnia
in 1997 with the ulterior motive to gain credibility of monetary policy in a fragile economic
and political environment and simultaneously not giving too much independence to local
authorities (Ho, 2002). The fiscal deficit of Bosnia was steadily improving in the recent
years and reached a surplus in the years 2003 and 2004. Total government debt was also
reduced continuously to a sound level of 29.1% in 2005. Fiscal policy was accompanied
by solid economic growth and low inflation rates during the last five years.6
5Originally, Estonia desired to introduce the Euro in 2007. However, as the projected inflation rate
was slightly above the required reference value according to the Maastricht Convergence Criteria, the
government delayed its strategy of the changeover to the Euro (Bank of Estonia, 2006). On May 16th
2006, the European Commission and the European Central Bank evaluated Lithuania for the state of
convergence. Both institutions suggested to reject Lithuania’s plan to adopt the Euro at the beginning
of 2007 as the inflation criterion was slightly missed and is expected to be missed in the near future, too
(European Central Bank, 2006; European Commission, 2006). This interpretation of the inflation
criterion is judged critically among many economists. For a detailed discussion see for example Buiter
and Sibert (2006) and Feuerstein and Grimm (2006a).
6The statistical data can be found on the webpage of the Bank of Bosnia:
http://cbbh.ba/en/statistics.html, 8 November 2006.
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4.3.4 Hong-Kong Currency Board
The motivation of the introduction of the Hong-Kong currency board was also to restore
confidence: The reason for the precipitating of the meltdown of the flexible exchange rate
regime at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s was the confidence crisis,
which was accruing from uncertainties surrounding Hong Kong’s political transition. After
several years of relatively high inflation rates of above 10%, Hong-Kong established its
currency board in 1983 (Chiu, 2001). Although having been attacked several times by
speculators, the exchange rate peg has never been changed and the currency board is
still operating. The key economic indicators were stabilizing in 2005 characterized by low
inflation rates (after a period of deflation), a solid growth rate of GDP, and a balanced
fiscal budget in 2004 after two periods of fiscal deficits with a peak of around 4.8% of GDP.
However, Hong-Kong shows an accumulated fiscal surplus of higher than 20% of GDP and
thus fiscal discipline plays no major role at the time (International Monetary Fund,
2006).
4.3.5 Argentinean Currency Board
Notwithstanding the well-performing and the findings of sound fiscal policies in the coun-
tries considered so far, the failure of the Argentinean Convertibility Plan in 2002 has
brought some scepticism concerning the actual benefits of hard peg regimes. In this con-
text, De la Torre et al. (2005, p.184) claim that “the advantages of hard pegs have
been greatly overstated”. According to their opinion, the currency board did not provide
nominal stability and did also not foster fiscal or monetary discipline. Therefore, we con-
sider thoroughly what went wrong in Argentina after a brief summary of the first years
under the Convertibility Plan.7
Out of similar reasons as in Bulgaria, after the failure of several stability programs
the Argentinean government decided to adopt a currency board system to combat hyper-
inflation and to regain credibility of monetary policy. The decision seemed to be a great
success during the period of 1991-1998: The macroeconomic environment was improved
impressively and economic growth returned. Even the Tequila Crisis of Mexico in 1994
had no major impact on the Argentinean economy. However, fiscal policy being on a solid
path at the beginning – also favorably influenced by revenues from privatizations – the
situation became worse from 1994 on. The budget deficit deteriorated caused by a change
7For a detailed discussion see Mussa (2002).
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in the social security system which led to an unexpected amount of additional expenditure
and by an increase of debts in the provinces, which occupied a high degree of autonomy in
their decision-making and budget planning. Furthermore, already in the first years of the
currency board a financial dollarization persisted and even increased during that time.
This has been “a key factor behind the ambivalence of investor confidence in the currency
board” (De la Torre et al., 2005, p.196). The behavior of investors, of course, was also
influenced by the omnipresent history of economic fragility in Argentina.
The bad times in Argentina began after 1998, when it slipped into a great recession
accompanied by high unemployment levels, which were triggered by a sudden stop of
foreign direct investments. The situation became worse, when the competitiveness of
Argentina came under great pressure after Brazil’s currency fell sharply over 50% towards
the US-$ in 1999. At the same time the peso appreciated together with its anchor currency,
the US-$, against the Euro, which contributed to a further loss of competitiveness resulting
in a drastic jump up of the current account deficit. As the biggest trading partner of
Argentina were Brazil and southern European countries, one has to criticize the choice
of the US-$ as an anchor currency. This argument is strengthened by the fact that
Argentina’s economy is relatively closed. It, therefore, was far from meeting the conditions
of an optimal currency area with the United States (Feldstein, 2002).
Due to the large fraction of net foreign debts, denominated primarily in US-$, an
exit of the currency board with the intention to devalue did not seem to be an option
of escape, as the real value of outstanding debt was supposed to rise consequently to
an unsustainable amount. We take up this point in the theoretical part of this chapter.
Argentina’s situation became unfavourable and is circumscribed by the notion of the
currency-growth-debt trap in De La Torre et al. (2005, p.196): “The currency was
overvalued, growth was faltering, and the debt was hard to service”. To maintain the
fixed exchange rate, it was necessary to pursue a restrictive fiscal policy which aggravated
the recession and reduced economic growth and led simultaneously to a painful deflation
because of the existence of great labor market frictions (Aschinger, 2002). To regain
competitiveness, a real devaluation, which is under a pegged exchange rate only attainable
by falling prices, was necessary. This, however, was hardly possible, on the one hand,
because of significant labor market inflexibilities as aforementioned, and, on the other
hand, because of the necessary size of devaluation: Calvo et al. (2004) show in their
examination that Argentina would have needed to depreciate its real exchange rate by 46
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percent in order to reach a balanced current account.8 However, a real depreciation was
also not a possible strategy as it would have triggered an increase of the burden of real
debts, also when assuming at the same time that the real interest rate would not change
remarkably.
Consequently, the bad economic conditions led finally to an abandonment of the cur-
rency board system and the largest default in history at the beginning of 2002, despite
the support packages granted by the IMF at the beginning of the crisis and the establish-
ment of the corralito, which was an attempt to limit capital outflows by freezing domestic
deposits.
The Argentinean crisis is widely discussed in literature. We refer only to a few of them
in this survey. The role of the currency board is thereby judged in quite different ways. De
la Torre et al. (2005) and Feldstein (2002) are sceptical about the benefits resulting
from a hard peg regime. In contrast, Berlemann and Nenovsky (2004) conclude that
in Bulgaria and Argentina the introduction of a currency board arrangement proved to be
a successful strategy to overcome a deep financial crisis and to restore financial stability,
but several mistakes in Argentina brought back economic instabilities.
We argue that a currency board system can contribute to macroeconomic stabilization.
What went wrong in Argentina was a mixture of “political malpractice” and “bad luck”.
The relatively closed economy and the big trading partners being from Latin America
and Europe suggest that the choice of the US-$ as an anchor currency was a mistake and
contradicted the idea of participating in an optimal currency area. So, it seemed to be
obvious that sooner or later strong asymmetric business cycles and economic shocks are
likely to appear. And, indeed, by the real appreciation to the most important trading
partners the Argentinean economy was driven into a recession. In addition, fiscal policy
seemed to be on a solid path at the beginning. However, delayed and dubious economic
reforms together with the occurence of corruption, the excessive debts caused by the
independent provinces, and the existence of labor market inflexibilities put additional
pressure on the Argentinean economy. We, therefore, state that the Argentinean case in
fact has shown that a currency board system is not a guarantee of long-term stability
per se, but the features of the Convertibility Law, which is the common denomination of
the Argentinean currency board system, were in several points not compatible with the
8The great size of the depreciation stems from the fact that Argentina is a relatively closed economy
as aforementioned, meaning that only a sharp decrease in relative prices to the main trading partners
will generate enough gains in net exports to balance the current account.
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economic environment.
4.3.6 Summary
To summarize, the findings in this survey about modern currency board systems supports
the hypothesis that the introduction of a currency board leads to more fiscal discipline
and to a sustainable debt growth. The case of Argentina seems to be an exemption.
Therefore, we draw the conclusion that a currency board may be a useful instrument to
(re)gain macroeconomic stability after a crisis or during a transition period. However,
the repealing of the Convertibility Plan in Argentina in 2002 and the resulting default
have shown that the features of the currency board system have to be implemented in a
compatible way with the specific structure of the economy. Of course, an exit strategy to
adopt the Euro like in Estonia, Lithuania and in the medium term probably in Bulgaria
and Bosnia would have helped to gain credibility. But, the development in Hong-Kong
has been favorable over a period of almost 23 years.
In the remainder of this chapter, we analyze how the introduction of a currency board
arrangement affects the choice of government expenditure and the optimal amount of
debt by using a theoretical model. Thereby, we examine the question whether a currency
board can in fact increase fiscal discipline. Furthermore, we show which basic condi-
tions guarantee high stability under a currency board and what circumstances lead to
an abandonment of the system. We conclude our theoretical work by a comparison of a
currency board and a standard fixed exchange-rate regime. Within the following sections,
we frequently refer to the empirical findings which were elaborated and summarized here.
4.4 Model
In this section, we first enhance the model of chapter 3, and derive the basic model
equations and the policy makers’ target function. Thereby, we also show the trade-offs
faced by the monetary and fiscal authorities. Second, we explain the sequence of the
decision-making under a currency board system and a standard peg regime.
4.4.1 Model Equations
We consider a small open economy with a credibility problem caused by macroeconomic
instabilities like e.g. a currency or debt crisis or by a lack of experience in policy-making
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during a transition period. The economy comprises the monetary authority, a government
which decides upon fiscal policy, and the private sector. The monetary authority does
not necessarily make its decisions independently, but may be influenced or overridden by
the national government (Tornell and Velasco, 1998).
The output gap in period t is given by a modified Lucas-supply function of the form9
yt = γ(pit − piet ) + wgt γ, w > 0 . (4.1)
The expression γ(pit − piet ) is a measure for the effect of surprise inflation on output:
Workers demand nominal wages that are sufficiently high to cover expected average future
price increases. As unexpectedly high inflation leads ex post to lower real wages, it
increases employment and, thereby, output.
Additionally, output is driven by the fiscal policy variable, gt, which equals total
government expenditure minus tax revenues and is, therefore, very close to the definition
of the fiscal deficit. For simplification, we will use the term “government expenditure”
to describe gt henceforth. The term wgt reflects the impact of fiscal policy on output.
We assume that government expenditure comprises, on the one hand, supply-side policy
(e.g. produced output of state-owned companies or granting of subsidies), which enters
the modified Lucas-supply function and, on the other hand, demand of goods from public
authorities. We discuss this point more detailed, when introducing the inflation equation
later in the section.10
Note that exactly speaking yt denotes the deviation of output from its natural level
(i.e. output gap), as log natural output is normalized to zero. For reasons of clarity, we
refer to yt by using the notion “output”, henceforth.
The (real) stock of debts in period t is denoted by bt and is given by
bt =
(1 + r)(1 + qet)
(1 + pit)
bt−1 + gt . (4.2)
This means that the outstanding stock of debts bt−1 and the corresponding real interest
payments, which are represented by the fraction (1 + r)(1 + qe2)/(1 + pit), plus the gov-
ernment spending deficit gt have to be financed by the end of period stock of real debts
9Note that analogously to the previous chapter, we use a log-linearized model where the logarithmic
natural output level equals zero.
10The assumption that fiscal policy can affect both the demand and the supply side is primarily used
for mathematical purpose to avoid corner solutions. In our analysis, we focus on a demand-side oriented
fiscal policy, as this seems to be the case which accords best with reality for developing and transition
countries. Therefore, w should be of small size. From a theoretical aspect, however, the two possible
directions of fiscal policy leave room for more flexibility for the application of our basic model.
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bt. The nominal interest rate r is taken as constant as we consider a small open economy
with perfect capital mobility; q is the fraction of foreign debts on total debt, which is
taken exogenously, and et denotes the percentage change of the nominal exchange-rate in
price notation.
In the following, we define b˜t−1 as the outstanding level of debt plus interest rate
payments, i.e. b˜t−1 := (1 + r)bt−1. Then, we can rewrite equation (4.2) as
bt =
(1 + qet)
(1 + pit)
b˜t−1 + gt . (4.3)
Multiplying the first summand by 1 = (1− pit)/(1− pit) yields
bt =
(1 + qet)(1− pit)
1− pi2t
b˜t−1 + gt . (4.4)
Furthermore, as pit is assumed to be a small number close to zero, we use the approximation
pi2t ≈ 0 and obtain
bt = (1− pit + qet − qpitet)b˜t−1 + gt . (4.5)
As qpitet is approximately zero (again following the same idea as above), we finally obtain
the resource constraint for the government, which is given by
bt = (1 + qet − pit)b˜t−1 + gt . (4.6)
The resource constraint used here is similar to that in Sachs, Tornell and Velasco
(1996) and Aloy, Moreno and Nancy (2003).11 Now, it is obvious that a devaluation,
i.e. an increasing et, increases (foreign) debts directly. In contrast, a higher inflation rate
pit leads to a decrease of the overall debt level. Government expenditure gt and the stocks
of debts bt and bt−1 are measured as shares of GDP. This seems to be most in line with
the definition of the natural output, which was normalized to one (log natural output was
normalized to zero, respectively).
To motivate the inflation equation used in our later analysis, it is necessary to look
more precisely on the idea of its derivation. It is assumed that in the considered economy
there exist tradeable and non-tradeable goods.12 Hence, inflation in period t is given
11Sachs et al. also include a seigniorage term µ(pit − piet,t−1), which is neglected in our analysis.
12The degree of openness of an economy in this model is considered as the fraction of tradeable goods
relative to all produced goods of this economy (and is thus mainly represented by κ and β, two parameters
we will introduce on the next page). Note that this definition is not typical. Usually openness is defined
as export volume relative to GDP or as the sum of exports and imports with respect to GDP. We already
mentioned the importance of openness in chapter 2, and in this chapter when discussing the breakdown
of the Argentinean currency board system in section 4.3.
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by the weighted sum of inflation in the tradeable good sector, piTt , and inflation in the
non-tradeable good sector, piNt . We can formulate the following equation:
pit = ξpi
N
t + (1− ξ)piTt , 0 ≤ ξ ≤ 1 , (4.7)
where ξ denotes the weight of non-tradeable goods relative to all consumption goods. We
assume that in the tradeable good sector firms act under perfect competition, so that the
stochastic purchasing power parity holds. Then, inflation in the tradeable goods sector
equals
piTt = pi
∗
t + et + εt , (4.8)
where pi∗t denotes foreign inflation, et the change of the exchange rate in period t, and εt
is a random PPP-shock. We assume that the considered economy pegs its exchange rate
to a stable anchor currency like for example the US-$, EUR or JPY to (re)gain credibility
of its domestic currency. Hence, it is no major restriction to assume that the foreign
inflation rate pi∗ is relatively low and can, thus, in the further analysis be considered as
being approximately zero.
In the non-tradeable sector, a certain degree of price-inflexibility caused for example
by price regulations in the good market sector and labor market frictions is supposed to
occur. Inflation for non-tradeable goods is given by
piNt = pit + ιgt , (4.9)
where pit reflects the part of inflation which depends on the asymmetric shock εt, on
exchange rate movements,13 on wage-setting behavior of firms in the non-tradeable good
sector and on the degree of price stickiness (which is closely linked to the wage-setting
behavior).14 The last term of (4.9) represents the effect of government expenditure used
for demand of goods to create surprise inflation, where ι > 0 is a weight factor. We assume
13We assume that a move of the nominal exchange rate changes the price of some input goods, which
lead also to a certain adjustment of output prices in the non-tradeable good sector. However, the existence
of price rigidities hampers a complete adjustment of prices and some inflation inertia – i.e. the need for
further adjustment in the following periods – remains.
14We forbear from a formal exposition of pit as a function of all the enumerated effects to keep the
number of parameters and variables tractable. Note, that in this context the wage-setting argument
is used for a more tangible motivation of some parameters, although the labor market is not explicitly
introduced into the model.
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to have a complete home-bias in government expenditure which means that public demand
comprises only home-produced goods.
To summarize, fiscal policy works in two directions: A fraction of government expendi-
ture is used to raise supply of goods, as mentioned when explaining equation (4.1) and the
rest is used for demand of goods aiming on pushing output above its natural level by cre-
ating unanticipated inflation. The latter case is the reason for having a time-inconsistency
problem of fiscal policy and monetary policy at the same time.
Referring to equation (4.7) and the idea briefly sketched above, overall inflation in
period t can be formulated as
pit = κet + βgt + φt , 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 and β > 0 . (4.10)
The exact size of the parameters κ and β depends mainly on the extent of wage and price
rigidities which are included in pit. If markets were completely flexible, κ would be equal
to one and β equal to zero, i.e. the stochastic purchasing power parity would hold for
both the tradeable and the non-tradeable good sector.15
Finally, φt is a random shock, which describes the current effect of the PPP-shock εt
on overall inflation pit. Analogously to the previous chapter, we assume that φt follows an
AR(1)-process:16
φt = ηφt−1 + ut , η ∈ (0, 1) , (4.11)
where the shock innovations ut are identically, independently distributed with zero mean
and σ2u > 0 for all t. We, additionally, assume in the sections 4.5 and 4.6.1 that there is
no inherited shock from the first period, i.e. φ1 = u1. We depart from this assumption in
subsection 4.6.2 to establish a fair comparison of a currency board and a peg and allow
for some shock persistence from period zero.
To motivate the inflation equation from the viewpoint of empirical evidence, we refer
to Cata˜o and Terrones (2003): They have shown by using a sample of 107 countries
15In principal, β < 0 would also be possible if fiscal policy is mainly characterized by granting pro-
duction subsidies. As this seems to be highly implausible for developing countries and emerging market
economies, on which we focus here, we strictly exclude β < 0.
16As explained already in chapter 3, φt represents an asymmetric shock that changes the equilibrium
real exchange rate, which reflects e.g. asymmetric business-cycle movements, demand-side effects and
exchange rate movements between the anchor currency and the currencies of third countries. φt > 0
corresponds to the necessity of a real appreciation and φt < 0 corresponds to the necessity of a real
depreciation, respectively.
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over the period from 1960 until 2001 that there is a strong positive association of fiscal
deficit and inflation.17 This result can be used as a further justification of the form of
our inflation equation and especially for the influence of government expenditure gt on
inflation. Remember in this context that, by definition, gt is closely linked to the fiscal
deficit.
The policy makers’ objective is to minimize a quadratic loss function which depends
on present and future expected inflation, and output as well as on outstanding debt at
the end of the world T . The intertemporal loss function is given by
Λt =
T∑
s=t
ρs−tEt [Ls(pis, ys)] +
1
2
ρT−tθbEt [bT ]
2 + ρT−tδci (4.12)
=
T∑
s=t
1
2
ρs−tEt
[
(θpipi
2
s + (ys − k)2)
]
+
1
2
ρT−tθbEt [bT ]
2 + ρT−tδci,
where ρ is the government’s intertemporal discount factor, E(bT )
2 is the expected loss
resulting from outstanding real debt in the final period T and θb > 0 is the policy makers’
relative weight on these debts.18 Analogously, θpi is the policy makers’ relative weight
of the inflation target. Political costs ci arise, whenever a policy maker under a fixed
exchange-rate system, i.e. for our case under a standard peg or a currency board, decides
to realign its exchange rate peg or central rate, respectively. δ is a dummy variable,
which equals one when leaving the peg or the currency board and equals zero otherwise.
The superscript i of political costs denotes the type of the exchange-rate system to be
withdrawn, i.e. a standard peg system or a currency board arrangement. The policy maker
wants to push output above its natural level, which is characterized by the parameter k.
Therefore, the parameter k together with the weight of the inflation target θpi, can be
considered as the main factors which determine the time inconsistency problem of the
policy makers, like in chapter 3.
17The sample used in Cata˜o and Terrones (2003) comprises advanced countries, emerging-market
countries and other developing countries. They find that “fiscal deficits have been shown to matter not
only during high hyperinflations but also under moderate inflation ranges [...]”. Furthermore, the positive
correlation between the fiscal deficit and inflation appeared significantly in all groups of countries and
“surprisingly strong over a broad range of developing countries [...] ”, (p.26). These are exactly the
countries in the center of our analysis.
18By applying the debt term in the loss function, we guarantee that debt accumulation is not for free:
This means that we avoid costless accumulation of debt, i.e. this assumption guarantees that the policy
maker abstains from creating an unlimited amount of debts.
CHAPTER 4. FISCAL POLICY AND STABILITY OF CURRENCY BOARDS 53
Figure 4.1: Debt-, Inflation- and Output Target
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We restrict our further examination to a time-horizon of two periods, by focussing
on the policy makers’ decisions for the second period. Therefore, we rewrite (4.12) and
consider the second-period loss under the assumption that the “world will end after that
period”. Then, L2 is given by
19
L2 =
1
2
[
(y2 − k)2 + θpipi22 + θbb22
]
+ δci . (4.13)
To summarize, the government dislikes inflation and debts, however, it prefers more output
to less, even beyond the natural output level (depending on k). The structure of the model
implies that several trade-offs may occur, which are illustrated by the Trade-off Triangle
in figure 4.1 and explained in the following.
A) Inflation-output Trade-off: On the one hand, the policy maker has an incentive to
push output above its natural level by creating surprise inflation, on the other hand,
inflation itself contributes directly to the policy loss.
B) Output-debt Trade-off: Fiscal policy has an incentive to push output to the desired
level via its policy instrument g2, at the same time fiscal policy (or to be more
precisely the fiscal deficit) has to be financed by an increasing debt which accounts
by itself for a policy loss.
C) Debt-inflation Trade-off: On the one hand, the policy maker has an incentive to
lower its real debt level by a rise of the inflation rate, on the other hand, inflation
itself contributes directly to the policy loss.
19Note that the intertemporal exposition of the loss function is needed to motivate the second-period
debt term θbb22 in the loss function.
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Summary of the Main Model Equations
To keep track of the main equations of the model to which we refer in the following
sections, we illustrate them here again in the two-period notation:
• Policy Makers’ Target Function:
L2 =
1
2
[
(y2 − k)2 + θpipi22 + θbb22
]
+ δci . (4.13)
• Output Equation:
y2 = γ(pi2 − pie2) + wg2 (4.1)
• Debt Equation:20
b2 = (1 + qe2 − pi2)b1 + g2 (4.6)
• Inflation Equation:
pi2 = κe2 + βg2 + φ2 (4.10)
4.4.2 Timing of Political Decision-Making
The currency board system is characterized as in chapter 3. A key feature of the currency
board is its establishment by law. Enoch and Gulde (1998) consider a sound legal
basis as an essential issue when introducing a currency board, “because a currency board
arrangement derives much of its credibility from the changes required in the central bank
law concerning exchange rate adjustments”, (p.42). The legal anchor of the currency
board arrangement gives reason that an abandonment of the system is not possible over
night.21 As a currency board is established by law, we state that it can only be repealed,
if this was announced one period in advance, i.e. before the private sector made its expec-
tations on inflation. The sequence of decision-making of the private sector and the fiscal
and monetary authority is depicted in figure 4.2.22 In our model, the decision whether to
20To be correct, b1 denotes the inherited debt level which also includes nominal interest rate payments,
and it should, thus, be denoted by b˜1 to be consistent with the definition above. In a two period-setting,
in which “the world ends” after period 2, we can drop the tilde for simplicity; but, the reader should note
that, henceforth, b1 comprises the inherited debt level including nominal interest rates.
21For a reference to the legal base of currency boards in practice see table 4.1 again.
22As we, typically, consider countries with a credibility and stability problem, the central bank may
not be acting independently as aforementioned. Therefore, we assume that the central bank and the
government act simultaneously and can be considered as a “single authority”. We further assume, that
strategic behavior of fiscal and monetary authorities does not matter here.
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Figure 4.2: Sequence of the Model
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repeal the currency board in a certain period or not is announced one period in advance
– here in the picture at time ♦ before the private sector forms second period expectations
pie2,1.
In the case of a standard peg, the fixed exchange rate can be abandoned after observing
the shock which would actually be possible in each period and is labeled in figure 4.2 by
4. As we, analogously to chapter 3, presume that a standard peg has some commitment
value, too, we assume that the policy maker will leave the peg earliest after the realization
of φ2. This means that a standard peg system survives at least in the first period after its
introduction.23 The private sector has rational expectations about inflation pie2,1, which
are formed before the future shock φ2 is observed. For a better understanding of the
sequence, we use the notation pie2,1 in figure 4.2 for the private’s expected inflation of the
second period, which was created in the first period. For reasons of brevity. we use in the
calculations only the first indicator, which means pie2,1 is rewritten as pi
e
2.
If the exchange rate is fixed, the monetary authority has to abstain from an active
policy and surprise inflation can only be created by a rise in government expenditure gt.
If the exchange rate is flexible, inflation can be influenced by a change of the nominal
exchange rate and by fiscal policy.24
23We do not model the optimal regime choice. In this model, we compare the losses occurring under a
standard peg regime and a currency board system. Both systems are introduced in period 0.
24Note that in figure 4.2 the arguments in the brackets, gt and et, are the policy variables of the fiscal
and monetary authorities through which the targets pit, yt and bt are determined.
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4.5 Government Debts and Fiscal Discipline
4.5.1 Comparison of a Currency Board and a Standard Peg
Regime
Subject of this section is to find out whether a standard fixed-exchange rate regime or a
currency board system induces higher fiscal discipline and a more conservative amount of
debts. Hence, we do not focus on the decision of maintaining or abandoning both types
of fixed exchange-rate regimes. In fact, we aim at a comparison of the fiscal policy
and the choice of the debt level under a currency board and a standard peg
while both systems are maintained.
To be more precisely: The idea is to elaborate a theoretical explanation for the find-
ings of the empirical literature demonstrated in chapter 4.3, which says that currency
board systems increase fiscal discipline. Therefore, we compare losses occurring under
both exchange-rate regimes from an interim perspective.25 This means that we make the
assumption that the fixed exchange rate is maintained in the second period under both
regimes (a standard peg and a currency board), but their survival was not obvious ex ante
and, therefore, the private sector may have a positive devaluation expectation under a
peg.
The optimization problem under both systems follows the same pattern. The systems
differ only from the expected inflation rate of the private sector due to the different timing
of political decision-making. We refer to this point again at the end of this subsection.
As the monetary authorities abstain from a devaluation, the resource constraint is
simply given by
b2 = b1 − b1pi2 + g2 . (4.14)
Note that we have no longer to distinguish between domestic and foreign debts, because
exchange rate movements are excluded here: Neither a revaluation, which would reduce
the net value of real foreign debts, nor a devaluation, which would increase the real foreign
debt level, will take place. The policy maker optimizes the second period loss function
L2 =
1
2
(y2 − k)2 + 1
2
θpipi
2
2 +
1
2
θbb
2
2
25Note that it makes no sense to compare fiscal policy outcomes of both fixed exchange-rate regimes,
if one or both systems have already been repealed. This problem belongs to another interesting aspect,
i.e. the stability of both systems, and is analyzed in section 4.6.1.
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with respect to the debt restriction (4.6), the output equation (4.1) and the inflation
equation (4.10). The first-order conditions of the problem are given by
(y2 − k) + λ1 = 0 (4.15)
θpipi2 − γλ1 + λ2 + λ3b1 = 0 (4.16)
θbb2 + λ3 = 0 (4.17)
wλ1 + βλ2 + λ3 = 0 , (4.18)
and by the three restrictions (4.1), (4.6) and (4.10). The optimization problem is solved
in appendix B.1, where we determine the optimal values for b2, pi2, y2, and g2 analytically.
For a better exposition, we define A := w+γβ and B := (1−βb1) in appendix B.1. Due
to the domain of the parameters, it is obvious that A is strictly positive. B is also assumed
to be positive, as for developing countries and transition economies total government debt
ratios, b1, lie typically between 20% and 60% of GDP and as the parameter β is supposed
to be sufficiently small. Note in this context that the Argentinean default on sovereign
debts in 2002 happened to be at a level of public debts of around 60% of GDP. Applying
the abbreviations A and B, we obtain the optimal debt value
b∗2 =
(k + γpie2 + wb1)AB
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
− (φ− βb1)(θpiβ + A(γ + wb1))
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
. (4.19)
We also obtain the optimal values for pi2, y2 and g2 given by
pi∗2 =
βA(k + γpie2) + φ2(θbB + wA)− θbβBb1
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
. (4.20)
The optimal rate of inflation depends positively on the second period shock, φ2, and
it is pushed by the desired output level k above its natural level. On the contrary, a
higher weight of the debts in the loss function, θb, may reduce inflation: In the considered
case, the central bank cannot create inflation to reduce (the domestic part) of the real
public debts, because the exchange rate is fixed. Therefore, a reduction of government
expenditure, which actually lowers inflation, remains the only way how fiscal policy can
reduce debts. A higher weight of inflation in the loss function, θpi, makes inflation more
costly and, hence, contributes to lower inflation.
Optimal output amounts to
y∗2 =
kA2 − θbb1AB − γpie2(θbB2 + θpiβ2) + φ2(θbB(γ + wb1)− θpiwβ)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
, (4.21)
where y2 depends positively on the second period shock, φ2, due to our assumption of
a very small ω and a relatively small β. Output depends also positively on the desired
output target k.
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The optimal fiscal policy is given by
g∗2 =
(k + pie2)A+ φ2(θbB − θpiβ + A(w + γ + wb1)) + b1(A(γβ − 1) + w − θbB)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
, (4.22)
where a high desired output target k and a large γ, the parameter which measures the
effect of surprise inflation on output, both lead to an incentive to create surprise inflation
by raising demand and, hence, contribute to the policy makers’ optimal choice of a higher
fiscal deficit g2. In contrast, an extremely high θb reduces government expenditure as the
reduction of debts is of major interest.
In the following, we calculate the first derivatives of the policy variables with respect
to pie2 and show that the signs are univocally determined:
∂b2
∂pie2
=
γAB
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
> 0 (4.23)
∂pi2
∂pie2
=
γβA
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
> 0 (4.24)
∂g2
∂pie2
=
A
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
> 0 . (4.25)
As the expected inflation rate under a currency board is according to empirical evidence
smaller compared to the expected inflation under a standard peg regime, the following
result holds:26
Result 1. The lower pie2 the higher is the discipline of fiscal policy and the lower are the
debts under the condition that the exchange rate is not changed.
As a currency board is associated with a lower expected inflation compared to a standard
peg system, a currency board leads to more fiscal discipline and to a lower debt level.
Furthermore, we can show that
∂y2
∂pie2
= − γ(θbB
2 + θpiβ
2)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
< 0 , (4.26)
i.e. output depends negatively on the inflation expectations. This stands in line with
the empirical findings of e.g. Ghosh et al. (2000) when analyzing the effects from
26Empirical evidence and a theoretical proof of pie,CB2 < pi
e,Peg
2 is added in the subsection 4.5.2. To
be more accurate, the lower expected inflation rate under a currency board compared to a standard peg
regime can be traced back to a lower expected devaluation under a currency board compared to a peg.
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introducing a currency board arrangement on economic growth. Therefore, we draw the
following conclusion:
Result 2. The choice of a currency board can contribute to a higher growth of output due
to the lower inflation expectations of the private sector.
4.5.2 Inflation Expectations
In this subsection, we compare the expected inflation of the private sector under a currency
board system and a standard fixed exchange-rate regime. At first, we derive the condition
for which the expected inflation rate is lower under a currency board arrangement than
under a standard peg by using a theoretical approach to justify the assumption made
in the previous subsection. Subsequently, we refer to empirical work suggesting that a
currency board system may contribute to higher credibility which is expressed by lower
inflation expectations.
Theoretical Approach
To derive inflation expectations, we use a similar calculation as in section 4.5.1. The
policy maker optimizes the following Lagrangean, where we introduce e2, which denotes
the change of the second period exchange rate:
L2 = 1
2
(y2 − k)2 + 1
2
θpipi
2
2 +
1
2
θbb
2
2
+λ1(y2 − γ(pi2 − pie2)− wg2)
+λ2(pi2 − φ2 − κe2 − βg2)
+λ3(b2 − b1(1 + qe2 − pi2)− g2) . (4.27)
At first, we treat e2 like an additional parameter. The idea is to derive the expected infla-
tion rate depending on an expected change of e2, to show in which direction a devaluation
drives the expected inflation pie2.
27
The calculation follows the same pattern as in the previous subsection and is shifted to
appendix B.3. By assuming rational expectations of the private sector, expected inflation
27Our analysis is limited to cases of a devaluation, as the need of an appreciation under a fixed exchange-
rate regime is assumed to be less problematic as it usually does not indicate a typical crisis scenario and
is thus less interesting for the purpose of our analysis.
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pie2 is determined by
pie2 =
βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA)− b1βθbB + ee2(wκA+ θbB(κ− βb1q))
θpiβ2 + wA+ θbB2
. (4.28)
Due to the announcement of maintaining or abandoning the currency board one period
in advance, the expected inflation rate under a currency board is given by
pie2
∣∣∣
ee2=0
=
βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA)− b1βθbB
θpiβ2 + wA+ θbB2
. (4.29)
Under a standard peg regime, a sudden realignment after the observation of the second
period shock, φ2, is possible. How the private sector’s expectation about second period
inflation is influenced by an expected devaluation of ee2 is given by
∂pie2
∂ee2
=
wκA+ θbB(κ− βb1q)
θpiβ2 + A2 + θbB2
. (4.30)
If foreign debts are not too high represented by a relatively small value of q and the
economy is quite open (represented by κ approaching one), the sign of the terms inside the
brackets is positive and an expected devaluation causes an increase of privates’ inflation
expectations.
Furthermore, we know from the common literature that by assuming a certain distri-
bution of the new shock u2, multiple equilibria may occur under a standard peg regime,
as pointed out in chapter 3. As we do not focus on the exact value for the inflation
expectations of both systems, but on a qualitative comparison, we do not calculate the
equilibria explicitly. If we assume that an appreciation of the exchange rate is excluded
as in the graphical explanation of the equilibrium exchange rate in Obstfeld (1996), i.e.
e2 ≥ 0, we can avail ourself on the fact that the private sector is aware that with a certain
probability – depending on the realization of the second period shock – the policy maker
will make use of her escape clause and devalue the currency under a standard peg system.
Therefore, we can state that the expected inflation rate is a (probability weighted) mix-
ture of the expected inflation rate for the case of defending the peg, which equals that of
a currency board system given by (4.29), and for the case of devaluing the exchange rate,
given by equation (4.28). According to the sketched idea, the following result holds:
Result 3. The private sector has a lower expected inflation under a currency board ar-
rangement than under a standard peg system, if (wκA+ θbB(κ− βb1q)) > 0.
This condition is unambiguously fulfilled if the fraction of foreign debts relative to total
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debts is not too large and the economy is relatively open, i.e. κ > βb1q.
28
As a stable fixed exchange-rate system is typically accompanied by a relatively small ratio
of foreign debts to total debts and a high openness towards the anchor currency, κ, it may
be no major restriction to use result 3, which states that pie,CB2 < pi
e,Peg
2 , in section 4.5.1.
However, the opposite may be true for a relatively closed economy characterized by a
small value of the parameter κ and a large amount of public debts denominated in the
foreign currency: If the government devalues its currency, the real value of outstanding
debts increases. Therefore, a high level of foreign debts can have two different effects: It
may prevent the government from a devaluation and thereby implies fiscal discipline or it
may force the government to default on its debts (as it happened in Argentina in 2001 as
highlighted in section 4.3).
Note that it is easy to understand the argumentation used here, when a revaluation
of the exchange rate is excluded. However, when referring to the common literature on
time inconsistency, a desired output level above the natural level creates an inflation bias,
which makes a devaluation more likely than a revaluation. Therefore abstaining from the
possibility of revaluation is not necessary for obtaining result 3, but makes it more easy
to capture the line of arguments and avoids at the same time the distinction of further
cases, which are necessary to examine when inherited shocks and debts from the past are
considered.
Empirical Findings
The two common proceedings to estimate inflation expectations are to evaluate survey
data or to use the difference of the nominal and real interest rates of non-indexed and
indexed governments bonds as a proxy for expected inflation. Survey data can only be
obtained for Bulgaria and government-bond yields (especially those of indexed bonds)
are hardly available for any currency board country on a monthly basis, which would
be necessary to obtain enough observations for a meaningful estimation. Therefore, we
abstain from an own estimation and refer to two empirical papers, which suggest that
expected inflation under a currency board is lower than under a standard fixed exchange-
rate regime.
Ghosh et al. (2000) compare inflation rates for countries with currency boards and
28If we consider the extreme case that a standard peg is highly credible, i.e. the probability of a
devaluation equals zero, the expected inflation is the same under both systems.
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standard peg regimes and show that inflation under currency board regimes is lower than
under standard fixed-exchange rate regimes. The findings can be used for claiming from
an ex post view that also the inflation expectations should be lower when operating a
currency board.
Carlson and Valev (2000) use survey data for Bulgaria to analyze whether the
introduction of a currency board system lowers expectations of inflation. The survey was
conducted a short time before the currency board was introduced and a follow-up survey
was conducted 10 months later. The authors show that already in the first survey, the
people had a lower expected inflation rate due to the near introduction of the currency
board arrangement. In the follow-up survey, it became obvious that the introduction of
a currency board did indeed lower inflation expectations as well as actual inflation rates.
4.6 Stability of a Currency Board System
We analyze the stability of currency board systems by focussing on two aspects. First,
we try to figure out under which conditions a policy maker operating a currency board
system announces the continuity or the abandonment of the currency board. We examine
thoroughly how the change of some characteristic parameters like e.g. the policy makers’
desired output deviation k, the volatility of the PPP-shock σ2u, the inherited shock from
the first period ηφ1, the inherited debt level b1 or the fraction of foreign debts on total
public debts q can influence the policy makers’ decision. We use a numerical approach to
obtain the results.
Second, we compare the stability of a currency board system with that of a standard
fixed exchange-rate regime for a given set of parameters. Here, we use a similar concept
of the credibility of an exchange rate system as in chapter 3, which is referred to the prob-
ability that the considered exchange rate regime survives the second period. Analogically
to the proceedings of the first part, we examine how the variation of some characteris-
tic parameters changes the credibility of a standard peg compared to that of a currency
board system by using four numerical scenarios. We derive the conditions under which
the currency board system induces a credibility advantage.
4.6.1 Decision-Making under a Currency Board
As the decision whether to repeal or to maintain a currency board regime is made before
the “new shock” is realized, we have to compare the expected losses of the next period
CHAPTER 4. FISCAL POLICY AND STABILITY OF CURRENCY BOARDS 63
for both cases. We suppose that, whenever a monetary authority decides to repeal the
currency board, the exchange rate will be adjusted optimally, which means that the new
system can be characterized by a free floating exchange rate regime in our two-period
framework.29 The policy maker announces the continuity of the currency board system
in the next period if the expected loss of the free float plus political costs cCB, which
arise when giving up the currency board, exceed the expected loss when maintaining the
currency board. Therefore, the critical threshold where the policy maker is indifferent
between both systems is determined by
E(Lfloat2 ) + c
CB = E(LCB2 ) . (4.31)
The solution is briefly sketched in appendix B.4. To gain insights into the solution, we
use two numerical examples in the following for a quantitative exploration. Our analysis
focusses on situations, in which the policy makers’ main problem is whether to devalue or
not. Therefore, we assume that besides the existence of the time-inconsistency problem,
a negative shock hits the economy in the first period. We make this assumption, as we
focus on examining situations characterized by the existence of a credibility problem,
which usually do not occur when a currency is revaluated.
The numerical values of the parameters in a first scenario and a short explanation of
each parameter are depicted in table 4.2. In this scenario, the expected second period
loss under a currency board system is lower compared to a free float system. The exact
numerical values for the expected losses in both cases are shown in table 4.3. Therefore,
in this scenario the policy maker would announce the continuity of the currency board
in period 1 — before the privates negotiate their wages (= build their expectation of
the second period inflation rate) and before the PPP-shock of the second period hits the
economy. However, we do not focus on the explicit values of the losses under this scenario.
In fact, the aim is to show how the variation of a particular parameter value can influence
the expected losses in both cases and, thus, the stability of the currency board system,
while keeping the rest of the parameters fixed. We measure the stability of the currency
board by the distance of the expected loss function in the currency board and the free float
case in this section. The sensitivity analysis of the expected losses of scenario I is done in
figure 4.3.30 The pictures confirm the results found in chapter 3, where the credibility of a
29Note that in this subsection, when referring to the free float system, we discuss the case of announcing
the abolishment of the currency board arrangement.
30Note that the vertical line in the single plots denotes the parameter set, which was used in Scenario
I.
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Table 4.2: Numerical Example, Scenario I
Parameter Numerical Value Explanation
k 0.02 Desired output deviation from the natural level
γ 1.00 Effect of surprise inflation on output
w 0.09 Effect of fiscal policy on output
(only fiscal policy addressed upon the supply side)
b1 0.20 Inherited stock of public debts
q 0.30 Ratio of foreign public debts to total public debts
κ 0.80 Effect of the change of the exchange rate on inflation
β 0.30 Effect of fiscal policy on inflation
(only fiscal policy addressed upon the demand side)
φ1 -0.03 PPP-shock of the first period
σu 0.02 Standard deviation of the PPP-shock
η 0.80 Shock persistence
θb 0.2 Policy makers’ relative weight on debt target
θpi 1.20 Policy makers’ relative weight on inflation target
cCB 0.012 Political costs
Table 4.3: Expected Losses in Scenario I
Expected loss under a currency board Expected loss under a free float
E(LCB2 ) = 0.0270 E(L
Float
2 ) + c
CB = 0.0436
currency board is examined without taking the effects of fiscal policy and public debts into
account: A high (negative) inherited shock from the first period φ1 and a high volatility
of the shock innovation in the second period σ2u increases the expected second-period
loss under a currency board relative to the expected loss under free float system. This
result stems from the fact that an announcement to maintain the currency board system
prevents the policy maker from offsetting the shock in the second period. Therefore, when
the first period shock reaches some critical threshold the policy maker will announce to
repeal the currency board in the second period to lower its expected policy loss. A high
volatility of the “new shock” works in the same direction, as it increases the risk that
the economy will be hit by a large shock in the second period to which the policy maker
cannot react under a currency board system.
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Figure 4.3: Sensitivity of Expected Losses (Scenario I)
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A larger desired output level, k, which together with a relatively small θpi reflects the
main cause for the time inconsistency problem of fiscal and monetary policy (i.e. fiscal
and monetary policy try to create surprise inflation to raise output), leads to a higher
stability of the currency board system. The time inconsistency problem of monetary policy
is solved under a currency board as the monetary authorities’ decision is well-known at
the point in time where the privates create their expectations of inflation (see also chapter
4.5). However, the time inconsistency problem of fiscal policy given by the desire of the
policy maker to create surprise inflation by raising government demand persists.
The reason for an increasing level of k to improve the stability of a currency board
system, anyway, is based on the quadratic loss function, i.e. a higher deviation from the
target levels leads to a disproportionately high increase of the policy loss. In the case of
repealing the currency board arrangement, the policy maker can mix two instruments to
raise inflation, the exchange rate (e2) and government expenditure (g2), whereas when
maintaining the currency board only fiscal policy (g2) is available. An increase in g2
primarily leads to higher debts and an increase of e2 primarily leads to an increase of
inflation. As both, debts and inflation enter the loss function quadratically, the costs
of each instrument increase disproportionately high by more intensive use. So, in the
case of repealing the currency board, a higher value of k leads to a disproportionately
higher incentive to generate surprise inflation, compared to the case when the currency
board is maintained. Hence, the time inconsistency problem is more severe in the case of
abandoning the currency board, which is also reflected by a higher expected inflation of
the private sector. Therefore, the result is still in line with chapter 3, where merely the
time inconsistency problem of monetary policy existed.
The last two pictures of figure 4.3 suggest that a rise in the inherited debt level, b1,
and an increasing fraction of foreign debts on total debts, q, leads to a higher stability of
the currency board system:
A rise in b1 makes the time inconsistence problem of monetary policy more severe,
as the monetary authority has now the incentive to create inflation for two reasons: (i)
create surprise inflation to push output above the natural level, and (ii) create inflation
to devalue the level of outstanding real government debts. As the currency board solves
the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy, a higher b1 leads to a higher stability
of the currency board.31
31Note that we solidly focus on the consequences in variations of b1 in our model, where we do not
incorporate the possibility of a default on government debts or binding credit market constraints, which
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A higher value of q does not influence the loss if the currency board is maintained, i.e.
a devaluation is excluded. However, a desired output level above the natural level and a
negative first period shock (see the parameter values in example 1) as well as a high pie2
triggers the policy maker to a relatively large devaluation when an exit of the currency
board arrangement was announced before, and the exchange rate can be adjusted freely.
The same devaluation leads in case of a larger q to a higher growth of real debts, where the
growth rate itself depends on the size of foreign debts, meaning that a higher q contributes
to higher policy loss and, hence, it makes a currency board more stable.
To abstain from sweeping something under the rug, we point out that when b1 and k
are varied the result may be contrary if the policy maker puts an extremely high weight
on public debts in the loss function, which is given by an extraordinary high θb. However,
as for developing countries such an extremely conservative behavior is not observable,
our results of example 1 seem to be robust with respect to the most relevant political
scenarios.
In the following, we apply our analysis once more to a “stressful” scenario for a policy
maker operating a currency board system. Now, a larger negative PPP-shock inherited
from the first period, a higher shock volatility, a greater weight of the inflation target in
the loss function and zero exit costs are assumed in scenario II.32 The exact parameter
values used here are given by table 4.4. The choice of the parameter set enables to exhibit
Table 4.4: Numerical Example, Scenario II
Parameter Numerical Value Parameter Numerical Value
k 0.02 φ1 -0.06
γ 1.00 σu 0.04
w 0.09 η 0.80
b1 0.30 θb 0.20
q 0.30 θpi 2.00
κ 0.80 cCB 0.00
β 0.30
an example in which, contrary to our first scenario, the policy maker decides to announce
may both play a major role from a practical point of view.
32The value of b1 was also slightly increased for a better graphical exposition, but the same qualitative
results could be obtained for b1 = 0.2, which was used in scenario I.
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to exit the currency board system in the second period. We make the free float case (i.e.
the incentive of abandoning the currency board) more attractive by choosing a higher
policy weight of the inflation goal, a higher volatility of the new shock, a raising inherited
first period shock, and exit costs of zero. The comparison of the losses of a free float and
a currency board is given in table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Expected Losses in Scenario II
Expected loss under a currency board Expected loss under a free float
E(LCB2 ) = 0.0586 E(L
Float
2 ) = 0.0439
Our main interest of the examination of example II is to find out, whether variations
in the parameters φ1, σ
2
u, k, b1 and q work in the same direction as in example 1. The
results are depicted from figure 4.4.
From a qualitative view the results obtained in scenario II stand strongly in line
with the results in scenario I. One more aspect, which is emphasized by the plots of
this scenario, is noteworthy to mention: The pictures in the second row illustrate, that a
currency board has an intrinsic commitment value, i.e. its stability does not solely depend
on the existence of the political costs cCB, as we find cases in which the continuity of the
currency board seems advantageous even when the exit costs cCB are equal to zero. This
result holds due to the characteristics of the currency board arrangement that it is defined
by law and, therefore, cannot be abolished on short notice.33 This stands in contrast to
the findings of Irwin (2004).
To complete this analysis and to strengthen one central result, we take up once more
the variation of k to analyze, how a more severe (overall) time inconsistency problem
contributes to the stability of the currency board when directly comparing scenarios I
and II.
Figure 4.5 shows that despite a higher shock volatility, a negative inherited first period
shock, and zero exit costs the loss of a currency board system is still increasing less
intensely when k rises compared to the loss of a flexible exchange rate system and thus
a currency board achieves a stability gain. Therefore, we emphasize once more that a
33The time inconsistency problem of monetary policy is completely solved, but, the time inconsistency
problem of fiscal policy remains. As aforementioned, the overall time inconsistency problem is reduced
as surprise inflation is more costly if fiscal policy remains the only instrument to increase inflation. This
is the reason for the intrinsic credibility of a currency board arrangement.
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Figure 4.4: Sensitivity of Expected Losses (Scenario II)
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Figure 4.5: Time Inconsistency Problem: Comparison of Scenario I and II
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currency board system can reduce the (overall) time inconsistency problem. However, for
a given k, of course, the stability of a currency board decreases in scenario II compared
to scenario I.
This subsection is concluded by a summary of the central results found in the two
scenarios.
Numerical Result 4. The stability of a currency board system – measured as the differ-
ence of the expected losses when deciding to maintain or to repeal the system – is relatively
high in cases characterized by
a) a relatively low volatility of the “new shock” u2,
b) a relatively low inherited first period shock ηφ1,
c) a relatively high fraction of foreign debts q,
d) a relatively high desired output level k,
e) and a relatively high inherited first period debt b1.
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4.6.2 Comparison of a Currency Board and a Standard Peg
The credibility of a (standard) fixed exchange-rate system and a currency board system is
measured by the probability that the system survives the second period. The proceeding is
motivated by the approach of Drazen andMasson (1994) and Feuerstein andGrimm
(2006b). The comparison of both exchange rate systems is done by using the maintaining
probabilities of the systems. The technical part of this subsection is shifted to appendix
B.5, where the support of the uniformly distributed “new shock” is characterized and the
explicit formulas for the probabilities of maintaining the currency board and defending
the standard peg system are derived.
In this section we refer to four numerical examples to compare the currency board
system and the standard peg regime. The comparison is done in a similar way as in
the previous section: We use a given set of parameters and calculate the maintaining
probability of a currency board and the probability of defending the peg regime. Then
we analyze how the probabilities change when the value of some parameter is varied. In
our analysis, we aim at finding the absolute credibility advantage (given if one exchange
rate system has a higher maintaining probability than the other one) and at the change
of the difference of the maintaining probabilities caused by the variation of a particular
parameter. To derive the results from our numerical examples, which are supposed to
hold “more generally”, we lay a greater importance into the latter case. We begin our
analysis with scenario I and scenario II from section 4.6.1 (see tables 4.2 and 4.4). As
the probability of maintaining a standard peg regime depends strongly on the exit costs,
we add exit costs of c = 0.012 in scenario II. We, furthermore, assume that the exit costs
under both systems are of the same size. Due to the nature of these costs, however, the
repealing of a currency board should go along with higher political costs, as was already
pointed out in chapter 3. Hence, the credibility of currency board may be underestimated
in several cases. Therefore, the arguments in favor of a currency board are actually even
stronger than stated here.
As already mentioned in previous sections, multiple equilibria may occur under a
standard peg regime. We abstain here from calculating these equilibria explicitly, but
assume analogously to section 4.6.2 that the inflation expectation of the private sector
is a mixture of the inflation expectation under a free float system and a currency board
system (= ultimate fix):
pie,Peg2 = αpi
e,float
2 + (1− α)pie,CB2 with α ∈ [0, 1] , (4.32)
where pie,CB2 is the expected inflation under a currency board system when its continuity
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in the future period has already been announced. We discriminate between three cases of
the private sector’s inflation expectations under a peg system:
a) Full anticipated credibility: α = 0, pie,Peg2 = pi
e,CB
2
b) Partial anticipated credibility: 0 < α < 1, pie,Peg2 = (1− α)pie,CB2 + αpie,F loat2
c) Zero anticipated credibility: α = 1, pie,Peg2 = pi
e,F loat
2
Now, we can calculate the maintaining probabilities for the three peg cases and for the
currency board arrangement in scenario I and II. In the following, α is set equal to 0.5 for
the case of partial anticipated credibility of the privates. Table 4.6 shows that the currency
Table 4.6: Maintaining Probabilities for the Scenarios I and II
Currency board Peg (α = 0) Peg (α = 0.5) Peg (α = 1)
Scenario I 1 0.9890 0.9311 0.7882
Scenario II 1 0.5773 0.5318 0.4577
board system is maintained with probability one in both scenarios, which means that the
policy maker will always announce to keep on operating the currency board system.
Technically speaking, the support of the shock φ1 is a subset of the maintaining-interval
of the currency board, which was derived in appendix B.5. The peg system is maintained
with a slightly lower probability in scenario I, which is decreasing with an increasing level
of α. Table 4.6 also shows that in the second scenario, the peg is maintained with a
probability around 50% for all three cases of α. Therefore, the currency board has a
credibility advantage compared to a standard peg in both scenarios.
Remark. Prima facie the result seems unexpected: Although the peg system has one
more degree of freedom than the currency board, i.e. a policy maker can decide whether to
leave or maintain the peg after the shock realization, and although presuming that α = 0,
which means that the private sector anticipates full credibility of the peg, a currency board
performs better than a standard peg. We, however, do not focus on a welfare comparison,
but on a comparison of the credibility/stability of an exchange rate system. Therefore, we
state that a policy maker under a currency board maintains the system with a probability
of one for the given set of parameters. In contrast, the policy maker operating a standard
peg system will abandon the peg and, hence, makes use of the escape clause when a large
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unfavorable shock occurs. For α = 0 this can indeed be welfare-improving compared to the
welfare achieved under a maintained currency board.
Not the result of scenario I itself, but, rather the explanation which parameters exactly
drive the credibility of both exchange rate systems is of major interest in the following.
Figure 4.6 shows, how the credibility of both systems react to variations of the character-
istic parameters.
The main result, which can be drawn from figure 4.6 is that an increasing volatility
of the new shock σ2u decreases the maintaining probability of both systems, but increases
the relative credibility of a standard peg regime. The result can be traced back on the
timing of the policy makers’ decision-making: A high volatility of the shock implies a high
risk to bear a large future shock. Whereas under a currency board system a sudden exit
in period 2 is not possible, the monetary authority operating a softer peg regime can do
a realignment in period 2, surprisingly. Therefore, a currency board is announced to be
abandoned with a higher probability in the first period, and the credibility of a standard
peg relative to a currency board rises with an increasing σ2u.
Furthermore, figure 4.6 suggests that for high values of θb, i.e. the policy maker puts
a high weight on debts in her loss function, a standard peg gains a relative credibility
advantage. A high θb triggers the policy maker to create inflation to lower real debts,
which is easily possible by a devaluation when the ratio of foreign debts to total debts, q,
is small as in the considered case. Therefore, the exit clause in the second period under a
standard peg may increase the relative credibility of the peg, meaning that if no favorable
second period shock materializes, the policy maker will devalue the currency. This option
is not possible under a currency board and, hence, may provide an incentive to the policy
maker to repeal the currency board more quickly.
The pictures in the fourth row suggest that a rising β leads to a relative credibility
advantage of a currency board. Note that β and κ are linked by the inflation equation
(4.10) and, therefore, an increase of β is supposed to be accompanied by a falling κ. As
we here vary only one parameter, we restricted the variation of β for a given κ on the
interval [0, 0.5]. Hence, we restrict κ out of the same reason on the interval [0.5, 1]. By
choosing these domains of κ and β, we assume that fiscal policy affects inflation, however,
the main force driving inflation is still the central bank: Assume, for instance, that the
government raises demand by one percent and the central bank devalues the currency by
one percent at the same time, then the devaluation should have a greater effect on the
inflation rate than fiscal policy has.
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Figure 4.6: Sensitivity of the Maintaining Probabilities in Scenario I
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Sensitivity of the Maintaining Probabilities in Scenario I (ad figure 4.6)
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Unfortunately, for the rest of the parameters the probability of maintaining a currency
board remains at 100% and, hence, we cannot draw further conclusions on the changes in
the relative credibility of a currency board to a standard peg.
We mention here, for the sake of completeness, that the results from the graphs of
scenario II stand almost in line with the results of scenario I. We abstain, therefore, from
an explicit discussion.
To get further insights into the comparison of the credibility of both regimes, we use
two stress scenarios. We, now, drop the assumption, which was made in section 4.4 and
presume, instead, that a negative inherited shock hit the economy in period zero. Analog-
ically to section 4.6.1, we want to examine the behavior of the maintaining probabilities
of both systems, when devaluation pressure resulting from a negative inherited shock is
present. The shock has to occur in period zero (and not in period one) to establish a fair
setting for the comparison of the currency board and the peg system. Furthermore, we
have chosen the parameter values with the intension to establish a scenario, where the
policy makers’ advantage under both fixed exchange-rate systems seems to be very lim-
ited, i.e. besides the inherited shock from period zero, we assume a relatively high shock
volatility, a relatively high κ, and a relatively small β to appear. This makes monetary
policy more important as a stabilization tool, as the effect of fiscal policy was strongly
reduced by the parameter choice in the scenarios III and IV and, thus, weakens the cred-
ibility of both fixed exchange-rate regimes. The parameter values for both scenarios are
exhibited in table 4.7. The maintaining probabilities in the two scenarios are shown in
table 4.8. In scenario III the maintaining probability of a currency board system is below
100%, and in scenario IV a repealing of the currency board is announced for any first
period shock, meaning that the interval in which the currency board is defended lies com-
pletely outside the support of the shock φ1 or shrinks to zero (for technical details see
appendix B.5).
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Table 4.7: Numerical Examples: Stress Scenarios III and IV
Parameter Stress scenario III Stress scenario IV
k 0.02 0.02
γ 1.00 1.00
σu 0.06 0.10
w 0.09 0.09
η 0.80 0.80
φ1 -0.04 -0.04
b1 0.30 0.20
θb 0.20 0.20
θpi 1.50 1.50
q 0.50 0.20
κ 0.80 0.90
β 0.30 0.20
cCB 0.012 0.012
ηφ0 -0.04 -0.04
Table 4.8: Maintaining Probabilities for the Stress Scenarios III and IV
Currency board Peg (α = 0) Peg (α = 0.5) Peg (α = 1)
Scenario III 0.9367 0.4310 0.3913 0.3128
Scenario IV 0 0.5239 0.5256 0.4843
The examination of the sensitivity of the maintaining probabilities to a parameter
change is done by a discussion of the figures 4.7 and 4.8, in the following.
In both stress scenarios, the three results found in scenario I and II are confirmed from a
qualitative perspective:
• an increasing shock volatility σu leads again to a credibility gain of the standard
peg, while the absolute credibility is decreasing in both systems,
• an increasing β leads also to a credibility advantage of the currency board,
• a greater value of θb contributes to a credibility gain of the standard peg regime.
Fortunately, we can derive further results from the two stress scenarios: We start with
the parameter k, the desired output level of the fiscal and monetary policy authorities,
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Figure 4.7: Sensitivity of the Maintaining Probabilities in Scenario III
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Sensitivity of the Maintaining Probabilities in Scenario III (ad figure 4.7)
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Figure 4.8: Sensitivity of the Maintaining Probabilities in Scenario IV
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Sensitivity of the Maintaining Probabilities in Scenario IV (ad figure 4.8)
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which determines (together with θpi) the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy.
While remembering the results from section 4.6.1, where we pointed out that the time
inconsistency problem of monetary policy is completely solved and that at the same time
the overall time inconsistency problem is reduced under a currency board system – which
is not the case under a standard peg due to the existence of an escape clause in period 2
– one would suppose that a higher k leads to a relative credibility gain under a currency
board system. The plots of scenario III and IV support that view, if α is greater than
zero. This result comes as no surprise, because α = 0 implies a full anticipated credibility
of the private sector and in that case the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy
is also solved under a peg by the definition of equation (4.32).
A decrease in θb leaves room for a more expansionary fiscal policy, which implies a
more severe time inconsistency problem (of fiscal policy). As a currency board reduces
the time inconsistency problem of fiscal policy, as mentioned before, which is not the case
for a standard peg, the credibility of a currency board increases compared to a standard
peg.
Scenario III further suggests that a higher inherited debt level from the first period,
b1, leads to a credibility gain of a currency board system. The explanation corresponds
to that in the previous section: a higher b1 amounts to a higher loss stemming from debts
in the policy makers’ loss function, if debts are not reduced in the second period. To
reduce debts, the monetary authority has a higher incentive to create inflation, which at
the same time aggravates the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. As the time
inconsistency problem of monetary policy is completely solved under a currency board
system, but remains, at least partly, under a standard peg system, a higher b1 suggests a
relative credibility gain of a currency board system.
A higher fraction of foreign government debts, q, leads ceteris paribus also to a credi-
bility gain of the currency board system. An increasing q makes the escape clause under
the peg, i.e. the possibility to devalue the currency, less important, because only the
fraction of government debts denominated in the home currency can be reduced. The
fraction of foreign government debts may even increase in real terms.
To summarize the findings of this subsection, we can state that in the first two scenar-
ios, which presumably accord best with reality, a currency board has (in frequent cases)
an absolute credibility advantage compared to a standard peg. The argument is strength-
ened by the fact that we have assumed equal exit costs under both systems and have
simulated the probability of maintaining the peg over the total range of possible shocks
φ1 to guarantee a fair comparison (see appendix B.5). This supports the empirical findings
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that currency board systems have proven to be stable exchange rate systems over several
years, with only one abandonment (or breakdown) in Argentina, which was discussed in
section 4.3.
The comparison of the credibility of a currency board and standard peg gives reason
to formulate the following conclusion:
Numerical result 5. The credibility of a currency board system and of a standard peg
are measured by the probability of maintaining the system in the next period. Using this
definition, the analysis of scenario I-IV states that a currency board gains a credibility
advantage compared to a standard peg when
a) the time inconsistency problem is severe (represented by a high value of k, and a
small value of θpi)
b) σu is low, which reduces the risk of bearing a high shock in the future period,
c) θb is relatively low and q relatively high, making a devaluation less necessary as a
stabilization tool,
d) b1 is large, which again leads to a more severe time inconsistency problem of mon-
etary policy, and
e) β is relatively large and κ relatively small, again making monetary policy (=a de-
valuation) as a stabilization tool less important.
Result e) makes only sense from a static perspective or from a purely theoretical point
of view. When discussing the stability of fixed exchange-rate regimes, a high degree of
openness (κ approaching one) and no major frictions are generally seen as an essential
prerequisite for a long-term stability, as shown in chapter 2. Otherwise, asymmetric
shocks to the anchor currency or a strong accumulation of debts will make a repealing of
the currency board or a realignment under the peg inevitable in the intermediate-term.
To analyze such effects, a dynamic setting will be a necessary premise.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we examined two major issues, the fiscal sustainability and the stability
of currency board arrangements. In section 4.2, we summarized empirical and theoretical
work about fixed exchange-rate systems and their impact on fiscal policy. The conclusions
drawn from the individual papers are quite different. Some argue that choosing a hard
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peg facilitates fiscal soundness, others find a contrary interrelationship, but only a few of
them divided the hard peg regimes into subgroups and, thereby, focussed especially on
currency boards. Two empirical studies did this and both, Fatas and Rose (2001) and
Grygonite (2003), found that currency board countries actually tend to have a higher
degree of fiscal discipline compared to other types of exchange rate systems. Before
attending to a theoretical exploration of this aspect, we gave an overview of recent and
present currency board systems in section 4.3. Thereby, it was shown that countries
operating a currency board had not only performed well with respect to fiscal policy, but
had also proven to have stable exchange-rate systems for several years.
In section 4.4, we introduced the basic model. The main feature of a currency board
system is its anchorage by law. We state, therefore, that a currency board gains a high
commitment value and cannot be abandoned surprisingly, but only if its abandonment
was announced one period in advance. Thus, the time inconsistency problem of monetary
policy, which means that a policy maker tries to increase the output level by creating sur-
prise inflation through a devaluation, is solved. Though, the possibility that fiscal policy
is used to create surprise inflation via an expansion of demand remains. And, therefore,
the (overall) time inconsistency problem is not completely solved under a currency board
either, but it is reduced. In contrast, the policy maker operating a standard peg regime
can make use of her escape clause in every period.
We showed in section 4.5 that a currency board leads to more fiscal discipline than a
peg system due to lower inflation expectations, meaning that the fiscal deficits and debts
will be lower under a currency board system. The lower inflation expectations under a
currency board are justified, on the one hand, by using a theoretical approach and, on
the other hand, by referring to empiricism.
The examination of the stability of a currency board system was subject of section
4.6. First, we analyzed how the stability of a currency board changes when varying
characteristic parameters by using numerical examples. The stability of a currency board
is measured by the difference of the expected losses occurring when a currency board
system is announced to be maintained in the next period and when it is announced to
be abandoned. We showed that the stability of a currency board decreases, when a large
(negative) future shock is likely to materialize due to a negative inherited shock and a
high shock volatility. A currency board becomes more stable, if the time inconsistency
problem is severe, as it is partially solved through the timing of the decision-making under
a currency board. The stability of a currency board also increases by a higher ratio of
foreign debts relative to total debts and by an increasing level of overall debt levels. A
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higher ratio of foreign debts makes a devaluation ceteris paribus more costly and reduces,
thus, the advantage of repealing the currency board. From an empirical perspective,
however, the result seems to be somewhat surprising. The reason for that may be found
in not taking moral hazard aspects into account. A high level of (foreign) debts can create
an incentive of the policy maker to default on its debts like for example 1999 in Ecuador
and 2002 in Argentina, a behavior which is not covered in our model.
Besides that, we also showed that a currency board system has an intrinsic commit-
ment value, which means that we find scenarios for which the currency board is maintained
although no exit costs exist. This characteristic originates from the reduction of the time
inconsistency problem, as aforementioned.
Second, we compare a currency board system and a standard peg system by intro-
ducing the concept of the “credibility of an exchange-rate system”, which is defined as
the probability that the current exchange rate system will still be in operation in the
following period. The results, although including the effects of fiscal policy, stand almost
in line with the results of chapter 3. We showed by using several numerical scenarios,
that a standard peg gains a credibility advantage if the stabilization of future shocks is of
paramount interest. This is the case if a high shock volatility exists. The result is traced
back on the existence of an escape clause under a peg, meaning that a policy maker can
realign its currency optimally after a large unfavorable shock hit the economy, which is
not possible under a currency board. In contrast, if the time inconsistency problem is
the dominant problem, a currency board gains a credibility advantage compared to a
standard peg system. Furthermore, we found that a larger amount of government debts
and a higher ratio of foreign debts increases the credibility of a currency board relative
to a standard peg. Also, a higher impact of fiscal policy on inflation while at the same
time the impact of a devaluation on inflation is decreasing makes the exchange rate policy
less important as a stabilization tool and, hence, raises the credibility of a currency board
system relatively to the credibility of a standard peg.
To get insights into the debt evolution and the stability of a currency board system
over an intermediate time-horizon, we focus on an enhancement of the model to more
periods in our future research. However, as the parametrization makes the model already
woefully complicated in the two-period setting, further restrictive assumptions would be
necessary.
An additional interesting modification of the model would be to incorporate nominal
interest rates endogenously: If debts are accumulated, private creditors would increase
the level of the rate of returns on government bonds to be willing to accept further debts
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due to the demand of a higher risk premia.34 We suppose that this would also affect the
stability and credibility of a currency board system. In this context a consideration of
borrowing constraints would be meaningful, too.
34Of course, the argument only holds, if the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem does not apply here. This
seems to be the case for emerging market economies.
Part II
Monetary and Fiscal Policies in a
Monetary Union
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Chapter 5
Introduction to Part II
The second part of this dissertation examines monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a
currency area. It includes four interdependent chapters which are based on Grimm and
Ried (2006): In this chapter, we give first an overview of related literature and an outline
of the structure and the main findings of part II. The second part of the introduction is
referred to the EMU. To motivate our work from an empirical point of view, we show that
inflation and growth differentials have been significant and persistent since the inception
in 1999 and discuss related empirical studies.
We lay out the model from its foundations in microeconomics in chapter 6: In section
6.1 we consider a currency area consisting of two regions and derive the region-specific
output and inflation equations. In addition, we derive a second-order approximation of
the welfare criterion in section 6.2, and show that the fiscal policy makers’ target function
aim at stabilizing region-specific inflation and region-specific output, whereas the common
central bank focusses on the whole currency area by minimizing a weighted-sum of the
social losses occurring in both regions.
The examination of fiscal and monetary policy interactions is done in chapter 7. We
highlight in section 7.1 the main building blocks of the “macroeconomic part” of our
model and characterize the different scenarios of strategic behavior of fiscal and monetary
policies. The evaluation of the different scenarios is done in section 7.2. We consider both,
supply-side fiscal policy, which is in line with the fiscal policy used in our microfounded
model, and demand-side policy. Analogously to the proceedings in the related literature,
we run a numerical simulation to obtain the results. For the supply-side policy, we use
a parametrization which is almost standard in this kind of literature. The parameters of
the demand-side fiscal policy are chosen for a quantitative exploration. The results under
both fiscal policies seem to be robust for parameter variations as shown in a sensitivity
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analysis. Chapter 8 concludes the second part of this dissertation.
5.1 Outline and Related Literature
A country participating in a currency union has to abstain from sovereign monetary
policy. Union-wide monetary policy aims at stabilizing inflation and output in the whole
currency area and cannot pay attention to every specific country in its decision-making.1
Instead, national fiscal policies are typically concerned with their single country and
not the union as a whole. This gives rise to a variety of possible strategic behaviors.
National fiscal policies can help monetary policy to maximize union-wide welfare (Gali
and Monacelli 2002, 2005a, and Benigno 2004), they can try to adjust the outcomes
of monetary policy to maximize nationwide welfare (Dixit 2001, Uhlig 2002), or they
can be used to maximize the probability of the current government staying in office after
the next elections (Beetsma and Uhlig 1999). In our model, we allow for all three
possibilities. We analyze monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union in
various scenarios and indicate the scenarios that are preferable from a welfare perspective.
The literature on monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union is vast, so we only
refer to articles of special importance to our work:2 Dixit and Lambertini (2003b)
consider monetary-fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union. They assume that the
participating regions and their policy goals are symmetric and in line with the common
central bank’s target. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that ideal output and inflation
levels can be achieved – even without coordination of the fiscal authorities and the common
central bank, and without the need for monetary commitment.
Dixit (2001), Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) and Lambertini (2004, 2006a) check
also the implications of this model for asymmetric policy goals in the case where monetary
policy is conservative in the sense of Rogoff (1985). One of their major findings is that
fiscal discretion destroys the positive effect of monetary commitment, and that fiscal
cooperation typically leads to less efficient outcomes than independently acting fiscal
policies.
Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) construct a symmetric, two-country model that
features government spending in the utility function. They find that the last result can
1The central bank’s target function will be derived in chapter 6.
2We refer the reader to De Grauwe (2003) for an overview of the field, as well as for references to
less recent literature.
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be overturned if the share of steady-state government spending in output is positive and
supply shocks are not perfectly negatively correlated. Nonetheless, for plausible parameter
values the welfare gains of fiscal cooperation are small.
Dixit and Lambertini (2001) allow for some heterogeneities by assuming that fiscal
and monetary authorities may have conflicting output and inflation goals. They show
that without commitment or leadership by either authority the ideal levels of output and
inflation cannot be attained.
Chari andKehoe (2004) take a closer look at the desirability of fiscal debt-constraints.
They find that such constraints are undesirable if monetary commitment is possible,
whereas the opposite holds if the central bank cannot commit to its policy. The latter is
the result of a time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy, which leads to free-riding
behavior by the fiscal authorities.
In the very recent literature, the topic of monetary and fiscal interactions has also been
dealt with in dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium models. However, the emphasis in
most of these papers is not so much on strategic behavior and game-theoretical scenarios.
Gali and Monacelli (2005a) e.g. analyze optimal fiscal and monetary policies in a
monetary union where all policy agents care about union-wide variables and Ferrero
(2005) considers a two-region model and compares the optimal policies to simple policy
rules where all policy agents care about union-wide variables. Canzoneri et al. (2005)
study the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union and com-
pare the results of their New Keynesian model with the data. They also assess the effects
of regional asymmetries on welfare, but they assume that fiscal policy is described by
exogenously given processes for government spending and distortionary taxes.3 Lamber-
tini (2006b) attempts to combine the game-theoretical approach of the static models with
features of dynamic models. To do so, she assumes that fiscal authorities can commit to
their policies. Also, she assumes that government spending is exogenously given. All these
dynamic models have in common that fiscal policies are given exogenously or reduced to
very simple rules.
In a series of papers, van Aarle et al. (2001) and (2002), Engwerda et al. (2002)
and Garretsen et al. (2005) focus on macroeconomic policy interactions in national fis-
cal policies and the monetary policy of a common central bank by using a New Keynesian
3As alternative specifications they consider fiscal policy rules making movements in the budget deficit
lead to reactions either in government spending or in tax rates. In our model, by contrast, the government
budget is always balanced.
CHAPTER 5. INTRODUCTION TO PART II 91
framework. Of these papers, van Aarle et al. (2002) is the one most closely related to
our model. They compare the outcomes of different scenarios by distinguishing between
non-cooperation, partial cooperation, and full cooperation between monetary and fiscal
policies. They find that the stability of coalitions depends strongly on the policy makers’
preferences. When the countries are very heterogeneous, non-cooperative behavior is the
most likely outcome.
We consider a static two-country model with a single currency and one monetary
policy conducted by a common central bank. Each country or region has its own fiscal
authority that maximizes its objective function with the arguments output and inflation.
The equations of the basic model and the loss functions are derived from microfoundation,
by enhancing and modifying the Dixit and Lambertini (2003a, 2003b) approach. Our
contribution here is to accurately model the possibility of various differences between two
regions in a heterogeneous monetary union.
As an application of the theory, the countries participating in the Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) are far from being homogeneous. Both the differentials of output
growth and inflation dispersion, have been significant and rather persistent as will be
shown in the following section. The spread of the key macroeconomic indicators in the
participating countries will presumably become even larger when the ten new EU member
states adopt the Euro. Hence, it seems appropriate to incorporate those heterogeneities
when analyzing the interactions of monetary and fiscal policies in a currency area like the
Euro area.
We do this in two steps. First, we derive the inflation and output equation from
microfoundation and state that terms of trade (i.e. inflation differentials) and a country-
specific productivity shock, both affect the region-specific output levels. Second, we take
the view that national fiscal policies are concerned with national output and inflation
targets, whereas they are not directly concerned with output growth and price changes
in other parts of the union, unless they decide to cooperate. As a simple illustration
relating to the EMU, the Greek finance minister considers the current wage and house-
price increases in Ireland not to be of major importance for his economy. Additionally, we
assume that fiscal authorities have target rates for output and inflation that are higher
than the welfare optimizing rates. Monetary policy is assumed to aim at the union-wide
optimal rates in terms of welfare.
We analyze the fiscal policy makers’ and central bank’s losses in various scenarios.
Policies can be conducted simultaneously in the Nash scenario, or sequentially in Stack-
elberg leadership scenarios for each policy. Alternatively, policies can be coordinated
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between some or all authorities. We investigate the implications for output, inflation,
and various policy loss functions in a numerical analysis, and using a sensitivity analysis,
we show that the ranking of the scenarios is relatively robust across different degrees of
heterogeneity. We, furthermore, compare the outcomes for the different scenarios for two
types of fiscal policies: supply-side and demand-side policy.
Our numerical results suggest that from the viewpoint of welfare maximization joint
cooperation between all policy makers, and monetary leadership produce the smallest
losses. The result holds for both cases, supply-side and demand-side fiscal policy. Fur-
thermore, we find that the more asymmetric the regions, the larger the overall losses and
the higher the relative gains from a first mover advantage of monetary policy and from
joint cooperation.
5.2 Heterogeneities in the European Monetary Union
Much empirical research referring to the EMU focusses on the existing heterogeneities
between its member countries. These heterogeneities may contribute to growth differences
and to inflation dispersion among the member countries. The growth differentials are
depicted in figure 5.1.4 The figure shows real GDP growth rates of the countries that
feature the most disparate movements: Output growth differentials have been rather
persistent over the recent years. While the real GDP growth rate has been most of the
time below the Euro area average level in Germany and Italy since the introduction of
the Euro, it has been above average in countries like Luxembourg, Greece and Ireland.
The existing theoretical literature on monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union
is well aware of the differences in GDP growth, whereas inflation dispersion is discussed
much less often. We, therefore, take a closer look at this aspect and recapitulate ex-
planations to this given in the literature. Inflation differentials per se are a well-known
observation, they appear in every “currency area”, like for example among individual
states of the U. S., or within regions of larger countries, e. g. between eastern and south-
ern parts of Germany. We nonetheless should pay special attention to inflation dispersion
in the European Monetary Union, because both the size of inflation differentials and the
4The data is obtained from the Eurostat webpage. The Euro area (EU-12) average level of output
growth before the introduction of the Euro in 1999 and before the participation of Greece in the EMU
in 2001 is artificially calculated by using the same country-weights that were used in 2006. GDP growth
rates for 2006 are estimates.
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Figure 5.1: Real GDP Growth Differentials in the European Monetary Union
variability of inflation rates between member states of the EMU is higher than in the
within-country cases described above, as is well documented in Honohan and Lane
(2003). This may stem from (i) substantial structural differences, (ii) good-market fric-
tions, (iii) labor-market inflexibilities and (iv) different exposures to extra-union trade
among the European countries.5 In the following, we want to look more thoroughly at
the developments in the Euro-zone since its inception in 1999. After that, we give a brief
survey of the literature on inflation differentials and discuss the implications for monetary
and fiscal policies.
Between the participating countries of the European Monetary Union inflation differ-
entials, interestingly, have risen again since the beginning of the Euro adoption, after a
period of decline from the beginning of the nineties until 1998, as figure 5.2 documents
for some selected countries.6 Inflation dispersion has also been proven to be rather persis-
5For the first three arguments, see e. g. chapters 4 and 8 inDe Grauwe (2003). For the last argument,
see Honohan and Lane (2003).
6Of course, the rise of inflation differentials after 1999 can be traced back on the fact that exchange-
rate policy was no longer available as a stabilization instrument, but it was used before 1999 (within a
+/-15% exchange-rate margin). However, the persistence of the inflation differentials which has been
observed since 1999 until today is somewhat surprising.
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Figure 5.2: Inflation Differentials in the European Monetary Union
tent, which means that the group of countries with inflation rates above average inflation
of the the Euro-zone and the group of countries with lower than average inflation rates
have comprised the same countries during the last five years: Inflation has been highest
in Greece, Spain and Luxembourg reaching levels between 3 and around 4 percent during
the last three years and has been most of the time above the average-rate of the Euro-zone
since 1999, as shown in figure 5.2. Also Portugal and Ireland showed inflation rates above
the EMU average level during this period.7 The countries at the lower end are Austria,
Finland and Germany.
At first glance, the observation seems to be quite unexpected, as one would think
that a high-inflation country tends to lose competitiveness relative to the other countries
participating in the currency area as a consequence of the real appreciation. A real
appreciation dampens demand for commodities in the high-inflation country and leads to
a decline of inflation towards the average level of the currency area. The opposite would
be true for the low inflation country. We call this the competitiveness effect.
7Ireland had the highest inflation rates of 5.3 percent in 2000 and well above 4 percent from 2000 until
2004, but converged to a level slightly above the EU average, recently. The reason for that is discussed
in the following.
CHAPTER 5. INTRODUCTION TO PART II 95
In the literature, there are several approaches to explain the existence and persistence
of inflation dispersion. Andre´s et al. (2003) analyze the effects of heterogeneities in eco-
nomic structures like the degree of competition, openness and the appearance of nominal
inertias on inflation differentials in response to asymmetric shocks. They parameterize a
two-country model of a monetary union, where the countries show a different economic
structure in the features characterized above and a different degree of openness which is
closely linked to the size of a home-biased behavior in consumption. By allowing moderate
differences in nominal frictions and real rigidities, like e.g. habit formation and investment
costs, they are able to “generate sizeable inflation differentials in a model calibrated to
match the most salient long-run features of the average big EMU economies”.8
Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004) use a stylized empirical model of the European
Monetary Union. They state that besides the above explained effect of a changing degree
of competitiveness by real exchange rate movements, additionally a dis-equilibrating effect
resulting from the differences in inflation rates can appear: a high inflation rate in one
country relative to another leads according to the well-known Fisher-relation to a lower
real interest rate compared to the other country, since all countries share the same nom-
inal interest rate. Hence, the original inflation differentials can be strengthened through
demand-side effects (via real investments), if the dis-equilibrating effect dominates the
competitiveness effect, which was explained already.
Hofmann and Remsperger (2005) mention further potential causes which con-
tribute to inflation differentials. The first and, probably, the most popular one is the so
called Balassa-Samuelson effect. Caused by heterogeneities in the productivity, the
country with a lower productivity will achieve productivity gains during the catch-up
phase. These gains mainly accrue in the sector of tradeable goods due to the pressure
stemming from international competition. Productivity gains lead, of course, to increas-
ing nominal wages in the tradeable sector. When assuming full mobility of labor between
the tradeable and non-tradeable sector, nominal wages in the non-tradeable sector also
rise until the same wage level in both sectors is achieved. This again implies a rise of goods
prices in the non-tradeable sector leading to inflation. Hofmann and Remsperger com-
pare several empirical studies and conclude that on average only a small part of inflation
in the European Monetary Union can be explained by the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
Michaelis and Minich (2004) share this view in their analysis.
Another aspect in Hofmann and Remsperger as well as inMichaelis andMinich
8Andre´s et al. (2003), p. 31
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is the occurrence of temporary shocks. By differing consumption habits the composition
of the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) varies over the countries and leads
to different exposures to common price shocks (oil prices, raw materials etc.). A similar
result is found by Honohan and Lane (2003). They claim that the Euro depreciation
against the U. S.-$ at the beginning of the European Monetary Union had a different
impact on the individual countries. Ireland, for instance, whose main trading partners are
the United States and Great Britain, both outside the currency area, faced an increase of
import prices resulting in a rise of output prises. The effect was strengthened by a higher
demand from overseas. The reverse effect has been observed since the starting of the
appreciation period of the Euro, and Ireland’s inflation rate now converges to the Union’s
average level.
To summarize, there are several reasons for inflation differentials in the European
Monetary Union, most of them of structural origin:
(i) Different cultures, languages, and habits, which lead to a restricted mobility of labor.
(ii) Different trading partners, which lead to an asymmetric ability to react to price
shocks and to unexpected nominal exchange rate movements of the Euro against
other currencies.
(iii) Different and uncoordinated national government expenditure and tax policies.
(iv) The existence of nominal rigidities, which lead to asymmetric effects of monetary
policy on the different currency area countries.
These are only some explanations for the inflation dispersion, which is higher and more
persistent than in the US-$ area and, probably, will become more relevant after the eastern
enlargement of the European Monetary Union.
Possible consequences are that the existence of output and inflation differentials may
lead to a different behavior of fiscal policies, which focus on national target variables.
We take up this point in the microfoundation of our model and in our policy analysis.
Another point of interest is, whether the common central bank should take heterogeneities
into account, and should, thus, pay attention to country-specific targets, or whether it
should stabilize union-wide variables.
Chapter 6
Microfoundation
6.1 A Microfounded Two-Country Model
We consider a general-equilibrium monetary model with monopolistic distortions and
staggered prices. The model is closely related to Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) and
refers to the seminal work of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).1 In the economy
there exists an infinity of consumption goods over the unit interval. These are imperfect
substitutes. Households derive utility from consumption and from holding real money
balances and suffer from work. Each household produces a specific good and consumes a
bundle of goods. We will, henceforth, refer to a representative household as a “producer-
consumer”. There are two regions, home H and foreign F , with the population on the
segment [0, n) belonging to the home region H and the remaining population belonging
to the foreign region F , with 0 ≤ n ≤ 1.2
6.1.1 The Problem of a Producer-Consumer
A producer-consumer j in region i ∈ {H,F} derives utility
U ji =
(
Cj
γ
)γ (
M ji /P
i
1− γ
)1−γ
−
(
di
β
)
(Y ji )
β, γ ∈ (0, 1), di > 0, β ≥ 1. (6.1)
1For a detailed explanation of the basic model see appendix A in Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) and
also Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chapter 10).
2This setting is taken from Benigno (2004). Other related models are Lombardo and Sutherland
(2004), Ferrero (2005), and Gali and Monacelli (2005b).
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The utility function depends on consumption, real money balances, and labor. The
producer-consumer derives a positive utility from consumption of goods and from the
stock of real money, while the parameter γ captures the elasticity of substitution between
the two. Labor, which, for simplicity, is assumed to be a linear function of output and
is therefore replaced by output itself, contributes negatively to the utility of agent j.
Here, 1 + β is the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor. The stochastic variable di
captures both the scaling of disutility of labor and the fluctuations in total factor produc-
tivity. Changes in this variable may be interpreted as changes in technology.3 The total
consumption of agent j – who for reasons of exposition is assumed to live in region H –
is given by4
Cj ≡ (C
j
H)
νH (CjF )
1−νH
(νH)νH (1− νH)1−νH , (6.2)
where νH is a preference shifter with n ≤ νH ≤ 1 that allows for a home bias in con-
sumption.5 We assume that all regions exhibit the same home bias, i.e. we henceforth
use ν ≡ νH = νF .
Consumption of goods from each region is given by
CjH =
[(
1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
cj(h)
θ−1
θ dh
] θ
θ−1
, CjF =
[(
1
1− n
) 1
θ
∫ 1
n
cj(f)
θ−1
θ df
] θ
θ−1
, (6.3)
where h is a generic good produced in region H, f a generic good produced in region
F , and θ > 1 the elasticity of substitution between different goods in the same region.6
The elasticity of substitution of the home and foreign bundles of goods equals one. The
corresponding consumer-price indices – with subscripts denoting the place of production
3To appreciate this, assume a production function of Y ji = AiN
j
i with total factor productivity Ai
and hours N ji . Then rewrite the second summand in the utility function as
di
β (N
j
i )
β with the help of
the definition di ≡ δiA−βi , where δi captures the disutility of labor. In the welfare derivation in section
6.2 below, we will define di ≡ δiξi, where for simplicity δi = 1 and ξi is a stochastic variable capturing
technological progress.
4For an agent j living in region F , total consumption is given by Cj ≡ (C
j
F )
νF (CjH)
1−νF
(νF )νF (1−νF )1−νF for all
j ∈ [n, 1].
5To our knowledge, this model is the first two-region model of a monetary union that features the
possibility of more than proportional demand for goods produced in the agent’s home economy.
6The weights (1/n)(1/θ) and (1/(1−n))(1/θ) are a “normalization with the implication that an increase
in the number of products does not affect marginal utility after optimization”. See Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987), p. 649.
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and superscripts denoting variables specific to agent j or region i – are
PH ≡ (PHH )ν(PHF )1−ν and P F ≡ (P FF )ν(P FH )1−ν , (6.4)
where
P iH ≡
[
1
n
∫ n
0
pi(h)1−θdh
] 1
1−θ
and P iF ≡
[
1
1− n
∫ 1
n
pi(f)1−θdf
] 1
1−θ
(6.5)
denote the market-price indices of goods consumed in region i and produced in region H
and F , respectively. Note that the price index PH is defined as the minimum expenditure
necessary for purchasing goods leading to a consumption index Cj of size one7 and the
price indexes P iH and P
i
F are defined as the minimum expenditure required to purchase
goods resulting in consumption indexes CjH and C
j
F , which equal one.
Although producers would have an incentive to set different prices across regions be-
cause of the home bias in consumption, we exclude this possibility by assuming that
goods-market arbitrage leads to identical prices across borders such that PHH = P
F
H = PH
and PHF = P
F
F = PF .
8 With output produced by agent j in region i denoted by Y ji , the
budget constraint for this agent is∫ n
0
pi(h)cj(h)dh+
∫ 1
n
pi(f)cj(f)df +M ji = p
i(j)Y ji (1− τi)− PiTi + M¯ ji ≡ Iji . (6.6)
The budget constraint guarantees that the sum of consumption expenditures plus money
demand equals nominal net income Iji , which is the sum of sale revenues from the good
produced and beginning-of-period money holdings minus net tax payments.
In each region, a government pursues its fiscal policy by making use of four instruments:
a tax rate τi proportional to sales, real lump-sum taxes Ti, government consumption
Gi, and wasteful government expenditures X i. Government consumption of goods Gi is
defined symmetrically to private consumption, as given in equation (6.3). Sale taxes could
also be negative with the interpretation of subsidies. Also, lump-sum transfers Ti < 0 are
7The same argument also holds for region F .
8In our theoretical model, inflation differentials occur due to the home-bias effect, as the composition
of the consumption bundles differ in both regions. This assumption is somewhat critical with reference
to the Euro zone, where significant price differences for the same product exist in different countries
(including tradeable goods).
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possible. For the two regional government budget constraints we have∫ n
0
pH(j)y(j)τHdj + nPHTH = χ
H [νPHGH + (1− ν)P FGF ] + (1− χH)XH
≡ IgH (6.7)∫ 1
n
pF (j)y(j)τFdj + (1− n)PFTF = χF [νP FGF + (1− ν)PHGH ] + (1− χF )XF
≡ IgF . (6.8)
Following Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) we assume that the government can spend
its budget on government consumption Gi or it can be wasted, X i, ruled by the weight
χi ∈ [0, 1].
Consumption maximization is done in two steps. First, suppose that CjH is a single
good instead of an aggregate. Then, utility maximization of agent j in region H subject
to the corresponding aggregated budget constraint implies the two first-order conditions
λBC =
(
Cj
γ
)γ−1(
M jH/P
H
1− γ
)1−γ
ν
Cj
PHH C
j
H
, (6.9)
λBC =
(
Cj
γ
)γ (
M jH/P
H
1− γ
)−γ
1
PH
. (6.10)
Equalizing the two equations by replacing the Lagrange multiplier λBC and noting that
P iCj
γ
=
Mji
1−γ = I
j
i leads to
9
CjH = ν
(
PH
PHH
)
Cj. (6.11)
Second, maximizing CjH with respect to two generic elements c
j(h) and cj(h′), subject to∫ n
0
P i(h)cj(h)dh = Z, leads to
cj(h) =
(
pi(h)
pi(h′)
)−θ
cj(h′) . (6.12)
Then, replacing cj(h) in equation (6.3) by the right-hand side of the previous equation
9This is a result of the Cobb-Douglas structure of the utility function.
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gives
CjH =
( 1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
((
pi(h)
pi(h′)
)−θ
cj(h′)
) θ−1
θ
dh

θ
θ−1
=
[
pi(h′)θ−1cj(h′)
θ−1
θ
(
1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
pi(h)1−θdh
] θ
θ−1
=
[(
1
n
) 1−θ
θ
(pi(h′))θ−1(cj(h′))
θ−1
θ
[
1
n
∫ n
0
(pi(h))1−θdh
]] θθ−1
= n(pi(h′))θcj(h′)
[
1
n
∫ n
0
(pi(h))1−θdh
]− θ
1−θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=(P iH)
−θ
= pi(h′)θcj(h′)n(P iH)
−θ,
which implies
cj(h) =
1
n
(
pi(h)
P iH
)−θ
CjH . (6.13)
Adding steps one and two plus the symmetric results for the foreign good (for ease of
exposition agent j is still assumed to live in region H) results in10
cj(h) =
ν
n
(
pH(h)
PHH
)−θ
PH
PHH
Cj and cj(f) =
1− ν
1− n
(
pH(f)
PHF
)−θ
PH
PHF
Cj. (6.14)
We assume that government spending is subject to the same home bias as private con-
sumption expenditures. This assumption lies between the extreme positions of no home
bias in government expenditures, as proposed by Lombardo and Sutherland (2004),
and complete home bias, as proposed by Beetsma and Jensen (2002), Benigno (2004)
and Gali andMonacelli (2005a).11 The symmetric results for optimal expenditures of
the home government are
gH(h) =
ν
n
(
pH(h)
PHH
)−θ
PH
PHH
GH and gH(f) =
1− ν
1− n
(
pH(f)
PHF
)−θ
PH
PHF
GH . (6.15)
10An agent j of region F would demand cj(h) = 1−νn
(
pH(h)
PFH
)−θ
PF
PFH
Cj and
cj(f) = ν1−n
(
pF (f)
PFF
)−θ
PF
PFF
Cj .
11Our solution is in line with the comment by Leith (2004) alluded to by Lombardo and Sutherland
(2004) in footnote 8. Gali and Monacelli (2005a) cite “evidence on a strong home bias in government
procurement” in their footnote 8.
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6.1.2 Terms of Trade and Aggregate Demand
As set out before, the law of one price holds in the economy considered, i.e. pH(h) =
pF (h) and pH(f) = pF (f). Nonetheless, agents appreciate consumption of domestically
produced goods more. Hence, the (consumer) price index in the home region PH includes
a larger share of domestic goods than the (consumer) price index in the foreign region
P F . This implies non-trivial terms of trade. Defining the terms of trade as the price of
imports relative to the price of exports,12 from the viewpoint of economy i we have
Si ≡ P
i
−i
P−ii
=
P−i
Pi
, (6.16)
where “not i” is denoted by “−i”. The latter equality holds as the rate of substitution
between domestic goods is constant in both economies, so that the basket of domestically
produced goods has the same composition in both economies, though not the same relative
size. Therefore a change in the price index of domestically produced goods has the same
impact on e.g. P FH and on P
H
H and we can drop the superscript. It is useful to relate
the terms of trade to the consumer price indices PH and P F and to the price indices of
goods produced in each region, PH and PF , using the definitions P
H ≡ (PH)ν(PF )1−ν and
P F ≡ (PF )ν(PH)1−ν , which are generalizations of (6.4):
PH
PH
= (SH)
1−ν ,
PH
PF
=
1
(SH)ν
,
P F
PH
= (SH)
ν and
P F
PF
=
1
(SH)1−ν
. (6.17)
In the case of an identical home bias in both regions, which we are assuming here, the
ratios of the two measures of inflation are inversely related to each other:13 Si = 1/S−i.
Movements in the terms of trade imply movements in relative prices and, therefore, shift
demand across the border. Using the terms of trade and the fact that Cj =
γIji
P i
, we can
rewrite the first-order condition of the producer-consumers with respect to their consump-
12This notation is the reciprocal of the usual definition, see e. g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), p.
242. The notation is in line with the standard literature from the viewpoint of the foreign economy.
13See Gali and Monacelli (2002) for a similar treatment in a small open economy setting.
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tion of a single good and – in a similar manner – to their money holdings M ji as
cj(h) =
ν
n
(
pH(h)
PH
)−θ
γIjH
PH
, (6.18)
cj(f) =
1− ν
1− n
(
pH(f)
PF
)−θ
γIjH
PF
, (6.19)
cj(h) =
1− ν
n
(
pH(h)
PH
)−θ
γIjF
PH
, (6.20)
cj(f) =
ν
1− n
(
pF (f)
PF
)−θ
γIjF
PF
, (6.21)
M ji = (1− γ)Iji . (6.22)
The first two equations determine a home resident’s optimal choice of home and foreign
goods, the next two equations determine the analog for a foreign resident, while the last
equation shows the optimality condition with respect to money holdings.
Total nominal expenditure by consumers in region H is IH =
∫ n
0
IjHdj, while in region
F it is IF =
∫ 1
n
IjFdj. The demand function for a good h is given by
Y d(h) =
∫ 1
0
cj(h)dj + χHgH(h) + χFgF (h)
=
(
pH(h)
PH
)−θ
1
n
·
[
γ
νIH + (1− ν)IF
PH
+ νχH
PH
PH
GH + (1− ν)χF P
F
PH
GF
]
. (6.23)
Similarly, the demand for a certain foreign good f is given by
Y d(f) =
∫ 1
0
cj(f)dj + χHgH(f) + χFgF (f)
=
(
pF (f)
PF
)−θ
1
1− n
·
[
γ
(1− ν)IH + νIF
PF
+ νχF
P F
PF
GF + (1− ν)χH P
H
PF
GH
]
. (6.24)
Again denoting “not i” by −i, we define a variable proportional to “wealth”:
W ≡ γ νIi + (1− ν)I−i
Pi
+ νχi
P i
Pi
Gi + (1− ν)χ−iP
−i
Pi
G−i. (6.25)
At this point it is useful to note that this definition includes the terms of trade between
domestic and foreign goods, as Ii =
P iC
γ
measures the nominal consumption expenditures
using the level of the consumer price index (CPI), while the denominator involves the
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level of the producer price index (PPI) as a reference. Using the identities from (6.17),
one can easily transform this notation into one that includes real expenditures and the
terms of trade S:
W =
ν(SH)1−ν
(
γ IH
PH
+ χHGH
)
+ (1− ν)(SH)ν
(
γ IF
PF
+ χFGF
)
if i = H,
ν(SH)
ν−1 (γ IF
PF
+ χFGF
)
+ (1− ν)(SH)−ν
(
γ IH
PH
+ χHGH
)
if i = F.
To obtain a single equation for demand, we define the following weights:
wi =
n if i = H,1− n if i = F.
Then, demand for a specific good j from region i amounts to
Y d(j) =
(
pi(j)
Pi
)−θ
W
wi
. (6.26)
Analogously to Benigno (2004), the smaller a region is (i.e. the higher the degree of
openness), the larger the terms of trade effect will be on regional output (included in the
W term).14
6.1.3 Price Setting
When selling the product, each producer is a monopolist. The producer, therefore, decides
upon the price of the product by maximizing the indirect utility function. The indirect
utility function is obtained by plugging Cj =
γIji
P i
and M ji = (1 − γ)Iji into the utility
function (6.1), replacing Iji by the right-hand side of the budget constraint, replacing the
price ratio with the help of equation (6.26), and simplifying:
U ji =(1− τi)
(
W
wi
) 1
θ
(Y ji )
θ−1
θ − Ti + M¯
j
i
Pi
−
(
di
β
)
(Y ji )
β. (6.27)
14Note that our demand functions are more complicated than the ones in Benigno (2004) because of
the preference parameter ν. This destroys the identity PH = PF that holds in Benigno (2004) as long
as νH 6= n. If νH = νF = n and 1− νH = 1− νF = 1− n, the consumer price indices of both regions are
identical, and the demand functions become as simple as in Benigno (2004).
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The indirect utility function of agent j is maximized with respect to the price pi(j), noting
that the output produced by agent j is equal to its demand, i.e. Y ji = Y
d(j).15
∂U ji
∂pi(j)
= (1− τi)
(
W
wi
) 1
θ
[
θ − 1
θ
(Y ji )
− 1
θ (−θ)
(
pi(j)
Pi
)−θ−1(
W
wi
)]
−di
β
β(Y ji )
β−1(−θ)
(
pi(j)
Pi
)−θ−1(
W
wi
)
= (1− τi)
(
W
wi
) θ+1
θ
(1− θ)
(
pi(j)
Pi
)−θ−1+1(
W
wi
)−1
θ
+diθ
(
pi(j)
Pi
)−θ(β−1+1)(
W
wi
)β−1+1
= (1− τi)W
wi
(1− θ)
(
pi(j)
Pi
)−θ
+ diθ
(
W
wi
)β (
pi(j)
Pi
)−θβ−1
!
= 0. (6.28)
We obtain the optimal ratio of prices by
(
pi(j)
Pi
)
=
 −diθ
(
W
wi
)β−1
(1− τi)(1− θ)

1
−θ+θβ+1
=
(
θdi
(θ − 1)(1− τi)
(
W
wi
)β−1) 11+θ(β−1)
. (6.29)
Furthermore, we assume that some prices are fixed in advance, comparable to a static
version of the staggered price-setting introduced by Calvo (1983). A fraction Φi of
producers cannot change their prices and thus have to charge the same prices as in the
past, whereas a fraction (1 − Φi) of producers is able to set their prices freely after the
realization of the shocks in region i. The price level of goods from region H is a weighted
sum of the average of pre-set prices E[p¯H(h)] and the newly set prices p˜H(h), which due
to symmetry are equal for all producers. Based on equation (6.5), we obtain
P 1−θH = Φ
H(Ep¯H(h))1−θ + (1− ΦH)(p˜H(h))1−θ. (6.30)
For goods produced in region F the equivalent equation is
P 1−θF = Φ
F (Ep¯F (f))1−θ + (1− ΦF )(p˜F (f))1−θ. (6.31)
15As the decision of a single individual has only marginal impact on terms of trade and the price indices,
this effect is neglected in the optimization.
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For convenience, the price ratio in region i may be defined as
λi ≡ Φi
(
Ep¯i(j)
Pi
)1−θ
+ (1− Φi)
(
p˜i(j)
Pi
)1−θ
= 1. (6.32)
In line with equation (6.4), the aggregate consumer price index in region i is given by
PH =
[
ΦH
(
Ep¯H(h)
)1−θ
+ (1− ΦH) (p˜H(h))1−θ] ν1−θ
·
[
ΦF
(
Ep¯F (f)
)1−θ
+ (1− ΦF ) (p˜F (f))1−θ] 1−ν1−θ (6.33)
P F =
[
ΦF
(
Ep¯F (f)
)1−θ
+ (1− ΦF ) (p˜F (f))1−θ] ν1−θ
·
[
ΦH
(
Ep¯H(h)
)1−θ
+ (1− ΦH) (p˜H(h))1−θ] 1−ν1−θ . (6.34)
This can be written in terms of the overall price level16
P ≡ (PH)n(P F )1−n
=
[
ΦH
(
Ep¯H(h)
)1−θ
+ (1− ΦH) (p˜H(h))1−θ]nν+(1−n)(1−ν)1−θ
·
[
ΦF
(
Ep¯F (f)
)1−θ
+ (1− ΦF ) (p˜F (f))1−θ]n(1−ν)+(1−n)ν1−θ . (6.35)
6.1.4 Aggregate Output and Fiscal Policy
Aggregate output in each region is defined by the following equations:
YH ≡
∫ n
0
pH(h)Y (h)
PH
dh and YF ≡
∫ 1
n
pF (f)Y (f)
PF
df. (6.36)
Using the demand functions (6.23) and (6.24) as well as the price index definitions (6.5),
and denoting the lower and upper integral limits of each region i by lli and uli, respec-
tively,17 aggregate output produced in region i can be rewritten as
Yi =
∫ uli
lli
pi(j)
Pi
(
pi(j)
Pi
)−θ
W
wi
dj =
[∫ uli
lli
(
pi(j)
Pi
)1−θ
dj
]
W
wi
(6.37)
= λi
W
wi
=
W
wi
.
16Note that the numerators of the exponents add up exactly to one.
17I.e., lli =
0 if i = H,n if i = F, and uli =
n if i = H,1 if i = F.
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Essentially, this implies that the goods’ supply in region i is equal to its demand, which
according to equation (6.25) originates from both regions. Total output is given as the
geometric average of output in both regions:
Y ≡ Y nHY 1−nF . (6.38)
We specify fiscal policy as follows: Each fiscal authority uses per-capita taxes Ti to sub-
sidize production, i. e., Ti > 0, τi < 0. We assume for the moment that there is no other
government spending, i.e. χi = X
i = Gi = 0. In this case, wealth W simplifies to
W = γ
νIi + (1− ν)I−i
Pi
=
γ
Pi
[
ν
∫ uli
lli
Iji dj + (1− ν)
∫ ul−i
ll−i
Ij−idj
]
=
γ
Pi
[ν
∫ uli
lli
(
pi(j)Y ji (1− τi)− PiTi + M¯ ji
)
dj
+(1− ν)
∫ ul−i
ll−i
(
p−i(j)Y j−i(1− τ−i)− P−iT−i + M¯ j−i
)
dj]
=
γ
Pi
[
ν
(
PiYi(1− τi)− PiTi + M¯i
)
+ (1− ν) (P−iY−i(1− τ−i)− P−iT−i + M¯−i)]
=
γ
Pi
[
νM¯i + (1− ν)M¯−i + νPiW
wi
+ (1− ν)P−i W
w−i
]
⇔ W = γ M¯
P
1
1− γ ν
wi
− γ 1−ν
w−i
Si
, (6.39)
where we assume identical beginning-of-period real money holdings for all agents M¯
P
=
M¯ji
Pi
and for all i, j.18 This fiscal policy uses distortionary taxation to offset market distortion
due to monopolistic competition. Therefore, this type of fiscal policy is closest to the
theoretical optimum. Nonetheless, our framework allows for various other fiscal policies.19
18Without the assumption of internationally identical money holdings M¯/P has to be replaced by
[nM¯i + (1− n)M¯−i]/Pi.
19Two alternative fiscal policies – with distortionary taxation that is either wasted or used for govern-
ment spending – are analyzed in Dixit and Lambertini (2003b): In the first, τi > 0, , χi = Gi = Ti = 0
and Xi > 0. In the second, τi > 0 (as long as Gi > 0), χi = 1, Ti = 0. Analyzing the effects of these
policies might be a useful topic for future research.
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6.1.5 Log-Linear Equilibrium Fluctuations: Price Setting
We log-linearize the model as follows: First, note that a linear approximation of equation
(6.4) around Pi = P
i = P for all i results in
piH = νpiH + (1− ν)piF and piF = νpiF + (1− ν)piH , (6.40)
where the inflation rates are defined as percentage deviations of the respective price level
from its steady-state level,20 i.e.
pii ≡ log(P i)− log(P¯ i), given P¯ i 6= 0. (6.41)
Then, equations (6.30) and (6.31) linearize21 to
piH = Φ
H p¯iH + (1− ΦH)p˜iH and piF = ΦF p¯iF + (1− ΦF )p˜iF . (6.42)
Combining the results gives
piH = ν(ΦH p¯iH + (1− ΦH)p˜iH) + (1− ν)(ΦF p¯iF + (1− ΦF )p˜iF ) (6.43)
piF = ν(ΦF p¯iF + (1− ΦF )p˜iF ) + (1− ν)(ΦH p¯iH + (1− ΦH)p˜iH). (6.44)
Now, we turn to the optimal price a producer would set if he could choose the price freely.
According to Dixit and Lambertini (2003a), we refer to the idea of Calvo-staggered
pricing, which reflects a dynamic setting (for details see again Calvo, 1983). Analo-
gously to the procedure proposed by Dixit and Lambertini, we introduce a discount
factor η with η < 1 (which means that pseudo-future period utilities have a lower weight
than present utility). We, first, assume that η equals unity to explain the “intuitional
proceeding”. In the case where prices are allowed to change, the optimal log price equals
p˜iH = (1− ΦH)pijH + ΦH p¯iH
p˜iF = (1− ΦF )pijF + ΦF p¯iF .
where piji is the log steady-state deviation of the price that would be optimal if prices
could be adjusted freely. The log price set by producer j is a sum of the weighted optimal
20Under the assumption that P¯ i ≡ 1, one can equivalently define pii ≡ log(P i) .
21To appreciate this, compare the following procedure undertaken with a simplified, yet similar equa-
tion:
P b = φQb + (1− φ)Rb ⇒ P¯ bebpi = φQ¯bebp¯i + (1− φ)R¯bebp˜i, which is approximately equal to
P¯ b(1 + bpi) = φQ¯b(1 + bp¯i) + (1 − φ)R¯b(1 + bp˜i) ⇒ bpi = φ Q¯b
P¯ b
bp¯i + (1− φ) R¯b
P¯ b
bp˜i. As the fractions are
equal to unity, this simplifies to pi = φp¯i + (1− φ)p˜i.
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price of producer j, if prices were fully flexible, and the weighted price that maximizes
the expected indirect utility, if prices are to be fixed in future periods. The weights equal
the probability of being able, (1 − Φi), or not being able, Φi, to change the price in the
following period(s).
Now we come back to the discount factor η < 1: As already mentioned, the individuals
place lower weight on future utilities. Therefore, the fact that the producer cannot change
the price in future periods with a certain probability is expressed by a lower weight than
the pure probability of future price setting (given by ηΦi) and a higher weight for the
present period (1− ηΦi). Hence, we obtain
p˜iH = (1− ΦHη)pijH + ΦHηp¯iH , (6.45)
p˜iF = (1− ΦFη)pijF + ΦFηp¯iF . (6.46)
In the case of η = 0, this setting would be purely static: Here, the (deviation from the
steady state of the) optimal price once an individual is allowed to change price p˜ii is
identical to the price that is optimal for the current period only, as there are no future
periods to form expectations about.
Using equations (6.45) and (6.46) to replace the optimal prices in the consumer price
indices (6.43) and (6.44) gives
piH = νΦH [1 + (1− ΦH)η]p¯iH + ν(1− ΦH)(1− ΦHη)pijH
+(1− ν)ΦF [1 + (1− ΦF )η]p¯iF + (1− ν)(1− ΦF )(1− ΦFη)pijF (6.47)
piF = νΦF [1 + (1− ΦF )η]p¯iF + ν(1− ΦF )(1− ΦFη)pijF
+(1− ν)ΦF [1 + (1− ΦF )η]p¯iH + (1− ν)(1− ΦF )(1− ΦFη)pijH . (6.48)
The overall inflation rate can be calculated by using the previous equations together with
equation (6.35):
pi = npiH + (1− n)piF (6.49)
= [nν + (1− n)(1− ν)]piH + [n(1− ν) + (1− n)ν]piF . (6.50)
Equation (6.49) states that union-wide inflation is the sum of the regional CPI inflation
weighted by the size of each region. The second equation (6.50) links union-wide inflation
to the PPI inflation rates in each region, where the influence of regional PPI inflation
depends on both the size of the region and the preference of agents for goods from that
region.
CHAPTER 6. MICROFOUNDATION 110
6.1.6 Inflation Determination
In general, a producer sets its price by maximizing the indirect utility function which
results in equation (6.29) above. A log-linear approximation of this equation around the
steady state, solved for the relative deviation of wealth from its steady state level, Wˆ , is
Wˆ =
1 + θ(β − 1)
β − 1 (pˆ
i(j)− pii)− 1
β − 1 dˆi −
τ¯i
β − 1 τˆi, (6.51)
where pii ≡ Pˆi, and a “hat” above a variable denotes percentage deviations of the variable
from its steady state.22 To replace Wˆ in the last expression, we log-linearize the policy-
dependent wealth equation.
For the fiscal policy considered here, we use equation (6.39), and obtain the result
Wˆ =
γm¯
ω
mˆ+
γ(1− ν)
ωw−i
si, (6.52)
where ω is given by ω ≡ 1− γ[ ν
wi
+ 1−ν
w−i
] and si ≡ Sˆi = pi−i − pii. mˆ = ̂¯M/P is the change
in the beginning-of-period real money holdings.
In the next step, equation (6.51) – with Wˆ replaced by the fiscal-policy-dependent
equation – is evaluated at both E[ ˆ¯pi(j)] ≡ p¯ii, the (log deviation of the) price that max-
imizes the future indirect utility, and at pˆji ≡ piji , the (log deviation of the) price that
maximizes the current period indirect utility. Starting with the first case p¯ii, we obtain
p¯ii = E[pii] +
1
1 + θ(β − 1)E[dˆi] +
τ¯i
1 + θ(β − 1)E[τˆi]
+
β − 1
1 + θ(β − 1)E
[
γm¯
ω
mˆ+
γ(1− ν)
ωw−i
si
]
= E[pii] +
1
1 + θ(β − 1)E[dˆi] +
τ¯i
1 + θ(β − 1)E[τˆi]
+
β − 1
1 + θ(β − 1)
γm¯
ω
E[mˆ] +
β − 1
1 + θ(β − 1)
γ(1− ν)
ωw−i
E[si]
=
1
1 + θ(β − 1)E[dˆi] +
β − 1
1 + θ(β − 1)
γm¯
ω
E[mˆ] +
τ¯i
1 + θ(β − 1)E[τˆi]
+
β − 1
1 + θ(β − 1)
γ(1− ν)
ωw−i
E[si] + E[pii]
=
1
1 + θ(β − 1)E[dˆi] +
β − 1
1 + θ(β − 1)
γm¯
ω
E[mˆ] +
τ¯i
1 + θ(β − 1)E[τˆi]
+
(
1− β − 1
1 + θ(β − 1)
γ(1− ν)
ωw−i
)
E[pii] +
β − 1
1 + θ(β − 1)
γ(1− ν)
ωw−i
E[pi−i]
= ω¯0,i + ω1E[τˆi] + ω2E[τˆ−i] + ω3E[pii] + ω4E[pi−i], (6.53)
22For the approximation of the fiscal policy term note that ̂(1− τi) = −τ¯i1−τ¯i τˆi.
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where ω¯0,i ≡ 11+θ(β−1)E[dˆi] + β−11+θ(β−1) γm¯ω E[mˆ], ω1 ≡ τ¯i1+θ(β−1) , ω2 ≡ 0,
ω3 ≡
(
1− β−1
1+θ(β−1)
γ(1−ν)
ωw−i
)
and ω4 ≡ β−11+θ(β−1) γ(1−ν)ωw−i .23 Note that via si = pi−i − pii the
terms in si have been replaced by terms in pii and pi−i. Accordingly, for the price that
maximizes the current period indirect utility only, we obtain
piji =
1
1 + θ(β − 1) dˆi +
β − 1
1 + θ(β − 1)
γm¯
ω
mˆ+
τ¯i
1 + θ(β − 1) τˆi
+
(
1− β − 1
1 + θ(β − 1)
γ(1− ν)
ωw−i
)
pii +
β − 1
1 + θ(β − 1)
γ(1− ν)
ωw−i
pi−i (6.54)
= ω0,i + ω1τˆi + ω2τˆ−i + ω3pii + ω4pi−i. (6.55)
Using equations (6.42), (6.45) and (6.46), we obtain an equation that expresses the
regional producer inflation rate in terms of the log of the price that maximizes the future
indirect utility and the price that maximizes the current period indirect utility only:
pii = ρ
ip¯ii + (1− ρi)piji , ρi = Φi[1 + (1− Φi)η]. (6.56)
Henceforth, we will neglect the superscript i for the parameter ρ for reasons of clarity,
because the results derived in the following have exactly the same structure for both
regions.
We use (6.56) and combine the two log prices in equations (6.53) and (6.55):
pii = ρ [ω¯0,i + ω1E[τˆi] + ω2E[τˆ−i] + ω3E[pii] + ω4E[pi−i]]
+(1− ρ) [ω0,i + ω1τˆi + ω2τˆ−i + ω3pii + ω4pi−i] . (6.57)
For the other region, analog steps yield
pi−i = ρ [ω¯0,−i + ω1E[τˆ−i] + ω2E[τˆi] + ω3E[pi−i] + ω4E[pii]]
+(1− ρ) [ω0,−i + ω1τˆ−i + ω2τˆi + ω3pi−i + ω4pii] , (6.58)
where ω0,−i differs only from ω0,i by the stochastic disutility of labor variable dˆ−i instead
of dˆi.
Combining (6.57) and (6.58) and solving this system of equations for the region-specific
23We add the term ω2 to show that under alternative fiscal policies this spillover effect can be non-zero.
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inflation rates, one obtains
pii = Ωρ
[
ω¯0,i +
(1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3 ω¯0,−i
]
+Ωρ
[(
ω¯1 +
(1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3ω2
)
E[τˆi] +
(
ω2 +
(1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3ω1
)
E[τˆ−i]
]
+Ωρ
[(
ω3 +
(1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3ω4
)
E[pii] +
(
ω4 +
(1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3ω3
)
E[pi−i]
]
+Ω(1− ρ)
[
ω0,i +
(1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3ω0,−i
]
+Ω(1− ρ)
(
ω1 +
(1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3ω2
)
τˆi
+Ω(1− ρ)
(
ω2 +
(1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3ω1
)
τˆ−i (6.59)
with Ω ≡ 1−(1−ρ)ω3
[1−(1−ρ)ω3]2−[(1−ρ)ω4]2 . Written in a more compact way, this result will be used
in the following sections:
pii = µi + c
iτˆi + c
−iτˆ−i, i ∈ {H,F}. (6.60)
Referring to the supply-side fiscal policy introduced above, we assume that ω2 = 0 and
obtain24
µi ≡ Ωρ
[
ω¯0,i +
(1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3 ω¯0,−i
]
+ Ωρ
[
ω1E[τˆi] +
(1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3ω1E[τˆ−i]
]
+Ωρ
[(
ω3 +
(1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3ω4
)
E[pii] +
(
ω4 +
(1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3ω3
)
E[pi−i]
]
+Ω(1− ρ)
[
ω0,i +
(1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3ω0,−i
]
,
which captures not only the terms dependent on monetary policy, but also the expecta-
tional terms and the stochastic terms, as shown by Dixit and Lambertini (2003a). The
parameters
ci ≡ Ω(1− ρ)ω1 and c−i ≡ Ω(1− ρ) (1− ρ)ω4
1− (1− ρ)ω3ω1
denote the impact of domestic and foreign fiscal policy on inflation, respectively. Equation
(6.60) states that regional PPI inflation can be explained as the outcome of influences
from monetary policy and stochastic events, from fiscal policy in the same region, and
from fiscal policy in the other region.
24Note that the calculations made so far hold more generally to facilitate enhancement of the micro-
model with respect to other types of fiscal policies. Henceforth, we assume that ω2 = 0.
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6.1.7 Output Determination
To obtain an equation for regional output yi, we start with equation (6.37) and plug in
equation (6.29):
Yi =
∫ uli
lli
(
pi(j)
Pi
)1−θ
dj
W
wi
=
∫ uli
lli
(
θdˆi
(θ − 1)(1− τi)
(
W
wi
)β−1) 1−θ1+θ(β−1)
W
wi
dj
=
(
θdˆi
(θ − 1)(1− τi)
(
W
wi
)β−1) 1−θ1+θ(β−1)
W
wi
.
Log-linearizing this equation and using the notation yi ≡ Yˆi, we obtain
yi =
1− θ
1 + θ(β − 1) dˆi +
1− θ
1 + θ(β − 1) τ¯iτˆi +
(β − 1)(1− θ)
1 + θ(β − 1) Wˆ + Wˆ . (6.61)
Now we follow the procedure in Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) and apply equation
(6.51) in two ways: First, we replace the first Wˆ in (6.51) with i indices and the second
Wˆ with −i indices. We thus obtain
yi =
1− θ
1 + θ(β − 1) dˆi +
1− θ
1 + θ(β − 1) τ¯iτˆi
+
(β − 1)(1− θ)
1 + θ(β − 1)
[
1 + θ(β − 1)
β − 1 (pˆ
i(j)− pii)− 1
β − 1 dˆi −
τ¯i
β − 1 τˆi
]
+
[
1 + θ(β − 1)
β − 1 (pˆ
−i(j)− pi−i)− 1
β − 1 dˆ−i −
τ¯−i
β − 1 τˆ−i
]
. (6.62)
Second, we do the same thing the other way round, leading to
yi =
1− θ
1 + θ(β − 1) dˆi +
1− θ
1 + θ(β − 1) τ¯iτˆi
+
(β − 1)(1− θ)
1 + θ(β − 1)
[
1 + θ(β − 1)
β − 1 (pˆ
−i(j)− pi−i)− 1
β − 1 dˆ−i −
τ¯−i
β − 1 τˆ−i
]
+
[
1 + θ(β − 1)
β − 1 (pˆ
i(j)− pii)− 1
β − 1 dˆi −
τ¯i
β − 1 τˆi
]
. (6.63)
In the next step, we add up the two equations and divide by two. We evaluate pˆi(j)
in both regions for the flexible price firms, i. e. we replace pˆi(j) by piji , the price that
maximizes current period indirect utility only. Replacing piji with equation (6.56) and
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simplifying leads to
yi=
(
1− θ
2[1 + θ(β − 1)] −
1
2(β − 1)
)
τ¯iτˆi −
(
1− θ
2[1 + θ(β − 1)] +
1
2(β − 1)
)
τ¯−iτˆ−i
+
βρ
(β − 1)(1− ρ)(pii − p¯ii + pi−i − p¯i−i)
+
(
1− θ
2[1 + θ(β − 1)] −
1
2(β − 1)
)
dˆi −
(
1− θ
2[1 + θ(β − 1)] +
1
2(β − 1)
)
d−i
=
(
1− θ
2[1 + θ(β − 1)] −
1
2(β − 1)
)
τ¯iτˆi −
(
1− θ
2[1 + θ(β − 1)] +
1
2(β − 1)
)
τ¯−iτˆ−i
+
2βρ
(β − 1)(1− ρ)(pii − p¯ii) +
βρ
(β − 1)(1− ρ)(si − s¯i)
+
(
1− θ
2[1 + θ(β − 1)] −
1
2(β − 1)
)
dˆi −
(
1− θ
2[1 + θ(β − 1)] +
1
2(β − 1)
)
d−i, (6.64)
The notation s¯i = E[si] is used to denote region i’s expected terms of trade. Given the
steady state of P¯i = P¯
i = P¯ for all i, we have s¯i ≡ 0 so that we can drop this term. For
ease of exposition we rewrite the last equation as follows:
yi = y¯i + a
iτˆi + a
i,−iτˆ−i + bi(pii − piei ) + κisi + φi, (6.65)
where y¯i = 0, a
i ≡
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] − 12(β−1)
)
τ¯i captures the effect of the home country’s fiscal
policy instrument and ai,−i ≡ −
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] +
1
2(β−1)
)
τ¯−i the effect of foreign fiscal policy
on domestic output.25 The effect of domestic surprise inflation on output is captured by
bi ≡ 2βρ
(β−1)(1−ρ) , with pi
e
i = p¯ii = E[pii], whereas the effect of a surprise change in the terms
of trade, si, is measured by κ
i ≡ βρ
(β−1)(1−ρ) . The variable φi replaces the effects of both
productivity shocks, given by
φi =
(
1− θ
2[1 + θ(β − 1)] −
1
2(β − 1)
)
dˆi −
(
1− θ
2[1 + θ(β − 1)] +
1
2(β − 1)
)
dˆ−i.
Henceforth, φi is denoted as the “region-specific” output shock. In the policy analysis done
in section 7.1, we will focus attention on equations (6.60) and (6.65), which summarize
the microeconomic model.
25Note that the steady-state level of subsidies τ¯i is negative, as will be shown in section 7.2. Therefore,
an expansionary fiscal policy is given if τi < τ¯i, i.e. if τˆi = τi−τ¯iτ¯i > 0. It is important to keep this in mind
in order to follow the fiscal policy description in section 7.1.
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6.2 A Utility Based Welfare Criterion
In this section, we derive a second-order approximation of welfare, based on the utility of
a representative agent. The resulting welfare criterion will then be used to evaluate the
various policies we consider in our model. The method of approximating welfare based on
utility is well documented in the literature, beginning with Rotemberg andWoodford
(1998), and Clarida, Gali andGertler (2002) for a two-country model. In our model,
we look at both regional and union-wide welfare and, thus, combine the closed economy
model with that of an open economy. Our approach is based on the textbook treatment
of Woodford (2003) and appendix B of Dixit and Lambertini (2003a).
One important insight shall become clear and is stressed in the upcoming sections: na-
tionwide welfare depends on the national producer price index (PPI) inflation, as opposed
to consumer price index (CPI) inflation. This means that a welfare maximizing policy
authority should target the prices of goods produced within this region, and not those
consumed in the region, which also include foreign goods’ prices. This finding is in line
with Gali and Monacelli (2002, 2005a), but in contrast to many papers on this topic,
e. g. Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003b). From a theoretical point of view, we give the
following explanation: In a microfounded yeoman-farmer model,26 the agents’ aversion of
inflation variation is a result of the “disutility of labor”-part in the utility function. As a
result of labor earnings that are assumed to be restricted to the home region, the home
price level and, thereby, home inflation becomes important for home residents.27 Hence,
a concerned domestic policy authority should stabilize domestic inflation and domestic
output in the short-run.28
In the following, we sketch the approximation method, derive the steady state around
which we approximate, and derive the welfare criteria for one region and for the union as
a whole.
26See Woodford (2003), pp. 144f.
27To apply this to the EMU, we state that mobility of labor appears still to be very low in the Euro-area
due to cultural and structural barriers.
28Note that also fluctuations in foreign prices influences the consumption behavior and, therefore,
affects also the utility of a household in region H. These prices, however, cannot be controlled by the
fiscal policy maker in region H. So, the domestic fiscal authority focusses on a stabilization of home
inflation and home output.
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6.2.1 Approximation Method and Optimal Policy Instrument
In general, a variable y ≡ log(Y/Y¯ ) is approximated by a second-order Taylor series at
the steady state Y = Y¯ :
log(Y/Y¯ ) ≈ log(Y¯ /Y¯ ) + 1
Y¯
(Y − Y¯ )− 1
Y¯ 2
(Y − Y¯ )2
2
≈ 0 + Y − Y¯
Y¯
− 1
2
(
Y − Y¯
Y¯
)2
, (6.66)
which can be transformed to Y−Y¯
Y¯
≈ y + 1
2
(
Y−Y¯
Y¯
)2
. Then, notice that y2 =
(
log(Y/Y¯ )
)2
,
approximated by a second-order Taylor series at the same point Y = Y¯ , looks as follows:(
log
Y
Y¯
)2
≈
(
log
Y¯
Y¯
)2
+ 2
(
log
Y¯
Y¯
)
1
Y¯
(Y − Y¯ ) + 2 1
(Y¯ )2
(Y − Y¯ )2
2
≈ 0 + 0 +
(
Y − Y¯
Y¯
)2
, (6.67)
which is exactly minus twice the last term in the first approximation. Therefore, up to
second-order,
Y − Y¯
Y¯
≈ y + 1
2
y2 . (6.68)
6.2.2 Steady State and Optimal Fiscal Policy
To understand the welfare implications of various policies, we evaluate the welfare costs of
deviating from the optimal steady state. In doing so, we first evaluate the optimal steady
state values, which would occur under flexible prices. Then, we calculate a second-order
approximation of the households’ utility function and simplify it to obtain a canonical
representation of the welfare function.
The representative agent j living in region i derives utility from equation (6.1). Plug-
ging in the first-order conditions and using the budget constraint yields the indirect utility
function, as given in equation (6.27). Using equation (6.37), we can replace W
wi
by Yi = Y
j
i
for all j, where the latter equality only holds for flexible prices. Neglecting the utility
from real balances, which is in line with what Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) call
the cashless limit of the economy, we obtain
U ji = (1− τi)Y ji − Ti −
di
β
(Y ji )
β. (6.69)
Analogously to the previous section, we assume that fiscal policy uses only the lump-sum
tax (or transfer) and the consumption tax (or subsidy) τi for its actions, while government
CHAPTER 6. MICROFOUNDATION 117
spending (or waste) is set equal to zero. The budget constraint for the fiscal authority in
region i is given by
Ti = −Yiτi . (6.70)
As flexible prices imply identical pricing decisions for all producers, the left hand side of
the first-order condition (6.29) becomes unity. Using again equation (6.37) and assuming a
steady state in which all stochastic terms are equal to their expected value, i. e. d¯i = E[di],
the steady state natural level of output in the flexible price scenario is given by
Y¯ j,ni =
(
(θ − 1)(1− τ¯i)
θd¯i
) 1
β−1
. (6.71)
We will approximate utility around this steady state given in equation (6.71), i. e. we
linearize the utility function around a point in which prices are flexible and stochastic
terms are equal to their expected values. Note, however, that we do not necessarily assume
that fiscal policy is efficient. Thus, the overall distortion in the steady state output level
is a result of both, market power and fiscal policy.29 When taxes were set efficiently, they
would eliminate the distortions stemming from monopolistic power. Taking the derivative
of equation (6.69) with respect to τi, while taking equation (6.71) into account, gives the
efficient tax rate
τ effi =
1
1− θ , θ > 1, (6.72)
which can be inserted into equation (6.71) to calculate the corresponding level of output
in region i. We, then, obtain
Y j,effi =
(
θ − 1
θdi − 1
) 1
β−1
. (6.73)
6.2.3 Derivation of a Regional Utility Based Welfare Criterion
A welfare maximizing fiscal policy in the home region optimizes the utility function of a
representative agent j living in region H, which is given by equation (6.1). We aggregate
all agents living in region H, which simplifies the consumption part due to the symmetry
of this problem, while it leaves us with an integral in the labor/output-part, as staggered
pricing implies a different behavior for different agents.
29See Woodford (2003), 293f. His parameter Φy equals our parameter κ used later in this section,
where we keep with the notation in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a), Appendix B.
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We obtain
UH = γu(CH ,MH/P
H)− 1
n
∫ n
0
vj(Y
j
H ; ξH)dj
= γ
(
CH
γ
)γ (
MH/P
H
1− γ
)1−γ
− 1
n
∫ n
0
(
dH
β
)
(Y jH)
βdj. (6.74)
Note that we do not consider the fraction of utility that originates from real balances, as we
focus on the cashless limit, following the seminal work of Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998). Therefore, we only consider the fraction γ stemming from the u(.)-term.
The notation ξ is used to capture all stochastic disturbances to the model. More
specifically, we assume that there exists a regional technology shock ξi that directly affects
production of region i. As explained in the beginning of section 6.1, we abstain from
modeling the production-side explicitly, but use instead a yeoman farmer model. The
technology shock is, therefore, treated as being a part of the “disutility of labor”- term,
which means that di is assumed to be a random variable, as defined at the beginning
of the previous section.30 We approximate around the flexible price steady state level of
consumption of households in region H, which — for reasons of brevity only — is denoted
by C¯ from now on.31
Approximation of the u(.)-part of the Utility Function
We begin with the approximation of the u(.)-part in the utility function (6.74) around
its steady state level under flexible prices and a given, constant fiscal policy by using a
second-order Taylor series:
u˜ = γ
(
u¯+ uCC˜ + uξ ξ˜H + umm˜+
1
2
uCCC˜
2 +
1
2
uξξ ξ˜
2
H +
1
2
ummm˜
2+
uCmC˜m˜+ uCξC˜ξ˜H + umξm˜ξ˜H
)
+O(||ξH ||3) , (6.75)
where a variable with a tilde (e.g. X˜) denotes the absolute deviation from the respective
steady state level (X¯), i. e., for home consumption we define C˜ ≡ C − C¯. The term
O(||ξH ||3) denotes that the residual of the approximation is of third or higher order,
30Placing the regional productivity shock ξH after the semicolon in the disutility-part of equation (6.74)
indicates direct dependency of the realization of the productivity shock.
31For a better exposition of the approximation of the utility function, we omit the superscripts H in
the consumption terms. Note that the steady state level of consumption can also be rewritten in terms
of domestic output YH , as it is done later in this section.
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where the expression ||ξH || is a bound on the amplitude of the exogenous disturbances.
The effects of third or higher order deviations of the various variables from their steady
state levels will be neglected. A subscript on u or v denotes the first derivative of v or
u with respect to the argument indicated by the subscript (uC is for example the first
derivative of u with respect to consumption C). Correspondingly, we use two subscripts
after u or v to denote second derivatives. Furthermore, we use the notationm for domestic
real money balance, i. e. m ≡MH/PH .
Summarizing terms that are independent of policy by t.i.p., we can rewrite equation
(6.75) as
u˜ = γ
(
u¯+ uCC˜ + umm˜+
1
2
uCCC˜
2 +
1
2
ummm˜
2 + uCmC˜m˜+ uCξC˜ξ˜H
)
+t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) . (6.76)
Combining the first-order conditions of the utility function with respect to consump-
tion and money holdings leads to32
MH = (1− γ)IH = 1− γ
γ
PHC
⇔ m = 1− γ
γ
C . (6.77)
After log-linearization, we apply this equation for m˜ with m˜ = 1−γ
γ
C˜.
The representative agent consumes goods of both regions, the home and the foreign
region. Home consumption can be expressed by C = γkY νHY
1−ν
F , where k ≡ (1− ν)1−ννν
and Yi with i = H,F denotes output of each region i.
The long-run steady state under flexible prices within the monetary union is given by
C¯ = Y¯H , (6.78)
where C is overall consumption of region H. This means that in the long-run steady state
domestic output (i. e. real income) equals the demand for commodities of the represen-
tative agents living in region H. This assumption holds, because government spending is
assumed to be zero for the considered supply-side fiscal policy, which was introduced in
section 6.1, and because international debt holdings are excluded in our examination.33
32For the derivation of this equation see section 6.1.
33Despite the one-period horizon, it is common when using this type of model to approximate around
the long-term flexible price equilibrium. See e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
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Applying the Taylor expansion of second order as explained at the beginning of this
section, we can substitute for
C˜ = Y¯H
(
YˆH +
1
2
Yˆ 2H +O(||ξH ||3)
)
, (6.79)
where we make use of the definition YˆH ≡ log(YH/Y¯H).
In the steady state, the following relations (6.80) - (6.85) hold:34
m¯ =
(1− γ)Y¯H
γ
, (6.80)
uC = γY¯
γ−1
H
1
γγ
(
m¯
1− γ
)1−γ
=
(
Y¯H
γ
)γ−1(
Y¯H
γ
)1−γ
= 1, (6.81)
um = (1− γ)
(
Y¯H
γ
)γ
m¯−γ
(1− γ)1−γ =
(
Y¯H
γ
)γ (
m¯
1− γ
)−γ
=
(
Y¯H
γ
)γ (
Y¯H
γ
)−γ
= 1, (6.82)
uCC = (γ − 1) Y¯
γ−2
H
γγ−1
(
m¯
1− γ
)1−γ
=
γ − 1
γ
(
Y¯H
γ
)γ−2(
Y¯H
γ
)1−γ
= −1− γ
Y¯H
, (6.83)
umm = −γ(1− γ)
(
Y¯H
γ
)γ
m¯−γ−1
(1− γ)1−γ = −
γ
1− γ
(
m¯
1− γ
)−γ−1(
Y¯H
γ
)γ
= − γ
1− γ
(
m¯
1− γ
)−γ−1(
m¯
1− γ
)γ
= − γ
m¯
, (6.84)
uCm = γ(1− γ) Y¯
γ−1
H
γγ
m¯−γ
(1− γ)1−γ =
(
Y¯H
γ
)γ−1(
m¯
1− γ
)−γ
=
(
Y¯H
γ
)γ−1(
Y¯H
γ
)−γ
=
γ
Y¯H
. (6.85)
If we use equation (6.75) and insert m and the derivatives given above, we obtain equation
34To help the reader with the notation, we point out that e.g. uC denotes the first derivative of u with
respect C, uCC denotes the second derivative of u with respect to C and uCm denotes the cross derivative
with respect to C and m.
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(6.86) after some mathematical manipulations:
u˜ = γ
(
u¯+ uCC˜ + umm˜+
1
2
uCCC˜
2 +
1
2
ummm˜
2 + uCξC˜ξ˜H
+uCmC˜m˜
)
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3)
= γ
(
u¯+ uC
(
YˆH +
1
2
YˆH
)
Y¯H + um
1− γ
γ
(
YˆH +
1
2
YˆH
)
Y¯H
+
1
2
uCC
(
YˆH +
1
2
YˆH
)2
Y¯ 2H +
1
2
(1− γ)2
γ2
umm
(
YˆH +
1
2
YˆH
)2
Y¯ 2H
+uCξ ξ˜H
(
YˆH +
1
2
YˆH
)
Y¯H + uCm
1− γ
γ
(
YˆH +
1
2
YˆH
)2
Y¯ 2H
)
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξ||3)
= γY¯H
(
uC
(
YˆH +
1
2
YˆH
)
+ um
1− γ
γ
(
YˆH +
1
2
YˆH
)
+
1
2
uCC Yˆ
2
H Y¯H
+
1
2
umm
(1− γ)2
γ2
Yˆ 2H Y¯H + ucξ ξ˜H YˆH + uCm
1− γ
γ
Yˆ 2H Y¯H
)
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3)
= γuC Y¯H
(
YˆH
(
1 +
um
uC
1− γ
γ
+
uCξ ξ˜H
uC
)
+
1
2
Yˆ 2H
(
1 +
um
uC
1− γ
γ
+
uCC
uC
Y¯H +
umm
uC
(1− γ)2
γ2
Y¯H + 2
uCm
uC
1− γ
γ
Y¯H
))
+t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3)
= γuC Y¯H
(
Yˆ
(
1 +
1− γ
γ
+ uCξ ξ˜H
)
+
1
2
Yˆ 2
(
1 +
1− γ
γ
− 1 + γ − 1 + γ + 2(1− γ)
))
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3)
= γuC Y¯H
(
YˆH
(
1 +
1− γ
γ
+ ucξ ξ˜H
)
+
1
2
Yˆ 2H
(
1 +
1− γ
γ
))
= uC Y¯
(
YˆH(γ + 1− γ + γuCξ ξ˜H
)
+
1
2
(
Yˆ 2H (γ + 1− γ)
)
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3)
= uC Y¯H
(
YˆH
(
1 + γuCξ ξ˜H
)
+
1
2
Yˆ 2H
)
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3).
We define q1 ≡ − γuCξ ξ˜uCC Y¯H and obtain for the u(.)-part of the loss function the approximation
u˜ = uC Y¯
(
YˆH (1 + (1− γ)q1) + 1
2
Yˆ 2H
)
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) , (6.86)
where t.i.p. summarizes, again, the terms which cannot be influenced by policy.
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Approximation of the v(.)-part of the Utility Function
Second order Taylor expansion of the disutility of labor part for a representative agent j
(in a certain state of nature) leads to
v˜j = Y˜
j
HvY +
1
2
vY Y (Y˜
j
H)
2 + vξ ξ˜H +
1
2
vξξ ξ˜
2
H + vY ξY˜
j
H ξ˜H +O(||ξH ||3)
= Y˜ jHvY +
1
2
vY Y (Y˜
j
H)
2 + vY ξY˜
j
H ξ˜H + t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) . (6.87)
By using the Taylor-approximation
Y˜ jH = Y¯
j
H
(
Yˆ jH +
1
2
(Yˆ jH)
2 +O(||ξH ||3)
)
, (6.88)
we can rewrite equation (6.87) as
v˜j = Y¯
j
HvY
(
Yˆ jH +
1
2
(Yˆ jH)
2 +
1
2
vY Y
vY
(
Yˆ jH +
1
2
(Yˆ jH)
2
)2
Y¯H
+
vY ξ ξ˜H
vY
(
Yˆ jH +
1
2
(Yˆ jH)
2
))
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3)
= Y¯ jHvY
(
Yˆ jH +
1
2
(Yˆ jH)
2 +
1
2
vY Y
vY
(
Yˆ jH
)2
+
vY ξ ξ˜H
vY
Yˆ jH
)
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3)
= Y¯ jHvY
[
Yˆ jH
(
1 +
vY ξ ξ˜H
vY
)
+
(Yˆ jH)
2
2
(
1 +
vY Y Y¯
j
H
vY
)]
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) .
(6.89)
By maximizing the utility function (6.74) and combining the first-order conditions, we
obtain
vY = uC(1− κ) , (6.90)
where the marginal disutility of producing output vY is equal to
vY ≡ ∂v
∂Y jH
= dH(Y
j
H)
β−1 . (6.91)
Inserting the symmetric steady state output (under fully flexible prices) given by equation
(6.71) results
vY = d¯H
(
(θ − 1)(1− τ¯H)
θd¯H
)
=
(1− τ¯H)(θ − 1)
θ
. (6.92)
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Analogously to the proceedings in Woodford, we define a parameter κ as a size which
“summarizes the overall distortions in the steady state output level as a result of both
taxes and market power”: 35
κ ≡ 1− (1− τ¯H)(θ − 1)
θ
. (6.93)
Equation (6.90) says that the marginal utility from consumption equals the marginal
disutility from labor. Using this condition with the disutility part (6.89) of an average
representative agent, we obtain
v˜ =
1
n
∫ n
0
vjdj
= Y¯HuC
(
(1− κ)
(
1 +
vξY ξ˜H
vY
)
E(Yˆ jH) +
1
2
E((Yˆ jH)
2)(1− κ)
(
1 +
vY Y Y¯H
vY
))
+t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) . (6.94)
Note that the expectations operator has to be used here, since agents are different from
each other with respect to their pricing decisions. We calculate the second derivative of
v with respect to the steady state output:
vY Y = (β − 1)dH(Y jH)β−2 =
(β − 1)dH(Y jH)β−1
Y jH
=
(β − 1)(θ − 1)(1− τH)
θY jH
=
(β − 1)(1− κ)
Y jH
=
(β − 1)vY
Y jH
. (6.95)
Solving for vY yields
vY =
Y jH
β − 1vY Y . (6.96)
Replacing vY in equation 6.94 yields
v˜ = Y¯HuC
([
(1− κ) + (1− κ)(β − 1) vY Y ξ˜H
vY Y Y¯H
]
E(Yˆ Hj )
+E((Yˆ jH)
2)(1− κ)(1 + β − 1)
)
+t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) (6.97)
= Y¯HuC
([
1− κ− (β − 1) vY ξ ξ˜H
vY Y Y¯H
]
+
β
2
[
(EYˆ jH)
2 +VarY jH
])
+t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) . (6.98)
35See Woodford (2003), appendix E, p. 394.
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To obtain equation (6.98) from (6.97), we refer to Dixit and Lambertini (2003a), who
assume that “κ is small”, meaning that it can be neglected if it enters (6.97) multiplica-
tively. This is possible as vY Y ξ˜H is on average significantly smaller than vY Y Y¯H . Further-
more, we use the definition of the variance and replace E[(Yˆ jH)
2] by (E[Yˆ jH ])
2 +VarY jH .
A second-order Taylor approximation of the CES-aggregator YH of home goods leads
to36
YˆH = EYˆ
j
H +
1
2
(
1− 1
θ
)
VarYˆ jH +O(||ξH ||3) . (6.99)
Solving for EYˆ jH , we have
EYˆ jH = YˆH −
1
2
(
1− 1
θ
)
VarYˆ jH +O(||ξH ||3), (6.100)
and inserting into equation (6.98) yields
v˜ = Y¯HuC
(
[1− κ+ (β − 1)q2] YˆH + β
2
Yˆ 2H +
1
2
[
β − 1 + 1
θ
]
VarYˆ jH
)
+t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) , (6.101)
where the definition q2 ≡ − vY ξ ξ˜HY¯HvY Y is used.
Derivation of the Welfare Function
Subtracting (6.101) from (6.86) yields social welfare
UH = uC Y¯H
(
Yˆ (1 + (1− γ)q1) + 1
2
Yˆ 2
)
−uC Y¯H
(
[1− κ+ (β − 1)q2] YˆH + β
2
Yˆ 2H +
1
2
[
β − 1 + 1
θ
]
VarYˆ jH
)
+t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3)
= −uC Y¯H
2
(
Yˆ 2H(β − 1)− 2YˆH [q1(1− γ) + q2(β − 1) + κ]
+
1 + θ(β − 1)
θ
VarYˆ jH
)
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) . (6.102)
When loglinearizing the CES-aggregator over domestically produced differentiated goods,
we obtain (see Woodford (2003), p. 396)
Yˆ jH = log Y¯H − θ(log pH(j)− logPH). (6.103)
36See Woodford (2003) chapter 6 and appendix E, or Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
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The variance of log Yˆ jH is given by
Var(Yˆ jH) = Var(log Y¯H − θ(log pH(j)− logPH)) = θ2Var(log pH(j)). (6.104)
The last equation incorporates a very important finding of our model: As the domestic
agent j only works in the home-region to produce the domestic good Y jH , and as the
production of this good matters for his utility (via the disutility part of labor in the utility
function), he also cares only about the variability of this output. Hence, only the price
level of domestically produced goods matters for the welfare of domestic agents. While
this finding is well documented in the theoretical literature,37 it is much less noted in
applied work. Of course, this finding is overturned once one assumes high labor mobility,
such that a representative agent of one region produces goods in both regions. So far, for
the European Monetary Union a high degree of labor mobility seems not to be backed by
the data.
To apply the variance of domestic prices to the welfare equation for obtaining the
inflation target, we need first to refer to the staggered price setting: We assume that a
certain fraction ΦH of firms (=producer-consumers) is not able to adjust the prices in
response to a shock, while a fraction (1−ΦH) can freely change their prices after a shock
occurs.
Using the overall inflation rate in region H given by equation (6.42) as well as the
“pseudo-intertemporal” equation (6.45) for the optimal inflation rate p˜iH derived in the
previous section, we can express the inflation rate as a combination of variables that have
a single period interpretation:
piH = ρp¯iH + (1− ρ)pijH , ρ = ΦH [1 + (1− ΦH)η], (6.105)
which is just a restatement of equation (6.56) for region H.38 Again, p¯iH is the average
inflation rate that arises when prices are set before the shocks occur, while pijH is the price
that is optimal for the current period only, i. e. after uncertainty about the stochastic
processes is resolved. With this single period representation we are able to apply the
result of the first example in Woodford (2003, pp. 397f.) for our next steps. Firms
that have to set prices before the shock materializes will set them identically according
to the expected value of the optimal price for the period, i. e.
37See Woodford (2003) or Gali and Monacelli (2002).
38This and the following steps are all loglinear approximations and are thus only accurate up to a
residual of order O(||ξH ||2) or higher.
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log p¯iH = E[pi
j
H ], (6.106)
where E denotes the expectations operator. Subtracting the expectation of equation
(6.105) from itself and noting that E[p¯iH ] = p¯iH , we obtain
piH − E[piH ] = (1− ρ)(pijH − E[pijH ])
= (1− ρ)(pijH − p¯iH). (6.107)
We, now, combine equations (6.104) and (6.107). The relation between the variance of
log pH(j) and the inflation goal in the representative agent’s utility function is given by
Var log pH(j) = ρ(1− ρ)(pijH − p¯iH)2 =
ρ(1− ρ)
(1− ρ)2 (piH − E[piH ])
2
=
ρ
1− ρ(piH − p¯iH)
2 . (6.108)
Inserting relation (6.108) into (6.102) yields
UH = − Y¯ uC
2
(
Yˆ 2H(β − 1)− 2YˆH [q1(1− γ) + q2(β − 1) + κ]
+
ρθ(1 + θ(β − 1))
1− ρ (piH − p¯iH)
)
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) . (6.109)
To obtain the output goal in the welfare function, we perform some mathematical manip-
ulations:39
Yˆ 2H(β − 1)− 2YˆH [q1(1− γ) + q2(β − 1)]− 2κYˆH
= (β − 1)
(
Yˆ 2H − 2YˆH
q1(1− γ) + q2(β − 1)
β − 1 −
2YˆH
β − 1κ
)
. (6.110)
The natural rate of output in region H, Yˆ nH , which materializes under flexible prices in
the setting of monopolistic competition, is given by a loglinearization of equation (6.71).
It can be expressed in terms of the region-specific variables q1 and q2:
40
Yˆ nH =
(1− γ)q1 + (β − 1)q2
β − 1 . (6.111)
39Note that q1 and q2, which were defined above, are region specific notations, as it contains first and
second derivatives of a representative household’s utility, who lives in region H.
40To see this, note that the loglinearized version of equation (6.71) reads Yˆ nH =
−1
β−1 (dˆi +
τ¯i
1−τ¯i τˆi).
Rewriting the terms in the last parentheses in absolute deviations from steady state, we obtain
Yˆ nH =
−1
β−1 (
di
d¯i
− 1−τi1−τ¯i ) = −1β−1 (Yi/Y¯i). Given our assumptions, ξH = dH , uC,ξ = 0 and the other partial
derivatives as given in the text, equation (6.111) is only a more general notation for the equation given
in this footnote.
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A detailed derivation of the natural rate of output for a similar utility function (but
restricted to a single-country examination) can be found in Woodford (2003), chapter
3. Using this result and adding terms from the t.i.p.-part, we can rewrite (6.110) as
(β − 1)
(
Yˆ 2H − 2YˆH Yˆ nH + (Yˆ nH)2 − 2
YˆHκ
β − 1 − 2
Yˆ nHκ
β − 1 +
κ2
(β − 1)2
)
+ 2
Yˆ nHκ
β − 1 −
κ2
(β − 1)2
= (β − 1)
(
(YˆH − Yˆ nH)2 − 2
(YˆH − Yˆ nH)κ
β − 1 +
κ2
(β − 1)2
)
+ t.i.p.
= (β − 1)
(
(YˆH − Yˆ nH)2 − 2(YˆH − Yˆ nH)y¯diffH + (y¯diffH )2
)
+ t.i.p. (6.112)
Here, we have used the notation y¯diffH for the log deviation of steady state level of output
associated with zero inflation, as given by an aggregated version of equation (6.71), from
the steady state of efficient output given by equation (6.73), evaluated at di = d¯i.
41
Formally,
y¯diffH = log
(
Y¯H
Y¯ effH
)
= log

(
(θ−1)(1−τ¯H)
θd¯H
) 1
β−1
(
θ−1
θd¯H−1
) 1
β−1
 = 1
β − 1 log
(
(θ − 1)(1− τ¯H)
θ
)
≈ 1
β − 1
(
(θ − 1)(1− τ¯H)
θ
− 1
)
= − κ
β − 1 , (6.113)
where d¯H = 1, the approximation holds only for values of (θ− 1)(1− τ¯H)θ−1 close to one,
and the last equation uses the notation of equation (6.93). The variable y¯diffH summarizes
the overall distortions in steady state output. Inserting (6.112) into equation (6.109)
yields
UH = − Y¯ uC
2
(
ρ
1− ρθ [1 + θ(β − 1)] (piH − p¯iH)
2 + (β − 1)(YˆH − Yˆ nH − y¯diffH )2
)
+t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) . (6.114)
Rearranging terms — and writing yi instead of Yˆi as well as y¯H instead of Yˆ
n
H + y¯
diff
H —
results in the welfare criterion for the home region,
LH =
1
2
(
(piH − p¯iH)2 + θH(yH − y¯H)2
)
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) , (6.115)
where θH is the relative weight of the output goal, which can be expressed by
θH =
(1− ρ)(β − 1)
ρθ[1 + θ(β − 1)] .
41Observe that in the current setting, the steady state of output under zero inflation coincides with
the steady state of output under flexible prices, see Woodford (2001, p. 16) or Woodford (2003).
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The optimization problem of social welfare in the foreign region follows the same principle.
Therefore, we can state that the foreign welfare criterion equals
LF =
1
2
(
(piF − p¯iF )2 + θF (yF − y¯F )2
)
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) , (6.116)
where θF is the output goal of the foreign region. Remark that our notation in terms of
percentage changes in output differs slightly from the one with an “output gap” typically
used in the literature. The reason for this is twofold. First, we want to express the
variables in our policy analysis throughout in terms of inflation and output. Second, we
prefer the explicit notation of observables rather than using the empirically less precise
concept of an “output gap”.
We follow the assumption in Woodford (2003, chapter 6, section 3.1) that the
inefficiency wedge κ is zero (or of order O(||ξH ||3), so that we can neglect it in the
quadratic approximation of expected utility). Implications of this are that (a) the steady
state of output is equal to the efficient steady state, (b) the percentage deviations of the
natural rate of output are equal to those of the efficient rate (up to second order), and
(c) the natural rate of output is (up to second order) equal to the efficient rate of output.
Thus, y¯diffH = Yˆ
n
H = y¯H = yH = 0, and the output argument in the welfare maximizing loss
functions simplifies to just the percentage deviation of regional output from its steady
state yH = 0.
6.2.4 Derivation of a Union-wide Utility Based Welfare Crite-
rion
One can imagine two forms of union-wide welfare: On the one hand, welfare in the whole
union can be seen as the utility of a representative agent of the whole union, who produces
union-wide output and cares about union-wide prices. On the other hand, union-wide
welfare can be seen as the weighted average of regional welfare in both regions.
To derive a utility-based welfare criterion of the first type from our micro-approach,
we abstract from differentials within the union and use union-wide variables: Union-wide
inflation is defined as pi = npiH+(1−n)piF , and analogously, union-wide output is defined
as y = nyH + (1 − n)yF . The maximization problem of a policy authority corresponds
to that of the region-specific welfare criterion, derived in the previous subsection, after
having replaced the region-specific variables by the corresponding union-wide variables.
Hence, we can write down the union-wide welfare criterion as
LU,I =
1
2
(
(pi − p¯i)2 + θM(y − y¯)2
)
+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) , (6.117)
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where y¯H = ny¯H + (1− n)y¯F .
Alternatively, a policy maker can optimize a weighted sum of each single region’s
social loss function. As an example, Pappa (2004) uses a central bank loss function of
this type when analyzing welfare-effects under a coordinated monetary policy. The idea
of its derivation is that a policy maker tries to maximize the utility of a “union-wide
representative household”, who behaves with a fraction of n like an agent of region H
and with a fraction of (1−n) like an agent of region F . The welfare criterion then equals
the sum of the region-specific welfare functions, weighted by the size of the corresponding
region. It has the form
LU,II =
1
2
[
n
(
(piH − p¯iH)2 + θH(yH − y¯H)2
)
+ (1− n) ((piF − p¯iF )2 + θF (yF − y¯F )2)]+ t.i.p. +O(||ξH ||3) . (6.118)
The two possibilities are not only important from the perspective of their microfoun-
dation, but they are also important for economic policy analysis. In this context, it is
not clear which loss function is most eligible for a common, union-wide monetary pol-
icy. Gros and Hefeker (2002) see a conflict in the fact that the European Central
Bank is responsible for the average performance of the Euro-zone as a whole, whereas the
European Union was created to serve the interests of its single member states. In their
model they compare the welfare impact of a common monetary policy which minimizes a
weighted average of national losses to a common monetary policy focussing on the min-
imization of the loss function treating Euro-area wide variables. One result is that the
inflation bias might be higher under a central bank that cares about area-wide variables
than under the one which cares about national variables. The main policy conclusion
is that in most cases a common central bank that takes national variables into account
outweighs a common central bank which optimizes a loss function considering Euro-area
wide variables from a welfare-perspective, when remarkable heterogeneities exist.
In a further paper, Aksoy et al. (2002) analyze the consequences of economic and
institutional asymmetries on the effectiveness of a common central bank’s policy in a cur-
rency area. Using a model similar to Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), assuming that
the policy maker optimizes a loss function depending on variability of output, inflation
and interest rates, they pose the question “whether the national representatives in the
ECB-Council take a union-wide perspective when deciding about monetary policy, or [...]
give a high weight to national economic conditions when taking [...] decisions” (p. 444).
From a more practical viewpoint – the decision-making problems that arise in a hetero-
geneous monetary union – they come to a different conclusion as Gros and Hefeker:
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Welfare is higher when having an ECB-Board focussing on Euro-wide variables compared
to a regime in which all members of the Governing Council take national targets into
account. This is based on the fact that the individual decision makers tend to offset each
other when asymmetries in shocks or transmission processes are significant.
We tested both possibilities to obtain the numerical results of section 7.2 and found
that the differences of the results using both types of social loss functions were marginal,
and did not change the qualitative order of the results. Therefore, we restrict our analysis
to a use of the second type of the central bank’s target function in the remainder of our
analysis.
Chapter 7
Policy Analysis
7.1 Setup of the Policy Analysis
In this section, we analyze the strategic behavior of monetary and fiscal policies in a
monetary union. The monetary union consists of two regions with independently acting
fiscal policies and an independent common central bank exercising monetary policy.
We begin with the establishment of the setting used for the analysis of fiscal and
monetary policy interactions. This summarizes the main model equations derived in the
previous sections 6.1 and 6.2, extended by additional assumptions made in this section.
We, furthermore, highlight the different scenarios in which we analyze the strategic be-
havior of monetary and fiscal policies. We distinguish between scenarios of simultaneous
policy actions and those in which policy makers act sequentially.
7.1.1 Framework
As in the micro-model we consider two regions, previously denoted by home region H and
foreign region F . From now on, we will use the notation region A and region B instead,
to take a neutral point of view. We consider a region to be defined by a set of countries
characterized by a high degree of homogeneity and exposed to similar shocks. Thus, fiscal
policies within one such region can be considered to be coordinated, as each region has to
optimize a similar problem. Alternatively, one region could capture one specific country
of interest, while the other region refers to the “rest of the monetary union”.
In the whole currency area, the population is given by a continuum of agents on the
interval [0, 1], with [0, n] living in region A and [n, 1] in region B. The fiscal authority in
region i chooses a policy variable τi, with i = A,B, where τi is a shortcut to τˆi, the notation
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used in the previous chapter. Fiscal policy affects national output, yi, and inflation, pii,
as well as union-wide output, y, and inflation, pi.1 Union-wide variables are given by the
weighted sum of the region-specific levels, where the weights of the regions are given by
n and (1 − n), respectively. In the following, we discuss the essential building blocks of
our model:
Output Equation of Country i
Output in region i is derived in the micro-model in section 6.1 and explicitly given in
equation (6.65). For convenience, we restate it here:
yi = y¯i + a
iτi + a
i,jτj + b
i(pii − piei ) + κisi + φi , (7.1)
where j denotes “not region i”.
According to Kydland and Prescott (1979) and Barro and Gordon (1983),
surprise inflation may generate an increase in the national output level. Workers demand
nominal wages that are sufficiently high to cover expected average future price increases.
When the inflation rate reaches an unexpectedly high level, i. e. pi > pie, it leads ex post to
lower real wages and increases both employment and output. Therefore, bi has a positive
sign.
A higher τi corresponds to a more expansionary fiscal policy. It can be interpreted (i) as
subsidies granted by the fiscal policies to reduce the frictions stemming from monopolistic
power (an interpretation of τi which is in line with our microfoundation of section 6.1 and
which is also typically used in New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
(DSGE) models), and (ii) as demand for public goods (which accords better with actual
fiscal policies in the European Monetary Union).2
We consider both interpretations of fiscal policies in section 7.2. In both cases an
expansionary fiscal policy is represented by an increase in τi. Furthermore, we derived
that fiscal policies have positive spillovers onto the other region. For the baseline supply-
side fiscal policy3 as well as for the demand-side fiscal policy both ai and aij have a positive
1More precisely, yi denotes the percentage deviation of output from its steady state. Henceforth, we
use “output” for reasons of brevity.
2While we have not incorporated this interpretation in our model, one can easily see from inspecting
the fairly general budget constraint of the fiscal authorities given in equation (6.7) and (6.8) that this is
a straightforward exercise.
3In New Keynesian DSGE models, fiscal policy is described by supply side policy, which aims at
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sign.4
The term κisi denotes the change in the current account, where κ
i > 0 and the terms of
trade, si, from the perspective of region i, which is given by the log-linear approximation
of equation (6.16):
si = (pij − pii) . (7.2)
We know from empirical studies that the terms of trade effect also depends on the region’s
size. This means that a smaller region typically has a higher κi, implying that inflation
differentials have a greater effect on output, something that is missing here.5 A higher
inflation rate in region j than in region i corresponds to a real depreciation of region i
and thus increases its net exports. This shift of consumption from foreign goods (region
j) to domestic goods (region i) increases domestic income.
Finally, a random shock φi enters the output equation, which is an i.i.d. shock with
an expected value of zero and variance σ2φi . In the microfounded model we have shown
that this shock is the weighted sum of the deviations of the two regional (stationary)
productivity processes from their respective steady states.6
eliminating the distortions stemming from monopoly power. We, thus, denote supply-side policy as
baseline case, henceforth.
4Note that ai and aij can principally also be negative, e.g. for demand-side policy if an expansionary
governmental policy has a great negative impact on private consumption or investment. We will, however,
neglect such situations in our analysis.
5Note that we implicitly assume that the intensity of trade inside the currency area is high enough
for effects from outside the union to be neglected. Another possibility for eliminating outside effects is to
assume that all regions within the monetary union have similar trade relations with the rest of the world
and are, thus, immaterial for our results. This is a critical assumption, as we pointed out in chapter
5.2 that empirically also trade relations with third regions matter, especially in the case of Ireland and
Finland.
6Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) use a nonlinear shock vector of structural parameters, as laid out
in the appendix of their paper. We depart from this, as we find it difficult to assume distributions of
the single parameters and also the correlations between them. Instead, we make the standard RBC
assumption that output is influenced by a normally distributed random variable capturing total factor
productivity. This shock may be interpreted as comprising the effects of the shock vector in Dixit and
Lambertini. Our shock effects output deviation as well as inflation directly, but also indirectly through
the policy variables.
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Inflation Equation of Country i
Inflation differences within the monetary union are caused by asymmetric shocks and
country-specific fiscal policy actions. Thus, inflation in region i evolves according to
pii = µ+ ciτi + c
ijτj , (7.3)
as derived in section 6.1 and stated in equation (6.60). Again, the superscript j denotes
“not region i”. The central bank influences a policy variable µ, where we assume that
monetary policy has the same impact on inflation in both regions.7 Analogously to Dixit
and Lambertini (2003a), “µ stands for some actual policy variable such as the base
money supply or a nominal interest rate, and determines a component of the price level,”
(p. 1525). Therefore, a higher µ implies a more expansionary monetary policy.
The parameter ci refers to the influence of national fiscal policies on inflation, while
cij measures the effect of foreign expenditure on region i’s inflation rate, i. e. it captures
the spillover effects stemming from fiscal policy.
Note that the parameters ci and cij can have either sign. Dixit and Lambertini
(2003a) indicate that the sign of the parameters may become negative when tax cuts and
subsidies raise the supply of goods and are at the same time financed by income taxes,
which lead to a crowding out of private demand. This is in line with the microfounded
model of section 6.1. By contrast, a positive sign appears when fiscal policies are charac-
terized by demand-side policies. This effect may be stronger if government expenditures
are financed by distortionary production taxes reducing supply. ci and cij have the same
sign, but the absolute value of ci is supposed to be higher than that of cij, i. e., direct
effects from fiscal policies are stronger than the resulting spillovers to the other region.
Rational Expectations
The private sector has rational expectations about inflation, i. e. the following condition
holds:
piei = E(pii). (7.4)
7In this context Ada˜o et al (2004) show that monetary policy cannot be used to offset idiosyncratic
shocks within different countries belonging to a monetary union, as common monetary policy affects the
monetary union as a whole.
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Target Functions of Fiscal Authorities
Fiscal authorities minimize a quadratic loss function, that aims at national inflation and
national output. The functional form of the loss function is identical to that of regional
welfare, derived in the previous section and explicitly stated in equations (6.115) and
(6.116):
LF i =
1
2
[
(pii − piiF )2 + θiF (yi − yiF )2
]
. (7.5)
Note that piiF is the fiscal policy’s inflation target in region i, and y
i
F is the desired output
level of the fiscal authority in region i. According to the utility-based welfare criterion
derived in section 6.2, these reference values should be equal to zero for inflation and to
the flexible price output plus the steady state deviation from the efficient steady state
in the case of output.8 If both fiscal authorities and the monetary authority agree on
the targets, the first-best situation with the highest possible welfare can be obtained.
This is demonstrated in Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) and corresponds to the joint
cooperation case in our model, which will be introduced later.
However, EMU national governments and the ECB have often disagreed about the
appropriate strategy for their policies. Therefore, we deviate from the microeconomic
model by presuming that the fiscal targets deviate from the socially optimal level. More
specifically, for inflation and output we assume target levels that are both above the socially
optimal levels. This might be justified by the fiscal policy makers’ desire to attain greater
government size (Fatas and Rose, 2001) and/or their incentive to maximize reelection
probability (Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999). To illustrate this, one can easily imagine
that fiscal authorities are able to deceive their voters about the socially optimal targets,
particularly during election campaigns. This would be espacially true of a monetary
union, where fiscal policy communicates with the domestic society, while monetary policy
is centralized and concerned with the whole society of the monetary union. Accordingly,
it communicates with the private sector of the individual regions from a greater distance.
Furthermore, the inflation and output targets of fiscal policies in both regions may:
Economically intuitive reasons for considering different inflation targets on the part of the
agents may be given (i) by home-bias effects in the consumption of goods, (ii) by different
elasticities of substitution in the representative agents’ utility function across regions,
or (iii) by different proportions of tradeable and non-tradeable goods in both regions.
8With the simplifying assumptions made below equation (6.116) the optimal target for output is also
zero.
CHAPTER 7. POLICY ANALYSIS 136
In our microeconomic model we have incorporated a home-bias effect in consumption
and considered region-specific productivity shocks, which represent possible reasons for
different fiscal targets in the two regions.
Target Function of the Common Central Bank
The common central bank is assumed to optimize the union-wide social welfare function
derived in section 6.2. Our major justification for this assumption is the relatively high
independence of central banks in industrialized countries. We choose the second specifi-
cation in regional variables, stated in equation (6.118), which we state again here, using
a notation with indices M to denote monetary policy:
LM =
1
2
[
n
(
(piA − piAM)2 + θAM(yA − yAM)2
)
+ (1− n) ((piB − piBM)2 + θBM(yB − yBM)2)] . (7.6)
In the case of excessive fiscal targets, as motivated above, we can state that the central
bank is relatively conservative in comparison to fiscal policies, given by piiM < pi
i
F and
yiM < y
i
F for all i. Our model differs in that respect from the approach of Dixit and
Lambertini (2003b). They assume that fiscal policies act in a socially optimal manner
and the central bank is too conservative, whereas we claim that the central bank maximizes
union-wide welfare, and fiscal policies act in too expansionary a way.
7.1.2 Scenarios
The different weights on output stabilization and the different output and inflation targets
of monetary and fiscal policies give rise to trade-offs among policy makers. Whereas the
fiscal authorities attach greater importance to output stabilization (and to pushing output
and inflation above their natural levels), the common central bank puts a relatively higher
weight on the stabilization of inflation. These conflicting targets induce strategic behavior
among the policy makers, which is examined in the following.
In our model, we restrict the analysis to scenarios under discretion. Discretionary
policies accord best with reality, as no major central bank makes any kind of binding
commitment on the way of conducting future monetary policy.9 Fiscal policies in the
9See Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). As an example of the lack of a binding commitment, the
European Central Bank, although officially announcing “close to, but below two percent” as its target
for a harmonized index of consumer prices inflation, regularly failed to achieve this goal in the last five
years, as figure 5.2 shows.
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European Monetary Union seem also far away from committing themselves to certain
rules. In this context, one can possibly consider the compliance of the stability and growth
pact, which is not too strict a rule. However, it has been violated by several EMU-
countries during unfavorable economic times without having been confronted to major
sanctions until today. And one currently cannot imagine that national fiscal authorities
would accept to commit to strict common rules. Beetsma and Jensen (2005) state that
actual fiscal policies in the European Monetary Union are primarily conducted with the
objective of serving national interests rather than union-wide-interests.
In this respect, we want to understand the nature of optimal monetary and fiscal poli-
cies when both, fiscal and monetary policy makers, move simultaneously and its nature,
when one of them moves first and, thereby, takes leadership. Furthermore, we want to al-
low for coordinated as well as uncoordinated policy-making between all policy authorities.
In the following, we give a brief overview of the scenarios that will be analyzed:
a) Monetary and fiscal policies take place simultaneously and are uncoordinated. Fiscal
policies aim at national targets and monetary policy aims at a union-wide loss
function.
b) Monetary and fiscal policy actions are conducted simultaneously and coordinated
in the sense of minimizing a union-wide loss function. Thereby, the three policy
makers mutually agree on the weights and targets on inflation and output.
c) Monetary and fiscal policy decisions are again made simultaneously. Monetary pol-
icy optimizes the union-wide target function given by equation (7.6). Fiscal policies
of region A and B are coordinated in the sense of optimizing also a union-wide
target function, but differ in their weights and targets from those of the common
central bank.
d) Fiscal policies are uncoordinated and act as a first mover (Stackelberg leader). The
common central bank is second mover (Stackelberg follower) and reacts optimally
in response to the fiscal policy decision.
e) The common central bank acts first (Stackelberg leader). Fiscal policies respond
optimally given the action of the common central bank (Stackelberg follower).
f) Fiscal policy makers cooperate and move first. Monetary policy reacts to the deci-
sion made by the national fiscal authorities.
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g) Monetary policy is Stackelberg leader and fiscal policies, which are coordinated, are
Stackelberg followers.
As all scenarios considered in cases a) – g) include only discretionary policies, the expecta-
tions of the private sector on inflation have already been made beforehand and are, thus,
taken as given: by contracting wages in advance, the private sector acts as a Stackelberg
leader against the policy authorities. Remember that the central bank is assumed to be
more conservative than fiscal policies in all scenarios besides scenario b), where all policy
authorities cooperate.
7.1.3 Strategic Behavior and Simultaneous Decision-Making
In this subsection we consider the scenario in which both fiscal authorities and the com-
mon central bank choose their optimal policies simultaneously. As the analytical results
are dreadfully complicated, we restrict our policy analysis to a numerical examination un-
dertaken in section 7.2. The explicit analytical solutions of the different scenarios, which
are used in our MATLAB-simulations can be found in appendix C and the corresponding
MATLAB simulation-files are attached in appendix D.
Nash Behavior
First, we consider the scenario of uncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies. The policy
makers decide upon their optimal policies after having observed the realizations of the
region-specific shocks. Thus, they take the households’ expectations on inflation as given.
For better understanding, the sequence is depicted in figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: Time Structure for Simultaneous Decision-Making
-
pie,i τA, τB
µ
t with i = A,B
φi
The optimization problem for the policy authorities is briefly sketched in the following:
Country A’s fiscal policy maker optimizes the social loss function (7.5) with respect to
τA, while taking the decision of the other region’s fiscal policy, τB, and the policy choice
of the common central bank, µ, as given.
CHAPTER 7. POLICY ANALYSIS 139
Using equations (7.5) and (7.6) as well as the definitions of output and inflation, we
obtain the following first-order conditions:
∂LiF
∂τ i
= (pii − piiF )ci + θF i(yi − yiF )(ai + bici + κi(cji − ci)) = 0, (7.7)
with i = A,B,j = A,B and i 6= j,
∂LM
∂µ
= (pi − npiAM − (1− n)piBM) + nθAMbA(yA − yAM) + (1− n)θBMbB(yB − yBM) = 0 , (7.8)
with pi = npiA+(1−n)piB. Solving the fiscal first-order condition of region A for piA yields
piA = pi
A
F − θAF (yA − yAF )
(
aA + κAcBA
cA
+ bA − κA
)
. (7.9)
For most of the scenarios when considering demand-side fiscal policy, there exists a neg-
ative correlation between inflation and output, since the parameters aA, bA, cA and cAB
are assumed to be positive in our policy analysis.10 However, if the terms of trade effect
is dominant, i. e. if κA is extremely large, inflation depends positively on output. Hof-
mann and Remsperger (2005) show that the inflation differentials in the EMU have
been largely persistent since 1999. This implies – at least up to now – that terms of trade
effects have tended to be rather small and, therefore, strengthen the view stated above.
We will consider this issue in greater depth in the sensitivity analysis in section 7.2. The
first-order condition for the fiscal policy of region B follows the same scheme.
Monetary policy optimizes the union-wide social loss function (7.6), taking the fiscal
policy actions and the expectations of the private sector as given. Solving for pi leads to
pi = npiAM + (1− n)piBM − nθAMbA(yA − yAM)− (1− n)θBMbB(yB − yBM) . (7.10)
As the parameters bA and bB are assumed to be strictly positive, the first-order condition
of monetary policy reflects also a negative correlation between inflation and the national
output levels. The complete analytical solution is given in appendix C.
Cooperation of Monetary and Fiscal Policies
According to many economists and politicians, coordination plays a crucial role. This is
emphasized by the fact that regions and international organizations create institutions like
the stability and growth pact and aim at further common targets like tax harmonizations,
10For fiscal policy aiming at reducing monopolistic distortions by granting subsidies, the opposite
correlation is likely to hold as shown in section 7.2.
CHAPTER 7. POLICY ANALYSIS 140
which are only a few examples of coordination instruments. In this subsection, we analyze
the scenario of coordination under discretion characterized by an agreement of the political
authorities on common policy goals, i. e. piAF = pi
B
F = piM = piJC , y
A
F = y
B
F = yM = yJC and
θAF = θ
B
F = θM = θJC , where the subscript JC denotes the “joint cooperation” scenario.
The timing of political decision-making corresponds to the Nash scenario and is illustrated
in figure 7.1. We assume here, that the policy makers share a combined loss function of
the following kind:
LJC = n
1
2
[(piA − piJC)2 + θJC(yA − yJC)2] (7.11)
+(1− n)1
2
[(piB − piJC)2 + θJC(yB − yJC)2] .
The minimizing problem follows the same pattern as in the Nash scenario, the only differ-
ence being that all authorities face the same loss function. We treat the joint cooperation
case as if the policy makers were committed to the socially optimal targets, i.e. we assume
that all policy makers aim at attaining the social optimum in this scenario, and that the
private sector is aware of that when forming its expectations about inflation. We do not
incorporate possible deviations from this strategy, though this could be an interesting en-
hancement of this model. Thus, the first-best optimum for the private agents is attainable
under joint cooperation. Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) use the same assumption in
their model. We return to this point in section 7.2. The analytical solutions are shifted
to appendix D.
Independent Monetary Policy and Cooperation between Fiscal Policies
In situations of union-wide stagnation of economic growth and rising unemployment the
fiscal authorities may put the common central bank under pressure to lower interest rates
and to increase money growth. In a case where the common central bank maintains
its focus on the primary objective, i. e. a high degree of price stability, Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1998) argue that coordination of fiscal players, in the sense that each fiscal
player internalizes the effects of a unilateral tax change on the other fiscal players, is
profitable, at least for the fiscal policy makers. This may encourage the fiscal authorities to
coordinate their tax decisions so as to induce the common central bank to set the inflation
rate in the direction preferred among the fiscal authorities. However, this behavior may
lead to an increase in inflation, taxes and expenditures at the same time and harms
welfare.
In our model, the fiscal authorities optimize a similar loss function as in the joint
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cooperation scenario, but with target values of inflation and output above the socially
optimal levels. The fiscal objective function of both regions is given by
LFC = n
1
2
[
(piA − piAFC)2 + θFC(yA − yAFC)2
]
(7.12)
+(1− n)1
2
[
(piB − piBFC)2 + θFC(yB − yBFC)2
]
,
where the subscript FC denotes “fiscal cooperation”. The results of Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1998) for cooperation of fiscal policies are almost in line with our numerical
results shown in section 7.2 for the case of a demand-side policy.
7.1.4 Strategic Behavior and Sequential Decision-Making
The policy choices made by monetary and fiscal authorities may possibly take place at
different times due to certain pre-scheduled rules, bureaucracy, or special intrinsic features
of the political institutions. Therefore, we focus here on interactions between fiscal and
monetary policies when both authorities act sequentially. The analytical results are again
shifted to the appendix C and D, and the evaluation of the different scenarios follows in
section 7.2.
Stackelberg Leadership of Fiscal Policy
We begin with the scenario of fiscal leadership, i. e. fiscal policy makers have to decide
on their policy actions before monetary policy has been implemented and after having
observed the realization of the regional shocks φi. Accordingly, they take the household’s
inflation expectation as given. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) argue that fiscal lead-
ership seems to be more likely when monetary policy can be implemented and adjusted
more quickly than fiscal policy. This may be applicable when choices for taxes and sub-
sidies are accompanied by bureaucratic and legislative processes that provide the fiscal
authority with leadership over monetary policy. The sequence in that scenario is depicted
in figure 7.2.
Figure 7.2: Time Structure for Sequential Decision-Making (Fisc. Leadership)
-
µφB
φA
τB
τA
pieB
pieA
t
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The solution of the game is obtained by backward induction. Solving the monetary
policy’s optimization problem at the second stage of the game leads to the optimal choice
of µ while taking the fiscal policy variables τA and τB as given. The monetary reaction
function is again given by (7.8). In the first stage, the fiscal policy maker of region i
optimizes τi to react to the action taken by the policy maker of region j, τj, and subject
to the monetary reaction function, which is derived from the second stage of the game.
For the analytical solution see the appendix C and D.
Stackelberg Leadership of Monetary Policy
In contrast to the previous case, monetary policy attains Stackelberg leadership over fiscal
policies if it only affects the economy with a lapse of time exceeding the legislative and
bureaucratic time need for fiscal policy decision-making. The timing is shown in figure 7.3.
The solution is similar to the former scenario of fiscal leadership. In the second stage,
Figure 7.3: Time Structure for Sequential Decision-Making (Mon. Leadership)
-
µφB
φA
τB
τA
pieB
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t
fiscal policy makers minimize the loss function (7.5) analogously to the Nash scenario
shown above, given the other region’s fiscal policy and the monetary policy variable µ.
The common central bank chooses µ in the first stage, given the best responses of the
fiscal policies τA and τB.
Fiscal Cooperation and Sequential Policy Actions
Analogously to the fiscal corporation scenario where the policy makers choose their op-
timal policies simultaneously, one can also assume coordination between national fiscal
policies when the decision-making on monetary and fiscal policies takes place at different
stages. The motivation for a coordinated fiscal policy in a sequential policy game corre-
sponds to that of fiscal coordination in a simultaneous game. Accordingly, we also analyze
scenarios (i) fiscal cooperation when fiscal policy moves first and (ii) fiscal cooperation when
monetary policy moves first.
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The time structure of scenario (i) corresponds to the one in figure 7.2, while the time
structure of scenario (ii) corresponds to that in figure 7.3. The optimization problem
under both scenarios follows the same pattern as in the corresponding sequential scenarios
without coordination and are, therefore, omitted in this section.11
7.2 Results
In the following we derive numerical results for the seven scenarios of strategic behavior
between monetary and fiscal authorities introduced in the previous section.
We, first, analyze our baseline case with a supply-side fiscal policy as described in
the microfoundation in section 6.1 and show the calibration of the model. Second, we
show the evaluation methods used for the ranking of the different scenarios. Third, we
run simulations for the case of a homogeneous and a heterogeneous monetary union by
using the structural parameters from the microfounded model of sections 6.1 and 6.2. In
this case, fiscal policy aims at granting production subsidies and levy per-capita taxes
to reduce the distortions caused by monopoly power. We use the results from the ho-
mogeneous monetary union as a reference case, and compare the rankings of different
scenarios in the heterogeneous case. Fourth, we strengthen our results by using a sen-
sitivity analysis regarding both the structural parameters and the policy targets. Fifth,
we run the simulations once more, now analyzing the strategic interactions among fiscal
and monetary policies when fiscal policy is described by demand-side policy. Thereby,
we do not refer to the parameter values of our microfoundation, but choose instead the
parameter values of the reduced-form model (macroeconomic equations of section 7.1) in
a quantitative exploration. In this case, the parameters ai, ai,j, ci and cij have positive
signs as already discussed in the previous section. I. e., expansionary fiscal policy raises
output and inflation at the same time. Like in the supply-side case, we strengthen the
results of our numerical settings by checking the sensitivity of our results to variations in
the macroeconomic parameters. Sixth, we show that it is possible to nest the results of
Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003a and 2003b) in our model.
11Please consult appendix C and D for details of the analytical solution.
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7.2.1 Calibration
We calibrate the structural parameters of the model in accordance with the standard
literature, as referred to in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a, appendix F). The elasticity of
marginal disutility of labor is set at 0.45, a value proposed by Blanchard and Fischer
(1989).12 This implies that the disutility parameter β, which is one plus the inverse
of the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor, has the value β = 3.22. The Calvo-
stickiness parameters ΦH and ΦF are set at a moderate value of 0.5, implying an average
price to be fixed for three periods. The elasticity of substitution between goods of the
same region is set at θ = 11, as in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a). Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2001) discuss the literature that has found values between 1 and above 20.
Note that the elasticity of substitution between goods of different regions is set to unity,
as in Benigno (2004). In setting the steady state of the technology parameter as d¯i = 1
and the subjective discount factor as η = 0.98 we strictly follow Dixit and Lambertini
(2003a). The steady-state value for the fiscal policy instrument is assumed to be set
optimally, i. e. to offset monopolistic distortion. Via τ¯i = 1/(1 − θ) we obtain a subsidy
rate of ten percent for both regions in the steady state.
We look here at two different cases. In the first case, both regions have the same size
(n = 1 − n = 0.5) and are completely symmetric, with identical structural parameters,
identical fiscal policies, and no home bias (νH = νF = 0.5). In the second case, region B
accounts for only 30 percent of the union and displays more price rigidities. The latter as-
sumption is based on the findings of Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2004). They estimate
the price rigidity in five core EMU countries and identify substantial heterogeneities.13
In the second case we presume that there is also a considerable home bias in consump-
tion in both regions, thus following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
Given the values stated above, we can calculate the various parameters ai, bi, ci and
κi in the model equations. Also, we can infer the values in the policy loss functions
maximizing social welfare. In the symmetric case, these are target values for inflation and
output of both zero, and a weight on output of θAM = θ
B
M = 0.00763. In the asymmetric
12The authors discuss this parameter on page 341. Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) assume unit wage
elasticity and thus less curvature.
13The average price duration varies between around four quarters in the Netherlands and Germany
and up to 17 quarters in Spain, implying price rigidity parameters between 0.75 and 0.94. We will choose
numbers between 0.5 and 0.58, following the more conservative estimates of Bils and Klenow (2004).
For a closer look at European data, the reader is referred to Dhyne et al. (2005).
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case, the output weight for region B rises to θBM = 0.01046, while all other socially optimal
target values remain the same.
As stated earlier, we assume that the common central bank sticks to these values, while
the fiscal policy authorities may deviate from them. There may be various reasons for such
deviation: For example systematic mismeasurement by the fiscal authorities or the fiscal
authorities maximizing a different objective function they are able to conceal from the
households. This was substantiated in section 7.1. More particularly, we assume that the
fiscal policy authorities put equal weight on output and inflation of unity. Furthermore,
fiscal policies have higher target values for output yAF = y
B
F = 0.015 and inflation pi
A
F =
piBF = 0.02. In the asymmetric case, fiscal policy in region B even puts a weight of
θBF = 1.25 on output, sets its output target at y
B
F = 0.025 and its inflation target at
piBF = 0.03, which could be seen as the result of its self-perception as a high growth catch-
up region. Table 7.1 summarizes this calibration. As in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a)
the stochastic term is calibrated to match the variance of output around its steady state
to be plus/minus six percent, as is the case for the U. S.
As set out in section 7.1, we assume that the private sector has rational expectations
about inflation. In our analytical calculations we treat pieA and pi
e
B as given (see appendix
C). The inflation expectations of the private agents in both countries are determined in
our model by iteration: In other words, we use an arbitrary starting value for the inflation
expectations in both countries and repeat the optimization calculations until the inflation
expectations differ from realized inflation by a value of less than 10−10 for both countries,
while keeping the shock at its expected value of zero. This approach guarantees that
piei = E(pii) holds for i = A,B. After inflation expectations are determined, we simulate
our model by averaging over 100,000 random draws of the stochastic processes.14
7.2.2 Evaluation Method
The main purpose of our numerical approach is to rank the different scenarios of strate-
gic behavior displayed by monetary and fiscal policies by the losses they induce. We
distinguish three approaches:
(i) Evaluation of the loss functions, referring to the policy exercised by the fiscal and
monetary authorities. In each cooperation scenario, the corresponding loss function
is a compromise between the cooperating authorities.
14The corresponding MATLAB-File can be found in appendix D.2.
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Table 7.1: Calibration of the Baseline Model
Parameter Value∗ Alternative× Explanation
Structural parameters
n 0.50 0.70 Size of region A
ν 0.50 0.80† Parameter capturing preference for home goods
β 3.22 3.22 One plus one over the elasticity of marginal disu-
tility of labor
Φ 0.50 0.58 Fraction of firms that cannot adjust prices
θ 11.00 11.00 Elasticity of substitution between goods
di 1.00 1.00 Technology parameter
η 0.98 0.98 Subjective discount factor
τ¯i -0.10 -0.10 Steady state value of taxes
Loss functions
θiM 0.00736 0.01046 Central bank’s weighting factor for output
piiM 0.00 0.00 Inflation target of the central bank
yiM 0.00 0.00 Output target of the central bank
θiF 1.00 1.25 Fiscal policy’s weighting factor for output
piiF 0.02 0.03 Inflation target of fiscal policy
yiF 0.015 0.025 Output target of fiscal policy
Remarks:
)∗ The term “Value” denotes the value chosen for both regions in the symmetric case and for
region A in the asymmetric case.
)× “Alternative” denotes the value chosen for region B in the asymmetric case.
)† For the heterogeneous case the home-bias parameter is set in both regions equal to 0.8.
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(ii) Evaluation of the region-specific loss functions. In each cooperation scenario, these
are the region-specific loss functions the policy authorities would minimize if they
were not cooperating. This approach allows us to infer whether cooperation scenar-
ios are preferable for each participating policy authority.
(iii) Evaluation of social welfare. For each region, we calculate the welfare loss that
arises due to deviations in output and inflation from the socially optimal values.
We show the losses involved in all three approaches in table 7.2 for the baseline model
and in table 7.4 for demand-side fiscal policy. In our discussion we incorporate only
the second and third approach. The reasoning behind this is as follows: In approach
(i), the losses of the three policy authorities are based on the loss functions used in
the optimization calculations. If the policy makers decide to cooperate, they usually
compromise on targets that differ from their own true preferences. However, the “true
losses” the policy makers face are still based on their specific preferences. Therefore, in
approach (ii) we calculate the values of the policy makers’ loss functions given by equations
(7.5) and (7.6), irrespective of the loss function used for optimization in the relevant
scenarios.15 One should also take these losses into account when exploring whether joint
cooperation among all policy makers or cooperation between fiscal policy makers can take
place on a voluntary basis.
The region-specific social welfare losses of approach (iii) are given by16
LA =
1
2
((piA − piAM)2 + θAM(yA − yAM)2)
LB =
1
2
((piB − piBM)2 + θBM(yB − yBM)2).
Additionally, we express the region-specific social losses in terms of an equivalent reduction
in region-specific consumption units, following the example of Lucas (2003): A scenario
“performs best” when it shows the lowest reduction of consumption units compared to the
consumption level in the social optimum. The calculation of the consumption-equivalent
losses follows the approach of Adam and Billi (2005):
From equation (6.114) in section 6.2, we know that for region A
UA = −Y¯AuCLA (7.13)
15Note that by this definition the losses in case (ii) only differ from the losses in case (i) for the joint
cooperation scenario and the scenarios of fiscal cooperation.
16Remember from section 7.1 that the central bank is assumed to optimize the union-wide social loss,
which is a region-sized weighted sum of the social losses of region A and B.
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holds. To derive a relation between a permanent reduction of consumption (given by δAC
percent), and the welfare loss, a second-order Taylor approximation of the utility loss is
generated by
UA ≈
(
−uC Y¯Aδ
A
C
100
+ uCC
(
Y¯Aδ
A
C
100
)2)
= −uC Y¯A
(
δAC
100
− uCC Y¯A
uC
(
δAC
100
)2)
= −uC Y¯A
(
δAC
100
+
(1− γ)Y¯A
Y¯A
(
δAC
100
)2)
, (7.14)
where we have used the results of equations (6.81) and (6.83). Replacing − UA
uC Y¯A
by LA
yields
LA =
(δAC)
2
1002
+ (1− γ) δ
A
C
100
. (7.15)
To calculate the reduction of consumption equivalent to the social loss for region A, we
solve for δAC to obtain
δAC = 100
−1 +√1 + 4(1− γ)LA
2(1− γ) . (7.16)
The reduction of consumption equivalent to a certain welfare loss for region B can be
obtained analogously. We use this transformation in the following subsections to make
the welfare losses more tangible.
7.2.3 Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Baseline Model
Now, we examine the results of the simulations for the supply-side fiscal policy described
in section 6.1. The model calibration was explained in section 7.2.1 and is summarized in
table 7.1. A summary of the results is given in table 7.2.
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Homogeneous Monetary Union
We begin with a comparison of the losses for the monetary and fiscal policy authorities
in the symmetric case. The first columns of table 7.2 show that the fiscal authorities of
both regions face the highest region-specific policy losses under cooperation and in the
scenario where monetary policy moves first. The lowest fiscal losses occur when fiscal
policies have the greatest influence, i. e. under the scenarios of fiscal cooperation when
fiscal policies move first and under fiscal cooperation in the simultaneous scenario. The
explanation is simple. Fiscal policies aim at higher inflation and higher output than the
central bank, which targets socially optimal levels. Due to the low relative weight on
output stabilization the central bank reacts strongly to offset inflation deviating from the
socially optimum level. Fiscal policies, themselves, engage in a trade-off between inflation
and output when fixing their own policy decisions. An expansionary fiscal policy pushes
output above the socially optimal level by granting subsidies in order to lower production
costs. Thus, it decreases inflation at the same time. Accordingly, output is higher than
natural output and lower than the desired fiscal targets. Inflation is below the fiscal target
levels and slightly below the social optimum. Note, however, that the central bank reacts
strongly to the downward pressure of inflation with an expansionary monetary policy on
account of the high weight on inflation in the target function.17
The loss in the Nash scenario is similar to that of the two scenarios where fiscal policies
move first.
In the scenarios where monetary policy takes the lead (with or without coordination of
fiscal policies), fiscal policies internalize the fact that the central bank cannot offset fiscal
policy that is too expansionary. Therefore, fiscal policies are less expansionary, and output
and inflation deviate from the fiscal targets to a higher degree than in the previously
analyzed scenarios. This implies higher losses for the fiscal policy authorities. The highest
losses occur when policy makers cooperate and agree on the socially optimal targets: On
average the realized value for inflation is close to zero (but still dependent on stochastics)
and output is at its lowest compared to the desired levels. It is, therefore, questionable
whether overall cooperation aiming at socially optimal targets can be implemented in this
setting.
17When fiscal policies are characterized by demand-side policy, an expansionary fiscal policy pushes
both output and inflation into the desired direction. Therefore, fiscal policy is much more expansionary
when fiscal policy raises demand, and the ranking of the losses differs from that under a supply-side fiscal
policy.
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Our assumption of a welfare maximizing monetary policy means that the rankings of
the central bank losses correspond to the rankings of the union-wide social losses. The
social losses, in turn, can be transformed into welfare equivalent consumption reductions
relative to the social optimum. Accordingly, we consider only the consumption losses of
the private agents in the following. We find that the ranking of the scenarios is quite
different in comparison with the (fiscal) policy makers’ losses (see again table 7.2). The
first best can be attained in the cooperation scenario.18 The consumption loss is also very
low in both monetary leadership scenarios, i.e. when fiscal policies do not cooperate and
when fiscal policies are coordinated. The highest social losses occur when fiscal policies
are dominant in the sense of being Stackelberg leaders, and in the Nash scenario. In line
with the explanation for the fiscal policy makers’ losses, inflation and output levels are
closest to the social optimum when monetary policy takes the lead (together, of course,
with the joint cooperation case).
Heterogeneous Monetary Union
In our analysis of a heterogeneous monetary union we assume that the fiscal policy of
region A follows the same strategy as in the homogeneous case, whereas the fiscal policy
of region B targets higher levels of both inflation and output. Furthermore, we assume
that region B is smaller than region A and is characterized by a slightly higher degree of
price-stickiness. The exact parameter values for region A are again depicted in the second
column of table 7.1, while the “alternative” parameter values for region B are summarized
in the third column of this table. Results for the heterogeneous case are shown in columns
seven to eleven of table 7.2.
Beginning with the losses for region A, we find that the values of the fiscal policy
maker’s losses are much higher for all scenarios in the heterogeneous case, except one:
The cooperation scenario corresponds to the homogeneous case by definition, as all policy
makers agree on the socially optimal targets. The ranking of the scenarios with respect
to the region-specific fiscal policy makers’ losses is similar to that in the homogeneous
case: the highest losses occur when monetary policy has the greatest influence (monetary
leadership scenarios), the smallest losses occur in the scenarios in which fiscal policies
have the greatest influence (fiscal cooperation when fiscal policy takes leadership, fiscal
cooperation and simultaneous decision-making, and fiscal leadership when monetary pol-
icy is uncoordinated), and in the Nash scenario. The fiscal policy maker again faces the
18The (monetary) policy loss is slightly larger than zero because of the shock in our simulation.
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highest loss in the joint cooperation scenario. We observe almost the same ranking for
region B, but the losses are higher compared to region A.
We find that the losses of the common central bank and, hence, also the consumption
losses of the private agents show also a similar ranking as in the homogeneous monetary
union: The lowest losses are attained when monetary policy moves first or when all policy
makers agree on the socially optimal targets (=first best). The highest losses occur when
fiscal policies moves first (uncoordinated and coordinated) and when fiscal policies are co-
ordinated and monetary and fiscal policy decisions take place simultaneously. This result
seems, at first glance, to be contrary to the findings of Lombardo and Sutherland
(2004), who state that fiscal cooperation is welfare-improving. But a closer look reveals
that our calibration of a unit elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods
also implies in Lombardo and Sutherland (2004), according to their Proposition 1,
that fiscal cooperation is no longer welfare-improving.19
The welfare-equivalent consumption reductions under Nash, fiscal leadership, and the
two fiscal cooperation scenarios with simultaneous actions or with fiscal leadership are
about three times larger in the (smaller) region B. Also, the equivalent consumption
reductions are relatively higher in the heterogeneous case compared to the homogeneous
case, by about 50 percent for region A and a factor of above four for region B. This implies
that a model of a homogeneous monetary union that does not properly take into account
heterogeneities possibly underestimates the welfare effects of certain policies. This finding
also suggests that homogeneity is a desirable feature of the currency area for all policy
makers (fiscal and monetary authorities) and the private agents. We take up this point
again in section 7.2.5 and consider the implications for the European Monetary Union.
7.2.4 Sensitivity Analysis for Supply-side Policy (Baseline-Case)
Are the results of the previous section robust to changes in the structural parameters of
the model? To examine this, we vary the structural parameters within plausible ranges.
In figure 7.4 we plot the parameter variations that show the highest sensitivity of results.
The corresponding parameters are the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor, (emdl),
price rigidity, φi, and the elasticity of substitution, θ. We plot their effects on fiscal policy
makers’ losses and social welfare, which is equivalent to the central bank loss for both the
19Note also that Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) features government consumption in the utility
function. We will refer to that point again in section 7.2.5.
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symmetric and the asymmetric case.20
Variation of the Elasticity of Marginal Disutility of Labor
We vary the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor (emdl) between zero and one, where
the lower bound is given in Blanchard and Fischer (1989), while the upper bound is
often used in New Keynesian models, see e. g. Gali andMonacelli (2005a). The effects
of these variations on the policy losses in the three simultaneous scenarios are depicted
in the first row of figure 7.4, while the second row shows the effects in the four sequential
scenarios.
Increasing elasticity of marginal disutility of labor leads to higher central bank losses.
This result is obvious as, given the other parameters, the same outcome is produced at
higher cost, meaning that the same effort in the production of goods leads now to a higher
reduction of utility than before.
Referring to the homogeneous case, we see that the rankings for both the fiscal author-
ities’ losses and the central bank losses are stable: fiscal policies suffer from the smallest
losses in the Nash scenario and if they obtain fiscal leadership, as in comparison with the
other scenarios they are better able to pursue their inflation and output targets (above
the socially optimal levels). The central bank’s welfare function shows the smallest losses
in the joint cooperation case (which determines the first best) and in the scenario where
monetary policy takes leadership. In the latter scenario, the fiscal policies are restrained,
as too expansionary a fiscal policy would lead to low inflation, which will not be corrected
by the central bank afterwards. Therefore, monetary leadership has a disciplining effect
on supply-side-oriented fiscal policies. The fact that joint cooperation leads to the first
best from a welfare perspective comes as no surprise as all policy makers agree upon the
socially optimal targets, as mentioned in the previous section.
In the heterogeneous case, the losses are higher for the fiscal policies of both regions,
the one with the more conservative and the one with the more aggressive targets, and also
for the central bank. However, the rankings seem to be robust with two exceptions: (i)
20In the figures we use the following abbreviations to save space: For the policy scenarios, Nash =
Nash, Coop = cooperation, FCoop = fiscal cooperation, FLead = fiscal leadership, MLead = monetary
leadership, FCFL = fiscal cooperation with fiscal leadership, FCML = fiscal cooperation with monetary
leadership. The labels on the x-axis denote emdl = elasticity of marginal disutility of labor, Φ = Calvo
parameter, i.e. the percentage of firms that cannot adjust their prices, and θ = elasticity of substitution
between different goods produced in the same region.
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Figure 7.4: Identical Parameter Variations in Region A and B (Supply-Side Policy)
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When monetary policy moves first fiscal losses are strongly increasing for higher values of
the elasticity of disutility of labor. (ii) The losses in the fiscal cooperation fiscal leadership
cases “explode” to a value of 0.4, which may be an indication that there is no equilibrium in
that case to which rational inflation expectations could converge. It would be interesting
to take up this point in further research.
Variation of Price Rigidity
The third and fourth rows of figure 7.4 examine the effect of varying price rigidities on fiscal
and monetary losses. The figure shows that the ranking of the scenarios is stable in the
homogeneous and heterogeneous case for almost the whole parameter set, and it is in line
with the results of table 7.2: Fiscal policies incur the smallest loss under fiscal leadership,
whereas monetary policy suffers from the smallest losses when it takes leadership and, of
course, under the joint cooperation scenario. Again, the fiscal cooperation fiscal leadership
scenario leads to dramatically increasing losses for more rigid prices, a factor that calls
for analysis in future research.21
Variation of the Elasticity of Substitution of Consumption Goods
In the fifth and sixth rows of figure 7.4 we consider the effect of changes from the elasticity
of substitution of consumption goods, θ, on the losses over the range discussed by Obst-
feld and Rogoff (2001). The figure confirms one intuitive result, i.e. that an increasing
θ leads to smaller fiscal policy and welfare losses: higher substitutability between goods
implies fewer distortions from monopoly power. There is again one interesting exception.
For a relatively small value of θ below 10 the losses explode, which, again, may conceivably
induce indeterminacy of equilibria.
Summary of the Findings
For all parameter variations over the ranges used in the standard literature (see model-
calibration), we find that the rankings of the different scenarios illustrated by table 7.2 are
relatively robust. The sensitivity analysis has also confirmed that the losses in a heteroge-
21The variations of the intertemporal discount factor η, which determines the importance of “pseudo-
future” periods relative to the present period in the producer-consumers price-setting behavior, show
almost the same results as those indicated for variations of the price rigidity parameter. We, therefore,
abstain from depicting and discussing the figures for η.
CHAPTER 7. POLICY ANALYSIS 156
neous monetary union tend to be higher. From the perspective of welfare maximization,
joint cooperation and monetary leadership are the best-performing scenarios.
7.2.5 Alternative Fiscal Policy: Demand-side Policy
In this section, we consider an alternative interpretation of fiscal policy: Governments
try to push output and inflation above their natural levels by raising demand for public
goods to lower unemployment below its natural rate. This type of fiscal policy is not
incorporated in our microfounded model. Nevertheless, we are interested in analyzing
how the different scenarios describing the interplay between policy makers are ranked
when using a parametrization for demand-side oriented fiscal policies.22
A homogeneous monetary union
First, we consider the case of a homogeneous monetary union. The parametrization we
use here is depicted in table 7.3. We assume that an expansionary fiscal policy leads to
an increase in output, i. e. ai > 0 and aij > 0. In contrast to the supply-side policy, the
coefficients ci and cij, which denote the effect of fiscal policies on inflation, now have a
positive sign: The additional demand of goods by fiscal policies causes an upward pressure
on goods’ prices.23 The values of the remaining parameters are equal to those in the
previous subsection or have, at least, the same sign, but differ in their absolute size. The
results are depicted in the first columns of table 7.4. The ranking of the policy makers’
losses shows some interesting changes compared to the supply-side case: The policy losses
in both fiscal-leadership scenarios, i. e. in the uncoordinated and coordinated scenarios,
are higher compared to the losses in the scenarios where monetary policy moves first.
The result is the outcome of a monetary policy that fights inflation strongly when fiscal
policy moves first: The monetary policy variable µ exhibits a relatively strong negative
value in the fiscal leadership scenarios compared to the monetary leadership scenarios.
We also find that joint cooperation of fiscal and monetary policies — characterized by
agreeing on the socially optimal output and inflation targets — reduces the losses of fiscal
22A microfoundation of demand-side oriented fiscal policy would also be possible, if adding public goods
to the representative household’s utility function. The reader is referred to Beetsma and Jensen (2005)
or Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) for related models with this feature.
23We assume that the demand-side effect of fiscal policies outweighs the crowding-out effect on private
demand.
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policy makers when underlying their true preferences on domestic inflation and domestic
output.24
Table 7.3: Demand-side Policy: Parameter Values in the Symmetric Case
Parameter Value Explanation
Output Equation
y¯i 0 Natural output level
ai 0.8 Effect of fiscal policy on the same region’s output
aij 0.1 Effect of fiscal policy on the other region’s output
bi 1.0 Effect of surprise inflation on the same region’s output
κi 0.2 Terms of trade effect of an inter-regional difference in inflation
rates
σφi 0.01 Variance of regional shocks to output
Inflation Equation
ci 0.5 Effect of fiscal policy on the same region’s inflation
cij 0.15 Effect of fiscal policy on the other region’s inflation
Loss Functions
θiM 0.5 Central bank’s weighting factor for output
piiM 0.0 Inflation target of the central bank
yiM 0.0 Output target of the central bank
θiF 1.3 Fiscal policy’s weighting factor for output
piiF 0.02 Inflation target of fiscal policy
yiF 0.015 Output target of fiscal policy
n 0.5 GDP share of region A on union-wide GDP
Remarks: i = A,B, j = A,B and j 6= i.
24At first glance, this suggests that the cooperation solution would be easy to implement. However,
we possibly have a prisoner’s dilemma: if the fiscal policy maker under cooperation deviates from the
cooperation strategy and optimizes his own target function, he can reduce the loss by more as long as
the other policy maker abstains from deviating. Cooperation of all policy makers would then only be
attainable if deviations were associated with a large enough imminent sanction.
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A further interesting result is that the scenarios in which monetary policy moves first
show the smallest losses for all policy makers, the governments and the common central
bank.
The ranking of the scenarios according to the welfare equivalent consumption losses
corresponds almost to that found for supply-side fiscal policy. The first best is obtained
if all policy makers agree on the socially optimal targets.25 Monetary leadership leads to
a lower consumption reduction compared to the fiscal leadership and the Nash scenario.
Under both monetary leadership scenarios monetary policy has a great influence which
leads to relatively low welfare equivalent consumption reductions. The result holds due to
the common central bank’s target function, which is assumed to maximize social welfare.
A heterogeneous monetary union
In a heterogeneous monetary union conflicts do not only occur between the targets of
monetary and fiscal policies, but also among fiscal authorities themselves.
Therefore, we analyze also for the case of demand-side fiscal policy the interactions of
monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union comprising two heterogeneous regions.
To relate this topic to a practical situation, one could think of the European Monetary
Union, where region A describes the richer northern and central European countries and
region B consists of southern and in the near future eastern European countries. We
choose a parametrization to analyze strategic behavior under heterogeneities which can
be applied to the situation in European Monetary Union. For the richer countries in
region A we use the same structural parameters as in the homogeneous case. Region B,
which can be called “catch-up”-region, is characterized by relatively higher output and
inflation goals and also by a higher relative-weight on the output goal compared to region
A. Furthermore, the parameters ai, bi and ci are assumed to be relatively higher in the
catch-up region, meaning that the same fiscal policy has a stronger impact on inflation
and output in region B. This may be caused by a higher price-stickiness in the catch-up
region due to greater labor-market frictions and a higher ratio of administered prices in
the goods market.26 The exact parameter values are listed in table 7.5. The results are
25Note, again, that this scenario is equivalent to a joint commitment scenarios due to our modeling:
we assume that the private sector has rational expectations on inflation and knows the true structure of
the policy maker’s target function and identifies the scenario perfectly. This is a critical assumption as
the true preferences of the policy makers do not necessarily coincide with the targets under cooperation
meaning that a deviation from the current strategy cannot be excluded, but this is not our main focus.
26See Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2004) and Dhyne et al. (2005) for an empirical assessment of
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depicted in the last columns of table 7.4. Compared to the symmetric case, the policy
authorities’ losses are higher for region A in a heterogeneous monetary union, although
the structural parameters remained the same. The reason is too expansionary a policy in
region B to which the common central bank reacts to. This implies that monetary policy
acts stronger for region A compared to the homogeneous case.
The overall ranking of the scenarios for region A is similar to that in the symmetric
case. The scenarios in which fiscal policy is dominant (leadership and/or fiscal cooperation
scenarios) and the Nash scenario exhibit the highest losses. Remember, in this context,
that the joint targeted inflation and output levels are a country-size weighted average of
the single countries’ preferences when fiscal policies cooperate.
The lowest welfare losses occur if monetary policy moves first or if all policies coop-
erate. Again, the relatively small losses under monetary dominance are due to the fact
that, when monetary policy moves first, fiscal policy makers know that the central bank
will not react to too expansionary a fiscal policy. Therefore, fiscal policy itself is more
restrained compared to the fiscal leadership scenarios.
For region B we have some changes in the ranking: the three scenarios in which fiscal
policies are dominant (cooperation of fiscal policies in a simultaneous game, in a sequential
game where fiscal policies move first, and in the scenario where fiscal policies move first
but act independently) and the Nash scenario show the highest losses. The reasons for
the high losses under the two fiscal cooperation scenarios are easy to explain: As has
been discussed for region A, the common central bank reacts strongly to fiscal policies by
aiming at lower inflation rates. At the same time the fiscal targets, themselves, which are
a weighted average of the regions’ targets, are more conservative than region B’s desired
levels. Both effects together amount to an even higher loss compared to the one of region
A.
The lowest losses for the fiscal authority in region B occur under (i) monetary lead-
ership and fiscal cooperation, and (ii) leadership of fiscal policies. In (ii), fiscal policy of
region B can follow its own targets best; in (i), fiscal policy makers recognize, again, that
they cannot exploit monetary policy to reach their own goals due to the time-sequence of
the game and abstain from too expansionary a fiscal policy.
The ranking of the central bank losses correspond again to the rankings of the union-
wide social losses by our assumption of a welfare maximizing monetary policy. We, there-
fore, consider the welfare equivalent consumption losses in the following. A comparison
this assumption.
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Table 7.5: Demand-side Policy: Parameter Values in the Asymmetric Case
Parameter i = A i = B Explanation
Output Equation
y¯i 0 0 Natural output level
ai 0.8 1.0 Effect of fiscal policy on the same region’s output
aij 0.1 0.1 Effect of fiscal policy on the other region’s output
bi 1.0 1.5 Effect of surprise inflation on the same region’s output
κi 0.2 0.2 Terms of trade effect of an inter-regional difference in in-
flation rates
σ2φi 0.01 0.058 Variance of regional shocks to output
Inflation Equation
ci 0.5 0.7 Effect of fiscal policy on the same region’s inflation
cij 0.15 0.15 Effect of fiscal policy on the other region’s inflation
Loss Functions
θiM 0.5 0.5 Central bank’s weighting factor for output
piiM 0.0 0.0 Inflation target of the central bank
yiM 0.0 0.0 Output target of the central bank
θiF 1.3 2.0 Fiscal policy’s weighting factor for output
piiF 0.02 0.03 Inflation target of fiscal policy
yiF 0.015 0.025 Output target of fiscal policy
n 0.7 GDP share of region A on union-wide GDP
Remarks: i = A,B, j = A,B and j 6= i.
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of the social losses under the symmetric and asymmetric case shows that, of course, the
region closer to the social optimum achieves generally higher losses when heterogeneities
exist. This may underline the meaning of the convergence criteria, which have to be
fulfilled by the new European member states before admitted to adopt the Euro.27
In our example, the targets of the fiscal policy maker in region A are closer to the
social optimum, meaning that fiscal policy is more conservative in region A than in B.
When comparing the welfare based consumption losses, we find for region A that the losses
are higher than for region B in scenarios where fiscal policy is coordinated or/and has a
first mover advantage, i. e. in scenarios where fiscal policies have the greatest influence.
These are also the scenarios under which the private agents achieve the highest consump-
tion losses in region B. The smallest consumption losses occur when monetary policy
moves first, leading to equilibria of output and inflation closer to the social optimum, i.e.
monetary policy gains a first mover-advantage in these scenarios.
7.2.6 Sensitivity Analysis for Demand-side Policy
Analogously to the procedure in section 7.2.4, we use a sensitivity analysis to examine
whether the results derived in the previous section still hold when the structural param-
eters are varied. We begin with varying ai, bi and ci for i = A,B simultaneously in both
regions. We consider how this affects the rankings of the different scenarios with respect
to the fiscal policy makers’ and central bank’s loss functions. The result is shown in figure
7.5. After that, we examine how the rankings change, when a parameter is changed in
one region while it is kept fixed for the other region. These results are depicted in the
figures 7.6 and 7.7.
27We agree that a certain level of (real and nominal) convergence is a necessary requirement for the new
EU member states to be able to abstain from an independent monetary policy as a stabilization tool, and
to participate successfully in the European Monetary Union. However, the way in which the convergence
criteria are used in practice is often debatable. E. g., an economic justification of the strict interpretation
of the Maastricht Criteria in the assessment of Lithuania’s state of preparation to adopt the Euro by
stating that Lithuania has slightly missed the inflation criterion is questionable: the convergence criteria
focus primarily on nominal convergence, but this may even hamper real convergence (see for a detailed
discussion e.g. Feuerstein and Grimm, 2004 and Siebke et al., 2003).
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Figure 7.5: Identical Parameter Variations in Region A and B (Demand-Side Policy)
Symmetric case Asymmetric case
sym. LFA sym. LM asym. LFA asym. LFB asym. LM
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Identical Variations of Parameters in Both Regions (Figure 7.5)
The first obvious result is that the losses in a heterogeneous monetary union are higher
for almost all scenarios over the whole parameter ranges. A result that we also found for
supply-side fiscal policy. The only exception is the cooperation case: Here we reach always
the first best for the central bank and, thus, the private agents due to the agreement of all
policy makers upon the socially optimal targets. However, if fiscal policies can, instead,
enforce (partially) their own targets, the result may not hold any longer and cooperation
can have worse outcomes than other scenarios exhibit.
Identical Variation of Both ai
Beginning with a more detailed discussion of the different cases, we see that for an in-
creasing ai, which raises the influence of fiscal policies on output, the losses of the central
bank and fiscal policy makers decrease in all scenarios except for fiscal cooperation in the
symmetric case (=homogeneous currency area). We also find that a value of ai > 0.6
leads to relatively small central bank losses in the scenarios where monetary policy has
leadership, no matter whether fiscal policies cooperate or not. The opposite is true for
the scenarios in which fiscal policies take leadership. The latter case stands in line with
the findings of the simulation output discussed in the previous section, where we used
ai = 0.8.
In the asymmetric case (=heterogeneous currency area), monetary leadership con-
tributes also to small losses when ai is large for the fiscal policy maker of region A, which
is the more conservative region: a large ai facilitates an expansionary fiscal policy in re-
gion B to push inflation and output into the desired direction more easily. The central
bank reacts with a strong contractionary fiscal policy. Therefore, the fiscal policy maker
in country A suffers from too low an inflation.
For region B, the Nash scenario and the simultaneous fiscal cooperation scenario show
the smallest losses around ai = 0.5; fiscal leadership creates for aB > 0.6 the smallest loss
together with monetary leadership when fiscal policies cooperate.
The two scenarios of monetary leadership (with fiscal cooperation and with indepen-
dently acting fiscal policies) lead to small welfare losses, as the central bank gains a
first-mover advantage and is able to implement its policy mostly in line with its targets in
these scenarios. Fiscal leadership, the Nash scenario, and fiscal cooperation when fiscal
and monetary policies act simultaneously produce the highest central bank losses.
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Identical Variation of Both bi
We, here, consider the pictures in the third and fourth row of figure 7.5. An increasing
bi together with fiscal authorities’ output targets above the socially optimal rate implies
a more severe time inconsistency problem of fiscal policies as explained in section 7.1.
Hence, an increasing bi tends to produce higher policy losses in almost all cases.
In the symmetric case, both monetary leadership scenarios contribute to the smallest
losses, whereas the Nash scenario, the fiscal cooperation scenario where fiscal policies
move first and where fiscal and monetary policies act simultaneously lead to the highest
losses for the fiscal policy makers. The realized losses are of a similar size. This supports
the findings of the previous section.
Nearly the same ranking can be observed for the fiscal authority of region A in the
heterogeneous case, with one exception: the fiscal leadership case creates higher losses.
The reason is that the inflation and output targets of region B are above those of the
relatively more conservative region A. The policy maker in A suffers, therefore, from a
too expansionary a fiscal policy in B to which the central bank reacts with a restrictive
monetary policy: for region A, output is above and inflation below the social optimum.
In contrast, for region B the cooperation scenario and the fiscal cooperation scenario
(when all players act simultaneously) produce the highest policy losses. Under the unco-
ordinated fiscal leadership case the losses are relatively small, because the fiscal authority
in region B can follow its own targets most aggressively.
From the viewpoint of the central bank, the monetary leadership scenario, and, inter-
estingly, the fiscal cooperation and monetary leadership scenario lead to the best outcomes
for 0 < bi < 0.8. This holds as fiscal cooperation dampens the extreme expansionary fiscal
policy of country B as the policy maker of B internalizes now the target function of A.
For a high value of bi monetary leadership contributes again to the smallest central bank
loss besides the joint cooperation scenario.
Identical Variation of Both ci
The parameter ci measures the direct impact of fiscal policies on inflation. The graphs
in the fifth and sixth row of figure 7.5 show that a high value of ci leads to a worse
performance of all three fiscal cooperation cases (simultaneous movement, fiscal leadership
and monetary leadership).
We find again that in the symmetric case the two monetary leadership scenarios pro-
duce relatively small losses for the fiscal authorities for values of ci < 0.5. The highest
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losses occur under the Nash case, in the simultaneous fiscal cooperation case, and in the
fiscal cooperation case where fiscal policies move first (with the exception of ci close to
1). We have a similar ranking for the central bank losses as in the two former cases:
Stackelberg leadership of monetary policy implies the lowest losses, again, besides the
joint cooperation scenario.
For a heterogeneous monetary union, we observe similar rankings for the losses of the
policy maker in region A and the common central bank. Region B, in contrast, faces
small losses when fiscal policies move first and are uncoordinated.
Summary of the Findings For Identical Parameter Variations (Figure 7.5)
The sensitivity analysis has proven that the ranking of the different scenarios with respect
to the fiscal policy makers’ target function and the central bank’s target function (= union-
wide social loss function) given in table 7.4 is relatively stable for variations in ai, bi and
ci. The main implications, which we have found are summarized in the following:
• Joint cooperation, monetary leadership and monetary leadership with coordinated
fiscal policies lead to the lowest central bank losses in a heterogeneous monetary
union. This implies also that these three scenarios generate the smallest welfare
losses for the private agents.
• The two monetary leadership scenarios contribute also to relatively small losses
faced by the fiscal authorities in the case of a homogeneous monetary union.
• The two fiscal leadership scenarios (for coordinated and uncoordinated fiscal poli-
cies) and the Nash-scenario lead to relatively high losses for both, the fiscal author-
ities and the central bank, in a homogeneous monetary union.
• In a heterogeneous monetary union where region B is characterized by a more
aggressive inflation and output goal compared to region A and the central bank,
fiscal leadership produces in many scenarios the smallest losses for fiscal policy in
region B, but high losses for the central bank and for fiscal policy in region A.
• For a low value of a < 0.6 and a high value of c > 0.5, the qualitative results become
for several scenarios unstable. However, both a > 0.6 and c < 0.5 seem to accord
best with reality.
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Figure 7.6: Sensitivity Analysis for Demand-side Policy in the Symmetric Case
Effects on LFA Effects on LFB Effects on LM
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Figure 7.7: Sensitivity Analysis for Demand-side Policy in the Asymmetric Case
Effects on LFA Effects on LFB Effects on LM
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Individual Parameter Variations
Figures 7.6 and 7.7 depict the fiscal and monetary authorities’ losses when the parameters
aA, bA or cA are varied in country A, while no changes occur in country B. The results
are almost in line with the results of figure 7.5. For the homogeneous monetary union,
the ranking of the results from table 7.4 are widely confirmed (see figure 7.6). For the
heterogeneous monetary union, the findings of table 7.4 are confirmed for aA < 0.5 and
cA > 0.5 by figure 7.7.
7.2.7 Nesting of the Results by Dixit and Lambertini
We are able to replicate the qualitative results of Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003a,
2003b) in our model, as explained in the following.
Dixit and Lambertini (2001) find that under Nash, piiN < piM < pi
i
F and y
i
N > y
i
F >
yM , under Monetary Stackelberg pi
i
STM > piM and under Fiscal Stackelberg y
i
STF > yM .
We obtain the same results if we set κi = 0 for all i and fulfill the conditions stated in
equation (7) of that paper.
Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) find that if all authorities share the same output
and inflation targets, those targets can be achieved without coordination and no matter
how the timing of actions is or whether the output weights are equal or not. We obtain
their results by setting κi = cij = 0 and equalizing the target values piM = pi
A
F = pi
B
F and
yM = y
A
F = y
B
F .
Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) find that yN < yM ≤ yF and piN > piF ≥ piM . For the
Stackelberg scenarios, no clear pattern emerges, as the stochastic terms can change either
inequality sign. Furthermore, they simulate and explore the implications for welfare under
different discretionary policy scenarios. We replicate their qualitative results by setting
n = 1 and κi = ci,j = aij = 0, ci < 0, piM < pi
A
F = pi
B
F and yM = y
A
F = y
B
F .
Chapter 8
Conclusion to Part II
In part II of this dissertation we have examined the interactions of fiscal and monetary
policies in a monetary union. One main focus of our model was to derive a theoretical
model that allows for capturing heterogeneities among the different countries participat-
ing in a monetary union, and for analyzing strategic interactions of fiscal and monetary
authorities. We have surveyed the empirical findings and the literature on heterogeneities
in the European Monetary Union in section 5.2. Thereby, we have shown that hetero-
geneities are a serious matter in the EMU, as inflation and output differentials have been
and still are sizeable and highly persistent. It is obvious that the enlargement of the EMU
will deepen the existing heterogeneities – at least during the first years of participation
of the new EU member states, until a high degree of real convergence will be attained at
some point in time.
Why do heterogeneities matter? The answer is quite simple. By adopting the Euro,
the participating countries abstain from a monetary policy of their own and fiscal policy
remains the only instrument for pursuing region-specific goals and stabilizing region-
specific shocks. The common central bank has to implement a monetary policy that is
most appropriate for the whole monetary union and it cannot respond to idiosyncratic
shocks and country-specific political targets. This makes the role of fiscal policies more
important and leaves room for strategic behavior in achieving national goals.
To examine these heterogeneities, we have enhanced and modified the model of Dixit
and Lambertini (2003b). From the microfoundation we have established that terms of
trade, i. e. inflation differentials, have an impact on regional output. In section 6.2 we
derived a utility-based welfare criterion for each region as well as for the whole monetary
union.
In our reduced-form framework, elaborated in section 7.1, we have introduced the
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different scenarios of strategic interactions between fiscal and monetary policies. In this
context we have assumed that fiscal policies deviate from maximizing regional welfare and
aiming, instead, at higher inflation and output levels compared to the union-wide central
bank. By contrast, monetary policy is assumed to maximize union-wide welfare.
We have used simulations to evaluate the different scenarios of strategic behavior, and
explored two types of fiscal policies: (i) a supply-side policy in line with the micro-model,
where fiscal policies grant subsidies to increase output financed by per-head taxes, and
(ii) demand-side policy, where fiscal policies try to push output by raising demand. We,
further, have considered a heterogeneous monetary union with two different regions: a
“conservative” region and a “catch-up” region. We have assumed that the desired inflation
and output targets of the “conservative region” are relatively closer to the social optimum.
To evaluate the supply-side policy (i), we have used a calibration of our micro-model
drawing upon the parameters from the standard economic literature. We have shown that
the losses of fiscal policies are relatively small in the Nash scenario, in the fiscal leadership
scenario (for both cooperation of fiscal policies and independently acting fiscal policies),
and when fiscal policies cooperate and all policy makers move simultaneously. In these
scenarios, fiscal policies achieve an output level closest to their preferred levels, whereas
inflation is stabilized close to the socially optimal level by the common central bank.
The losses of monetary policy, which correspond to the welfare losses of the private
agents, are lowest when monetary policy moves first. The first-best situation is attained
when all policy makers agree upon the socially optimal levels. But as the central bank
and fiscal policy makers consider different scenarios optimal, such an agreement appears
to be unrealistic on a voluntary basis.
If fiscal authorities exercise a demand-side oriented policy (ii), which accords best with
the policies in the EMU, fiscal leadership leads to relatively low losses for the catch-up
region. In contrast, monetary leadership produces the lowest losses for the conservative
region. If monetary policy moves first, fiscal cooperation would be preferable for the
catch-up region, whereas the conservative region prefers to act independently.
From the viewpoint of monetary policy (and welfare), the smallest losses are again
attained when monetary policy moves first and, of course, when monetary and fiscal
policies agree on the socially optimal level.
In the EMU, fiscal policies appear primarily to track national interests. However, the
analysis has shown that fiscal policies in a heterogeneous monetary union can contribute
to high welfare losses under both types of fiscal policies. From a welfare perspective,
monetary leadership or cooperation would then be a desirable scenario for both types of
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fiscal policy.
To summarize, if the authorities’ preferences do not coincide, or are at least relatively
far apart, worse outcomes are likely to occur. In such a case, designing the institutions so
that monetary policy plays a lead role generates the smallest losses for the agents living
in both regions, even with existing heterogeneities.
The European Central Bank aggressively pursues the price-stability goal, meaning
that the inflation rate should not exceed 2%. Accordingly, it appears to act as a first
mover, which is beneficial for welfare. At the same time, fiscal policies are restricted
in their actions by the Stability and Growth Pact, which leaves less room for pursuing
too excessive fiscal targets and implies a reduction of the trade-offs caused by strategic
behavior. Recent experience, however, has shown that in bad times meeting the stability
criteria may not be a very credible option for fiscal policies, especially, when the culprits
judge their own sanctions, as has happened in the European Union. Therefore, reducing
heterogeneities and bringing fiscal policies’ targets closer to the socially optimal levels is
an essential task in achieving a longer-term stability guarantee for the EMU.
Appendix A
Supplements to Chapter 3
In this appendix, we investigate the expected inflation rate in the case of a fixed exchange-
rate system and derive sufficient conditions under which multiple equilibria can be ex-
cluded.
A.1 Calculation of the Expected Value of Inflation
under a Peg
As mentioned in section 3.5.2, for certain parameter values the boundaries uu2 or u
l
2 may
lie outside the support of the new shock u2 which is uniformly distributed. In that case,
we can replace the boundaries by −A or A, respectively. To determine pie2, we thus define
u˜l2 and u˜
u
2 as
u˜l2 = min{max{ul2,−A}, A}
u˜u2 = min{max{uu2 ,−A}, A} . (A.1)
For instance, uu2 > A implies u˜
u
2 = A.
Using (A.1), we can rewrite (3.25) as
E1(pi2) =
u˜l2 + A
2A
· Γ(pie2, k) +
A− u˜u2
2A
· Γ(pie2, k) +
(
ηφ1 +
u˜u2 − u˜l2
2A
)
u˜u2 − u˜l2
2A
=
(
ηφ1 +
u˜u2 − u˜l2
2
)
u˜u2 − u˜l2
2A
+
(
1− u˜
u
2 − u˜l2
2A
)
Γ(pie2, k) . (A.2)
E1(pi2) is a continuous function of pi
e
2. The equilibrium condition is given by pi
e
2 = E1(pi2).
To solve for the expected inflation pie2, we consider the following five different cases:
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• Case (i): uu2 < −A, i.e. the interval [ul2, uu2 ] lies outside the support of u2.
E1(pi2|u˜u2 = −A) =
ηφ1 − 2A
2
· −A+ A
2A
+
1− (−A+ A)
2A
· Γ(pie2, k)
= Γ(pie2, k) (A.3)
The solution equals the free-float equilibrium rate, as monetary authorities will
always revalue.
• Case (ii): uu2 > −A and ul2 < −A, i.e. [ul2, uu2 ] lies partly in the support of u2. In
this case the expected value of pi2 is given by
E1(pi2|uu2 > −A ∧ ul2 < −A) =
(
ηφ1 +
uu2 − A
2
)
uu2 + A
2A
+
(
1− u
u
2 + A
2A
)
· Γ(pie2, k)
= Γ(pie2, k) +
uu2 + A
2A
[
ηφ1 +
uu2 − A
2
− Γ(pie2, k)
]
= Γ(pie2, k)−
1
4A
(
−ηφ1 + Γ(pie2, k) +
√
c
γ2 + θ
+ A
)
·
[
−ηφ1 + Γ(pie2, k)−
√
c
γ2 + θ
+ A
]
. (A.4)
• Case (iii): −A ≤ ul2 < uu2 ≤ A, i.e. [ul2, uu2 ] is a subset of the support interval
[−A,A]. This leads to
E1(pi2|ul2 > −A ∧ uu2 < A) =
(
ηφ1 +
uu2 + u
l
2
2
)
uu2 − ul2
2A
+
(
1− u
u
2 − ul2
2A
)
· Γ(pie2, k)
= (ηφ1 − ηφ1 + Γ(pie2, k))
1
A
√
c
γ2 + θ
+
(
1− 1
A
√
c
γ2 + θ
)
Γ(pie2, k)
= Γ(pie2, k) . (A.5)
• Case (iv): ul2 < A and uu2 > A, i.e. the interval [ul2, uu2 ] lies partly in [−A,A].
E1(pi|ul2 < A ∧ uu2 > A) =
(
ηφ1 +
1
2
A+ 1
2
ul2
)
(A− ul2)
2A
+
(
1− A− u
l
2
2A
)
· Γ(pie2, k)
= Γ(pie2, k) +
1
4A
[
A+ ηφ1 − Γ(pie2, k) +
√
c
γ2 + θ
]
·
(
A+ ηφ1 − Γ(pie2, k)−
√
c
γ2 + θ
)
. (A.6)
• Case (v): If ul2 > A, i.e. the interval [ul2, uu2 ] lies also outside of the support interval
of u2, the policy maker will always devalue.
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Using C :=
√
c
γ2+θ
, we can rewrite the results for the different cases as
E1(pi2|case (i)) = Γ(pie2, k)
E1(pi2|case (ii)) = Γ(pie2, k)−
1
4A
(−ηφ1 + Γ(pie2, k) + C + A) [−ηφ1 + Γ(pie2, k)− C + A]
E1(pi2|case (iii)) = Γ(pie2, k)
E1(pi2|case (iv)) = Γ(pie2, k) +
1
4A
(−ηφ1 + Γ(pie2, k) + C − A) [−ηφ1 + Γ(pie2, k)− C − A]
E1(pi2|case (v)) = Γ(pie2, k) .
A.2 Graph of E1(pi2) as a Function of pi
e
2
The function E1(pi2) is defined by cases. As u
l
2 and u
u
2 depend positively on pi
e
2 (equations
3.23 and 3.24), the sequence of the respective intervals corresponds to the numbering of
the cases (i) to (v).
The graph of E1(pi2) lies on the straight line Γ(pi
e
2, k) with the slope
γ2
γ2+θ
< 1 in the
three cases (i), (iii) and (iv). By investigating the second derivative of E1(pi2), it follows
that the function is concave in case (ii) and convex in case (iv). Thus E1(pi2) is a straight
line with two convexities – one above (case ii) and one below (case iv) the line as illustrated
in figure A.1. The position of the line and the convexities depend on the parameters, in
particular on k and ηφ1.
A.3 Conditions for a Unique Equilibrium under a
Peg
In the following section, we derive two conditions excluding the possibility of multiple
equilibria under a peg.
A) From the description of the graph of E1(pi2) it is clear that the equilibrium is unique,
if the function E1(pi2) cuts the bisecting line in the range of case (iii).
B) Moreover, we can exclude the existence of multiplicities if the slope of E1(pi2) does
not exceed one in the two cases (ii) and (iv), too. We take up case (iv) for further
examination, the argument in case (ii) is analogous.
APPENDIX A. SUPPLEMENTS TO CHAPTER 3 176
The first derivative of E1(pi2|case (iv)) is given by
dE1(pi2|case (iv))
dpie2
=
1
2
γ2(γ2pie2 + γk + Aγ
2 + Aθ − ηφ1θ − ηφ1γ2)
A(γ2 + θ)2
=
1
2A
γ2
γ2 + θ
[Γ(pie2, k)− ηφ1 + A] . (A.7)
The expression in equation (A.7) equals one if1
pie2 = A+ ηφ1 +
2Aθ2 + 3γ2Aθ − γ3k + γ2ηφ1θ
γ4
. (A.8)
The boundary between the ranges of the cases (iv) and (v) is given by
pie2 =
(
A+ ηφ1 +
√
c
γ2 + θ
)
γ2 + θ
γ2
− k
γ
. (A.9)
If that boundary lies left of the point where dE1(pi2)
dpie2
= 1, the slope of E1(pi2) is
smaller than one also in the range of case (iv) because the function is convex in that
interval. Thus, the following condition excludes multiplicities
A+ ηφ1 +
2Aθ2 + 3γ2Aθ − γ3k + γ2ηφ1θ
γ4
−
[(
A+ ηφ1 +
√
c
γ2 + θ
)
γ2 + θ
γ2
− k
γ
]
> 0
⇔ 1
γ4
·
(
2Aθ2 + 2γ2Aθ − γ4
√
c
g2 + θ
− γ2θ
√
c
g2 + θ
)
> 0
⇔ 2Aθ(γ2 + θ)− γ2
√
c
γ2 + θ
(γ2 + θ) > 0
⇔ 2Aθ − γ2
√
c
γ2 + θ
> 0 . (A.10)
As by assumption
√
c
γ2 + θ
≤ A,
2Aθ − γ2A > 0 (A.11)
is sufficient for (A.10). Thus, multiplicities can be excluded, if θ >
γ2
2
.
Figure A.1 depicts E(pi2) as a function of pi
e
2 for a set of parameters satisfying this
condition (i.e. γ = 0.7, k = 1, cpf = 1.2, A = 1.5, η = 0.5, φ1 =
−2
5
A and θ = 0.5).
The unique equilibrium is denoted by E.
1Note, that we first determine the point where the slope equals one and check afterwards, if the point
is in the range of case (iv).
APPENDIX A. SUPPLEMENTS TO CHAPTER 3 177
Figure A.1: Expected Value of Second Period Inflation under a Peg
Appendix B
Supplements to Chapter 4
B.1 Calculations for a Fixed Exchange Rate System
In the following part of the appendix, we determine optimal fiscal and monetary policy
under a fixed exchange-rate system. At first, we make the assumption that expected
inflation is treated as given. The results of the calculations are used in section 4.5.1 and
in section 4.6. After that, we reformulate the loss function and determine the rational
expectations equilibrium for the case of the exchange rate peg being defended with a
probability of one.
B.1.1 Optimization with Exogenous pie2
The optimization problem of the policy maker is given by
max
y2,pi2,b2,g2
L2 = 1
2
(y2 − k)2 + 1
2
θpipi
2
2 +
1
2
θbb
2
2
+λ1(y2 − γ(pi2 − pie2)− wg2)
+λ2(pi2 − φ2 − βg2)
+λ3(b2 − b1(1− pi2)− g2) . (B.1)
The first-order conditions are
∂L2
∂y2
= (y2 − k) + λ1 = 0 (B.2)
∂L2
∂pi2
= θpipi2 − γλ1 + λ2 + λ3b1 = 0 (B.3)
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∂L2
∂b2
= θbb2 + λ3 = 0 (B.4)
∂L2
∂g2
= wλ1 + βλ2 + λ3 = 0 . (B.5)
Combining equations (B.2), (B.4) and (B.5) yields
λ2 = −wλ1
β
− λ3
β
=
θbb2
β
+
w
β
(y2 − k) . (B.6)
By inserting (B.2), (B.4) and (B.6) into (B.3), we obtain
θpi2 = k
γβ + w
β
− y2γβ + w
β
+ θbb2
βb1 − 1
β
⇔ y2 = − θpiβ
γβ + w
pi2 + θbb2
βb1 − 1
γβ + w
+ k . (B.7)
Restriction 3 (=debt equation) solved for g2 yields
g2 = b2 + b1pi2 − b1. (B.8)
Inserting into restriction 1 (=output equation) leads to
y2 = γ(pi2 − pie2) + wg2 = γpi2 − γpie2 + wb2 + wb1pi2 − wb1
= pi2(γ + wb1) + wb2 − wb1 − γpie2. (B.9)
Combining (B.7) and (B.9) yields
θpipi2 = k
γβ + w
β
− γβ + w
β
(pi2(γ + wb1) + wb2 − wb1 − γpie2)
+θbb2
βb1 − 1
β
⇔ pi2
(
θpiβ + (γβ + w)(γ + wb1)
β
)
=
γβ + w
β
(k + wb1 + γpi
e
2)
+
θb(βb1 − 1)− w(γβ + w)
β
b2 . (B.10)
Some further manipulations lead to
pi2 = − θb(1− βb1) + w(γβ + w)
(γ + wb1)(γβ + w) + θpiβ
b2 +
(k + γpie2 + wb1)(γβ + w)
(γ + wb1)(γβ + w) + θpiβ
. (B.11)
Restriction 2 (=inflation equation) combined with restriction 3 (=debt equation) gives
pi2 =
β
1− βb1 b2 +
φ2 − βb1
1− βb1 . (B.12)
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Setting (B.11) equal to (B.12) leads to[
β
1− βb1 +
θb(1− βb1) + w(γβ + w)
(γ + wb1)(γβ + w) + θpiβ
]
b2 =
(k + γpie2 + wb1)(γβ + w)
(γ + wb1)(γβ + w) + θpiβ
− φ2 − βb1
1− βb1
b2
β[(γ + wb1)(γβ + w) + θpiβ] + θb(1− βb1)2 + w(γβ + w)(1− βb1)
(1− βb1) [(γ + wb1)(γβ + w) + θpiβ)]
=
(k + γpie2 + wb1)(γβ + w)(1− βb1)− (φ2 − βb1)[(γ + wb1)(γβ + w) + θpiβ]
(1− βb1) [(γ + wb1)(γβ + w) + θpiβ)] .
(B.13)
Solving for b2 yields the optimum value of second period debts (for a given pi
e
2) which
equals
b∗2 =
(k + γpie2 + wb1)(γβ + w)(1− βb1)− (φ2 − βb1)
(
(γ + wb1)(γβ + w) + θpiβ
)
(γβ + w)2 + θpiβ2 + θb(1− βb1)2 .
(B.14)
For a better exposition and to simplify further calculations, we define A := w + γβ and
B := (1− βb1). Note that from the domain of parameters used here A > 0 and B > 0 is
obvious. Therefore, we can rewrite b∗2 as
b∗2 =
(k + γpie2 + wb1)AB
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
− (φ2 − βb1)(θpiβ + A(γ + wb1))
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
. (B.15)
The optimal second period inflation rate and the optimal output y2 are given by
pi∗2 =
φ2 − βb1
B
+
β
B
b∗2
=
βA(k + γpie2 + wb1)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
− β(φ2 − βb1)(θpiβ + A(γ + wb1))
B(θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2)
+
φ2 − βb1
B
=
βA(k + γpie2 + wb1)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
+
φ2 − βb1
B
[
θbB
2 + w2 + wβ(γ − wb1 − βγb1)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
]
=
βA(k + γpie2 + wb1)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
+
(φ2 − βb1)(θbB + wA)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
=
βA(k + γpie2) + φ2(θbB + wA)− θbβBb1
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
, (B.16)
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y∗2 = k − θbb∗2
B
A
− θpipi∗2
β
A
= k − (k + γpi
e
2 + wb1)(θbB
2 + θpiβ
2)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
−φ2 − βb1
A
θpiβ(w
2 + wβ(γ − wb1 − γβb1))− θbB2(A(γ + wb1))
B(θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2)
= k − (k + γpi
e
2 + wb1)(θbB
2 + θpiβ
2)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
+
(φ2 − βb1)(θbB(γ + wb1)− θpiwβ)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
=
kA2 − θbb1AB − γpie2(θbB2 + θpiβ2) + φ2(θbB(γ + wb1)− θpiwβ)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
. (B.17)
To reach the optimum, the policy maker chooses a fiscal deficit of
g∗2 = b
∗
2 + b1pi
∗
2 − b1
=
(k + γpie2 + wb1)AB
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
+
βA(k + γpie2)b1 − θbβBb21
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
−(φ2 − βb1)(θpiβ + A(γ + wb1))
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
+
φ2(θbB + wA)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
− b1 (B.18)
=
(k + pie2)A+ φ2(θbB − θpiβ + A(w + γ + wb1)) + b1(A(γβ − 1) + w − θbB)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
.
The derivatives of optimal second period output, inflation, debt, and of the policy instru-
ment g2 for pi
e
2 equals:
∂b2
∂pie2
=
γ(γβ + w)(1− βb1)
(γβ + w)2 + β2θpi + θb(1− βb1)2 > 0 for βb1 < 1 (B.19)
∂pi2
∂pie2
=
γβ(γβ + w)
(γβ + w)2 + β2θpi + θb(1− βb1)2 > 0 (B.20)
∂g2
∂pie2
=
γβ + w
(γβ + w)2 + β2θpi + θb(1− βb1)2 > 0 (B.21)
∂y2
∂pie2
= − γ(θbB
2 + θpiβ
2)
(γβ + w)2 + β2θpi + θb(1− βb1)2 < 0 . (B.22)
B.1.2 Reformulation of the Loss Function as a Function of pi2
For a better handling in section 4.6, we rewrite the loss function by using the calculations
of the first section of appendix B.1 (for a given pie2). From equation B.9, we have
y2 = pi2(γ + wb1) + wb2 − wb1 − γpie2 . (B.23)
Solving (B.12) for b2 yields
b2 =
B
β
pi2 − φ2 − βb1
β
=
1− βb1
β
pi2 − φ2
β
+ b1 . (B.24)
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Inserting (B.24) into (B.23) leads to
y2 = pi2
w + γβ
β
− w
β
φ2 − γpie2 . (B.25)
Plugging (B.24) and (B.25) into the loss function, we obtain
2 · LCB2 (pi2) =
(
pi2
w + γβ
β
− w
β
φ2 − γpie2 − k
)2
+ θpipi
2
2
+θb
(
1− βb1
β
pi2 − φ2
β
+ b1
)2
. (B.26)
B.1.3 Rational Expectations Equilibrium
We assume that the private sector has rational expectations on inflation. Then, the
following condition holds:
pie2 = E(pi2) =
βAk + βAγpie2 + ηφ1(θbB + wA)− θbβb1B
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
⇔ pie2
(
θbB
2 + A+ θpiβ
2 − βγA
θbB2 + A+ θpiβ2
)
=
βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA)− θbβb1B
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
⇔ pie2 =
βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA)− θbβb1B
θbB2 + wA+ θpiβ2
. (B.27)
Inserting (B.27) into equation (B.16) yields the rational expectation equilibrium value,
given by1
pi∗∗2 =
βAk + φ2(θbB + wA)− θbβb1B
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
+
βγA
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
· βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA)− θbβBb1
θbB2 + wA+ θpiβ2
=
βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA)− θbβb1B
θbB2 + wA+ θpiβ2
+ u2
θbB + wA
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
. (B.28)
The equilibrium value for b2 is obtained by plugging (B.28) into equation (B.24):
b∗∗2 = pi
∗∗
2
B
β
− φ2
β
+ b1
=
B(βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA)− θbb1βB)
β(θbB2 + wA+ θpiβ2)
+ b1 − u2 A(γ + wb1)
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
, (B.29)
and y2 can be obtained by plugging (B.28) into (B.25)
y∗∗2 = wpi
∗∗
2 + γu2
θbB + wA
θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2
− w
β
φ2 . (B.30)
1Rational expectations equilibrium values are denoted by the superscript “**”.
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The rational expectations equilibrium is used in the sections 4.5.2 and in section 4.6.
Note that we, of course, can calculate the optimal size of government expenditure (=fiscal
deficit) g2 for the rational expectations equilibrium, too.
B.2 Calculation for a Flexible Exchange Rate System
We, here, derive optimal fiscal and monetary policy under flexible exchange rates. At
the beginning of this section, we make again the assumption that expected inflation is
exogenous. The results are used in section 4.5.1. Thereafter, we reformulate the loss
function and determine the rational expectations equilibrium.
B.2.1 Optimization with an Exogenous pie2 and an Exogenous
Ratio of Foreign Debts q
Optimization problem of the policy maker:
max
y2,pi2,b2,g2,e2
L2 = 1
2
(y2 − k)2 + 1
2
θpipi
2
2 +
1
2
θbb
2
2
+λ1(y2 − γ(pi2 − pie2)− wg2)
+λ2(pi2 − φ2 − κe2 − βg2)
+λ3(b2 − b1(1 + qe2 − pi2)− g2) , (B.31)
where e2 and g2 are the policy instruments to reach the output-, inflation- and debt-goal.
The first-order conditions are
∂L2
∂y2
= (y2 − k) + λ1 ⇔ λ1 = k − y2 = 0 (B.32)
∂L2
∂pi2
= θpipi2 − γλ1 + λ2 + λ3b1 = 0 (B.33)
∂L2
∂b2
= θbb2 + λ3 = 0⇔ λ3 = −θbb2 (B.34)
∂L2
∂g2
= −wλ1 − βλ2 − λ3 = 0 (B.35)
∂L2
∂e2
= −κλ2 − b1qλ3 = 0 . (B.36)
Combining (B.36) and (B.34) yields
λ2 = −b1q
κ
λ3 =
qb1θbb2
κ
. (B.37)
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Plugging (B.37) and (B.32) into (B.35) leads to
λ1 = −β
w
λ2 − λ3
w
= −qb1βθbb2
wk
+
θbb2
w
= θbb2
κ− qβb1
wκ
. (B.38)
Using (B.34), (B.37), (B.38) and (B.33), we obtain
θpipi2 = γλ1 − λ2 − λ3b1
⇔ θpipi2 = −qb1
κ
θbb2 + θbb2b1 +
γ
wκ
θbb2(κ− qb1β)
⇔ θpipi2 = θbb2
(
b1 − qb1
κ
+
γ(κ− qb1β)
wκ
)
⇔ pi2 = θbb2
θpi
γ(κ− qβb1)− b1w(q − κ)
wκ
. (B.39)
The first-order condition with respect to λ3 solved for g2 equals
g2 = b2 − b1(1 + qe2 − pi2) = b2 − b1qe2 − b1 + b1pi2 . (B.40)
The first-order condition with respect to λ2 solved for e2 yields
pi2 = φ2 + κe2 + βg2
⇔ e2 = 1
κ
(pi2 − φ2 − βg2). (B.41)
Combining (B.40) and (B.41) leads to
g2 =
b2κ
κ− b1qβ +
b1(k − q)
κ− b1qβ pi2 +
b1q
κ− b1qβφ2 −
b1κ
κ− b1qβ . (B.42)
Using (B.32) and (B.38) yields
y2 = k − θbb2κ− qβb1
wκ
. (B.43)
Inserting (B.41) into the output equation (first-order condition with respect to λ1), we
obtain
y2 = γ(pi2 − pie2) + wg2 = γpi2 + wg2 − γpie2
= γpi2 + b2
wκ
κ− qβb1 + pi2
wb1(κ− q)
κ− qβb1 +
qwb1φ2
κ− qβb1 −
wb1κ
κ− qβb1 − γpi
e
2
= pi2
γ(κ− b1qβ) + wb1(κ− q)
κ− b1qβ +
w
κ− b1qβ (κb2 + qb1φ2 − b1κ)− γpi
e
2 . (B.44)
Using (B.43) with (B.44) yields
pi2
γ(κ− b1qβ) + wb1(κ− q) + w(κb2 + qb1φ2 − b1κ)
κ− b1qβ − γpi
e
2 = k − θbb2
κ− qβb1
wκ
pi2 =
(k + γpie2)(κ− b1qβ)− wb1(qφ2 − κ)
γ(κ− b1qβ) + wb1(κ− q) −
θb(κ− b1qβ)2 + (wκ)2
wκ(γ(κ− b1qβ) + wb1(κ− q)b2 . (B.45)
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By combining (B.39) and (B.45), we obtain the optimal second period debt level b2 as a
function of inflation expectations of the private sector pie2 by
2
bf2 =
θpiwκ(κ− b1qβ)(k + γpie2) + θpiw2b1κ(κ− qφ2)
θb(γ(κ− b1qβ) + b1(κ− q))2 + θpiθb(κ− b1qβ)2 + θpi(wκ)2 . (B.46)
We define E := κ−qβb1 and F := wb1(κ−q). E and F may both have either sign, mainly
depending on the size of foreign debts q and the openness parameter κ. From an empirical
perspective, however, a prerequisite for a stable exchange rate is a highly open economy,
which guarantees the flexibility necessary to offset unfavorable shocks (this means κ is
close to one); at the same time, a credibly stable exchange rate is characterized by the
fact that creditors trust more in domestic debts, which contributes to a small q. If this
holds for the considered economy, E and F are positive. Using the abbreviations, we can
rewrite (B.46) as
bf2 =
E(k + γpie2)θpiwκ+ θpiw
2b1κ(κ− qφ2)
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2
. (B.47)
The optimal value for inflation is calculated from (B.39):
pif2 = b
f
2
θb
θpi
γ(κ− b1qβ) + wb1(κ− q)
wκ
= bf2
θb
θpi
γE + F
wκ
=
θb
θpi
· γE + F
wκ
· E(k + γpi
e
2)θpiwκ+ θpiw
2b1κ(κ− qφ2)
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2
=
θb(γE + F ) [E(k + γpi
e
2) + wb1(κ− qφ2)]
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2
; (B.48)
and optimal output is derived from (B.43) as
yf2 = k − θbbf2
E
wκ
= k − θbE
wκ
· E(k + γpi
e
2)θpiwκ+ θpiw
2b1κ(κ− qφ2)
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2
= k − θbE [(k + γpi
e
2)θpiE + θpiwb1(κ− qφ2)]
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2
. (B.49)
Combining the k-terms yields
k
[
θb(γE + F )
2 + θpiθbE
2 + θpi(wκ)
2 − θbθpiE2
]
= k(θb(γE + F )
2 + θpi(wκ)
2) . (B.50)
Inserting in (B.49) leads to
yf2 =
k(θb(γE + F )
2 + θpi(wκ)
2)− θbθpiE2γpie2 − θbθpiEwb1(κ− qφ2)
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2
. (B.51)
2We denote the equilibrium values in the free float case by a superscript f , henceforth.
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B.2.2 Reformulation of the Loss Function as a Function of pi2
To simplify the calculations in section 4.6 and appendix B.5, we rewrite the loss function
of a flexible exchange rate system. As shocks are perfectly offset in this setting, output
and debts can be expressed as a multiple of pif2 . Therefore, the loss function has the simple
form
2 · L2 = (y2 − k)2 + θpi(pif2 )2 + θbb22
=
(
− Eθpi
γE + F
pif2
)2
+ θpi(pi
f
2 )
2 +
(
θbθpi
wκ
γE + F
pif2
)2
=
(
− (κ− qβb1)θpi
γ(κ− qβb1) + wb1(κ− q)pi2
)2
+ θpi(pi
f
2 )
2
+
(
θbθpi
wκ
γ(κ− qβb1) + wb1(κ− q)pi
f
2
)2
= (pif2 )
2
(
θpi + θ
2
pi
[
(κ− qβb1)2 + (θbwκ)2
(γ(κ− qβb1) + wb1(κ− q))2
])
. (B.52)
B.2.3 Calculation of the Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Assuming rational expectations of inflation, we have
pie,f2 = E(pi
f
2 ) =
θb(γE + F )
[
E(k + γpie,f2 ) + wb1(κ− qηφ1)
]
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2
(B.53)
⇔ pie,f2
(
1− θb(γE + F )γE
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2
)
=
θb(γE + F ) [Ek + wb1(κ− qηφ1)]
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2
(B.54)
⇔ pie,f2 =
θb(γE + F ) [Ek + wb1(κ− qηφ1)]
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2 − θb(γE − F )Eγ
⇔ pie,f2 =
θb(γE + F ) [Ek + wb1(κ− qηφ1)]
θbF (F + γE) + θpi(wκ)2 + θpiθbE2
. (B.55)
To check the correctness of the result, we plug (B.55) into (B.48):
pi∗∗f2 =
θb(γE + F ) [Ek + wb1(κ− qφ2)]
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2
+
θb(γE + F )γE
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2
· θb(γE + F ) [Ek + wb1(κ− qηφ1)]
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2 − θb(γE + F )Eγ
=
θb(γE + F ) [Ek + wb1(κ− qηφ1)]
θbF (F + γE) + θpi(wκ)2 + θpiθbE2
− θb(γE + F )wb1qu2
θb(γE + F )2 + θpiθbE2 + θpi(wκ)2
. (B.56)
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B.3 Optimization of the Policy Maker, while Treat-
ing e2 as a Parameter
This part of the appendix refers to section 4.5.2. We compare the privates’ expectations of
inflation under a currency board and a peg system. The optimization problem is similar
to that in appendix B.2, but the change of the exchange rate e2 is here treated like an
additional parameter. The aim of this section is to show, how the equilibrium values and
the inflation expectations change when e2 is varied.
We have the following Lagrangean:
L2 = 1
2
(y2 − k)2 + 1
2
θpipi
2
2 +
1
2
θbb
2
2
+λ1(y2 − γ(pi2 − pie2)− wg2)
+λ2(pi2 − φ2 − κe2 − βg2)
+λ3(b2 − b1(1 + qe2 − pi2)− g2) . (B.57)
The first-order conditions are given by
∂L2
∂y2
= (y2 − k) + λ1 ⇔ λ1 = k − y2 = 0 (B.58)
∂L2
∂pi2
= θpipi2 − γλ1 + λ2 + λ3b1 = 0 (B.59)
∂L2
∂b2
= θbb2 + λ3 = 0⇔ λ3 = −θbb2 (B.60)
∂L2
∂g2
= −wλ1 − βλ2 − λ3 = 0 . (B.61)
Solving equation (B.61) for λ2 yields
λ2 = −w
β
λ1 − λ3
β
, (B.62)
and by inserting (B.58) and (B.60) into (B.62) we have
λ2 =
w
β
(y2 − k) + θbb2
β
. (B.63)
Plugging (B.58), (B.60) and (B.63) into (B.59) leads to
θpipi2 = γλ1 − λ2 − b1λ3
= γ(k − y2) + w
β
(k − y2)− θbb2
β
θbb1b2
= (k − y2)w + γβ
β
− θbb21− βb1
β
= (k − y2)A
β
− θbb2B
β
, (B.64)
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where A := (γβ+w) > 0 and B = 1−βb1 > 0. Solving restriction 2 (=inflation equation)
for g2 yields
g2 =
1
β
(pi2 − φ2 − κe2) . (B.65)
Inserting this into restriction 1 (=output equation), we have
y2 = γ(pi2 − pie2) + w
pi2 − φ2 − κe2
β
=
A
β
pi2 − γpie2 −
w
β
φ2 − wκ
β
e2 . (B.66)
Combining (B.66) and (B.64) results in
θpipi2 =
A
β
(
k − A
β
pi2 + γpi
e
2 +
w
β
φ2 +
wκ
β
e2
)
− θbb2B
β
⇔ pi2 θpiβ
2 + A2
β2
=
A
β
k +
Aγ
β
pie2 +
Aw
β2
φ2 +
wκA
β2
e2 − θbb2B
β
⇔ pi2 = A [βk + βγpi
e
2 + wφ2 + wκe2]
θpiβ2 + A2
− θbb2 βB
θpiβ2 + A2
. (B.67)
Solving restriction 3 (=debt equation) for g2 yields
g2 = b2 − b1(1 + qe2 − pi2) . (B.68)
Inserting (B.68) into restriction 2 leads to
pi2 = φ2 + κe2 + βb2 − βb1 − βb1qe2 + βb1pi2
⇔ pi2 = φ2 − βb1
B
+ e2
κ− qβb1
B
+
β
B
b2 . (B.69)
Combining (B.67) and (B.69) results in
A(βk + βγpie2 + wφ2 + wκe2)
θpiβ2 + A2
+
βb1 − φ2 − e2(κ− qβb1)
B
=
β
B
b2 +
θbβB
θpiβ2 + A2
b2 .(B.70)
Solving for b2 yields
b2 =
AB(k + γpie2)− φ2(A(wb1 + γ) + θpiβ) + b1(θpiβ2 + A2)
θpiβ2 + A2 + θbB2
+
e2(−κA(wb1 + γ)− θpiβ(κ− qβb1) + qb1A2)
θpiβ2 + A2 + θbB2
. (B.71)
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We obtain b2 by using the above equation in B.69
pi2 =
φ2 − βb1 + e2(κ− qβb1)
B
+
β
B
b2
=
[φ2 − βb1 + e2(κ− qβb1)](θpiβ2 + A2 + θbB2) + βAB(k + γpie2)
B(θpiβ2 + A2 + θbB2)
−φ2β(A(wb1 + γ) + θpiβ) + e2(−κAβ(wb1 + γ)− θpiβ2(κ− qβb1) + qβb1A2)
B(θpiβ2 + A2 + θbB2)
=
βAB(k + γpie2) + φ2B(θbB + wA)− b1βθbB2 + e2(wκAB + θbB2(κ− βb1q))
B(θpiβ2 + A2 + θbB2)
=
βA(k + γpie2) + φ2(θbB + wA)− b1βθbB + e2(wκA+ θbB(κ− βb1q))
θpiβ2 + A2 + θbB2
. (B.72)
We can determine the expected inflation pie2 (with rational expectations):
pie2 = E(pi2) =
βA(k + γpie2) + ηφ1(θbB + wA)− b1βθbB + e2(wκA+ θbB(κ− βb1q))
θpiβ2 + A2 + θbB2
⇔ pie2
(
θpiβ
2 + A2 + θbB
2 − γβA
θpiβ2 + A2 + θbB2
)
= . . .
. . .
βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA)− b1βθbB + e2(wκA+ θbB(κ− βb1q))
θpiβ2 + A2 + θbB2
⇔ pie2 =
βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA)− b1βθbB + e2(wκA+ θbB(κ− βb1q))
θpiβ2 + wA+ θbB2
. (B.73)
Assumption: We neglect the possibility of a revaluation (cf Obstfeld, 1996).
Solution: If foreign debts are not to high, represented by a relatively low q (with q generally
is part of the interval ∈ (0, 1)) and the economy is not very closed (represented by κ
approaching one), a devaluation causes an increasing expectation of inflation under a
float.3
Conclusion: As a standard peg system can surprisingly be abandoned after the realization
of the shock (escape clause) for an optimal realignment (which corresponds to a free float
in the two-period setting), the inflation expectation should be a mixture of the inflation
expectations of both an ultimate fixed exchange-rate regime and a free float. Therefore,
under the above derived cases, a currency board (ultimate fix) guarantees lower inflation
expectations than a standard peg.
Note that in cases where the probability of a devaluation under a peg converges to zero,
the inflation expectations in both systems become equal and pie,CB2 = pi
e,peg
2 holds.
3See also the first derivative of equation B.73, which is depicted in chapter 4.
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B.4 Determination of the Threshold for Maintaining
or Leaving the Currency Board
The rational expectation equilibrium values for y2, pi2, and b2 were derived in appendix
part B.1 (currency board) and part B.2 (free float) and are used in the following.
The characteristics of a currency board that its abandonment must be announced in
advance leads to the following maintaining condition:
E(Lf2) + c
CB ≥ E(LCB2 ) . (B.74)
Note that the exit costs cCB are given exogenously. The condition means that the policy
maker compares the expected loss which would occur if she decides to maintain the cur-
rency board with the situation in which she decides to abolish the currency board and
chooses the optimal exchange rate freely and optimally. The loss in the latter case, of
course, corresponds to the expected loss under a free float. The comparison is done in the
following.
We again make use of the following abbreviations, which were introduced in the ap-
pendices A and B:
A = w + γβ > 0; B = 1− βb1 > 0; F = wb1(κ− q); E = κ− qβb1 .
Note that when referring to the domains of the particular parameters E and F the ap-
pearance of negative values cannot be excluded per se.
B.4.1 Determination of the Expected Loss under a Currency
Board
Using equation (B.26), we calculate the loss under a currency board when inserting the
rational expectations equilibrium values:
Lcb2 (pi2) =
(
pi2
w + γβ
β
− w
β
φ2 − γpie2 − k
)2
+ θpipi
2
2
+θb
(
1− βb1
β
pi2 − φ2
β
+ b1
)2
. (B.75)
We define D := θbB
2+A2+θpiβ
2 and D˜ := θbB
2+wA+θpiβ
2. Both D and D˜ are obviously
strictly positive. We use these abbreviations in the following and refer to appendix B.2,
where
γ(pi2 − pie2) = u2
θbB + wA
D
, (B.76)
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and
w
β
(pi2 − φ2) = w
β
(pi2 − ηφ1 − u2)
=
w
β
βAk + ηφ1(θbB + wA− θbB2 − wA− θpiβ2)− θbβb1B
D˜
+u2
w
β
θbB + wA− θbB2 − A2 − θpiβ2
D
= w
Ak + ηφ1(θbb1B − θpiβ)− θbb1B
D˜
+wu2
θbb1B − γA− θpiβ
D
. (B.77)
Combining both parts and adding “−k”, we can rewrite the output goal in the loss
function as
(y2 − k)2 =
(
w
Ak + ηφ1(θbb1B − θpiβ)− θbb1B
D˜
− k
+u2
wBθbb1 − γwA− wθpiβ + θbB + wA
D
)2
=
k
[
wA− D˜
D˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Q1
+ηφ1
[
θbb1B − θpiβ
D˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Q2
+u2
[
θbB(wb1 + 1) + wA(1− γ)− wθpiβ
D
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Q3
+
[
−θbb1B
D˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Q4

2
. (B.78)
The inflation goal θpipi
2
2 can be rewritten by using equation (B.16) as
θpipi
2
2 = θpi
k
[
βA
D˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Q5
+ηφ1
[
θbB + wA
D˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Q6
+u2
[
θbB + wA
D
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Q7
+
[−θbb1βB
D˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Q8

2
. (B.79)
The third term of the loss function θbb
2 can be transformed into
θbb
2
2 = θb
[
1
β
(Bpi2 − ηφ1 − u2) + b1
]2
= θb
(
βABk + ηφ1(θbB
2 + wAB − θbB2 − wA− θpiβ2)− θbβb1B2
βD˜
+u2
θbB
2 + wAB − θbB2 − A2 − θpiβ2
βD
+ b1
)2
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= θb
(
ABk + ηφ1(wb1A− θpiβ)− θbb1B2
D˜
+ u2
−A(wb1 + γ)− θpiβ2
D
+ b1
)2
= θb
k
[
AB
D˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Q9
+ηφ1
[
wAb1 − θpiβ
D˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Q10
+u2
[−A(wb1 + γ)− θpiβ
D
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Q11
+
[
b1 − θbb1B
2
D˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Q12

2
. (B.80)
By using the abbreviations Q1, . . . , Q12 in the loss function, we obtain
Lcboard2 = k
2Q21 + (ηφ)
2Q22 + u
2
2Q
2
3 +Q
2
4 + 2kηφ1Q1Q2 + 2ku2Q1Q3 + 2kQ1Q4
+2ηφ1u2Q2Q3 + 2ηφ1Q2Q4 + 2u2Q3Q4
+θpi(k
2Q25 + (ηφ1)
2Q26 + u
2
2Q
2
7 +Q
2
8 + 2kηφ1Q5Q6 + 2ku2Q5Q7 + 2kQ5Q8
+2ηφ1u2Q6Q7 + 2ηφ1Q6Q8 + 2u2Q7Q8)
+θb(k
2Q29 + (ηφ1)
2Q210 + u
2
2Q
2
11 +Q
2
12 + 2kηφ1Q9Q10 + 2ku2Q9Q11 + 2kQ9Q12
+2ηφ1u2Q10Q11 + 2ηφ1Q10Q12 + 2u2Q11Q12) . (B.81)
The expected value of L2, by noticing that E(u2) = 0 and E(u
2
2) = σ
2
u, equals
E(Lcboard2 ) = k
2Q21 + (ηφ)
2Q22 + σ
2
uQ
2
3 +Q
2
4
+2kηφ1Q1Q2 + 2kQ1Q4 + 2ηφ1Q2Q4
+θpi(k
2Q25 + (ηφ1)
2Q26 + σ
2
uQ
2
7 +Q
2
8
+2kηφ1Q5Q6 + 2kQ5Q8 + 2ηφ1Q6Q8)
+θb(k
2Q29 + (ηφ1)
2Q210 + σ
2
uQ
2
11 +Q
2
12
+2kηφ1Q9Q10 + 2kQ9Q12 + 2ηφ1Q10Q12) . (B.82)
B.4.2 Determination of the Expected Loss under a Free Float
Subject of this subsection is to determine the expected loss under a flexible exchange rate
system. The second period loss was calculated in appendix B.2 and is given by equation
(B.52):
L2 = (pi
f
2 )
2
(
θpi + θ
2
pi
[
(κ− qβb1)2 + (θbwκ)2
(γ(κ− qβb1) + wb1(κ− q))2
])
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:R0
= (pif2 )
2R0 .
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Furthermore, we use the two definitions T := θbF (γE + F ) + θpi(wκ)
2 + θpiθbE
2 and
T˜ := θb(γE + F )
2 + θpi(wκ)
2 + θpiθbE
2. Of course, T˜ is strictly positive. T is in most of
all cases also strictly positive as the signs of E and F are closely linked by the parameter
values of κ and q and have thus in most cases the same sign as discussed before.
Then, the rational expectations equilibrium of inflation, pi∗∗f2 can be written as
(pi∗∗f2 )
2 =
k
[
θbE(γE + F )
T
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:R1
+ηφ1
[−qwb1
T
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:R2
+u2
[−θb(γE + F )wb1q
T˜
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:R3
+
[
wb1κ
T
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:R4

2
. (B.83)
The second period loss equals
L2 = R0(kR1 + ηφ1R2 + u2R3 +R4)
2
= R0(k
2R21 + (ηφ1)
2R22 + u
2
2R
2
3 +R
2
4 + 2kηφ1R1R2 + 2ku2R1R3
+2kR1R4 + 2ηφ1u2R2R3 + 2ηφ1R2R4 + 2u2R3R4) . (B.84)
The expected value of L2 is given by
E(Lfloat2 ) = R0(k
2R21 + (ηφ1)
2R22 + σ
2
uR
2
3 +R
2
4 (B.85)
+2kηφ1R1R2 + 2kR1R4 + 2ηφ1R2R4) .
B.4.3 Comparison of the Expected Losses
The difference of the expected losses under a currency board and a float is given by
D2 = E(L
cboard
2 )− E(Lfloat2 )− cCB
= k2Q21 + (ηφ)
2Q22 + σ
2
uQ
2
3 +Q
2
4 + 2kηφ1Q1Q2 + 2kQ1Q4 + 2ηφ1Q2Q4
+θpi(k
2Q25 + (ηφ1)
2Q26 + σ
2
uQ
2
7 +Q
2
8 + 2kηφ1Q5Q6 + 2kQ5Q8 + 2ηφ1Q6Q8)
+θb(k
2Q29 + (ηφ1)
2Q210 + σ
2
uQ
2
11 +Q
2
12 + 2kηφ1Q9Q10 + 2kQ9Q12 + 2ηφ1Q10Q12)
−R0(k2R21 + (ηφ1)2R22 + σ2uR23 +R24 + 2kηφ1R1R2 + 2kR1R4 + 2ηφ1R2R4)− cCB .
(B.86)
As it is hardly possible to find an explicit solution, we do comparative statics to compare
both systems in section 4.6.1 by using two numerical scenarios. The solution of D2 is
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used for the MATLAB-simulations to obtain the numerical results and is interpreted as
a measure for the stability of a currency board system in section 4.6.1.
B.5 Comparison of a Currency Board and a Standard
Peg
Before going through the technical details of the comparison of a currency board and a
standard peg, we introduce briefly the assumptions made in this section:
• To compare the standard peg regime and the currency board arrangement, we use
the probability of maintaining each system. We, henceforth, interpret the proba-
bility of maintaining an exchange rate system as the credibility of that system (a
similar approach can be found in Drazen and Masson, 1994 or Feuerstein and
Grimm, 2006b).
• We have to calculate the maintaining probabilities by comparing the expected second
period losses of a currency board / standard peg and the free float case from the
view of period 0 after a shock materialized in period 0. In scenario I and II of section
4.6.2, we assume that there is no shock in period 0. Furthermore, we assume that
the standard fixed exchange rate is defended in the first period (this means that the
peg has an implicit commitment value in the first period after its introduction), but
can be abandoned surprisingly in period 2. A currency board can only be abandoned
in period 2, if this was announced in period one, before the private sector’s wage
bargaining (inflation expectations) takes place and before the second period shock
occurs. Therefore, the maintaining interval of the currency board depends on φ1 and
the maintaining interval of the peg depends on φ2. The preparations to establish a
fair comparison of both systems despite the different timing of decision-making is
done in the parts 2 and 3 of appendix B.5.
• When analyzing the standard peg system, multiplicities of pie2 may occur if the
private sector has rational expectations of inflation (see discussion in section 4.5).
Therefore, in our calculations we treat pie2 as an exogenous parameter. When com-
paring the credibility of a currency board arrangement with the credibility of a
standard peg, we assume that inflation expectations under a standard peg are a
mixture of expectations under a currency board (full credibility) and a free float
system (zero credibility).
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B.5.1 Second-period Loss Functions (for a given pie2)
In a standard peg regime, the policy maker decides whether to defend or to leave the
exchange-rate peg after the realization of the second period shock. Therefore, a policy
maker’s decision is based on a comparison of the loss functions (B.26) and (B.52) for a
given pie,Peg2 after the realization of the shock φ2.
We begin with reformulating the loss function (B.26) by using the inflation equation
(B.16), where pie2 is taken as given. The first component of the loss function equals
(y2 − k)2 = 1
(βD)2
((βAk + βγApie2 + φ2(θbB + wA)− θbβBb1)A
− φ2w(θbB2 + A2 + θpiβ2)− γpie2(θbβB2 + βA2 + θpiβ3)
−k(θbβB2 + βA2 + θpiβ3)
)2
=
1
(βD)2
(
β(k(θbB
2 − θpiβ2) + φ2(θbB(γ + wb1)− wθpiβ)
+pie2(−γθbB2 − γθpiβ2) + (−θbb1BA))
)2
=
1
D2
k (θbB2 − θpiβ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P1
) + φ2 (θbB(γ + wb1)− wθpiβ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P2
+pie2 (−γθbB2 − γθpiβ2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P3
+(−θbb1BA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P4
2 . (B.87)
The second component of the loss function is rewritten as
θpipi
2
2 =
θb
D2
k (βA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P5
+φ2 (θbB + wA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P6
+pie2 (γβA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P7
+(−θbβBb1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P8
2 . (B.88)
The third component θbb
2
2 equals
θbb
2
2 = θb
(
B
β
pi2 − φ2
β
+ b1
)2
= θb
(
k
[
AB
D
]
+ φ2
[
wAB − A2 − θpiβ2
βD
]
+ pie2
[
γAB
D
]
+
[
−θbB
2b1
D
+ b1
])2
=
θb
D2
k [AB]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P9
+φ2 [−γA− θpiβ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P10
+pie2 [γAB]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P11
+ [b1(A
2 + θpiβ
2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:P12
2 . (B.89)
Using the definitions P1 to P12 in the loss L
Peg
2 simplifies to
LPeg2 =
1
D2
[
(kP1 + φ2P2 + pi
e
2P3 + P4)
2 + θpi(kP5 + φ2P6 + pi
e
2P7 + P8)
2
+θb(kP9 + φ2P10 + pi
e
2P11 + P12)
2
]
. (B.90)
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Now, we rewrite the loss function (B.52) of the free float case by inserting the inflation
equation (B.48) while, again, treating pie2 as given:
Lf2 = R0
θb(γE + F )
T˜ 2
k [E]︸︷︷︸
=:S1
+pie2 [γE]︸︷︷︸
=:S3
+φ2 [−qwb1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:S2
+ [κwb1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:S4
2
= R0
θb(γE + F )
T˜ 2
(kS1 + φ2S2 + pi
e
2S3 + S4)
2 , (B.91)
where R0 and T˜ were defined in the second section of appendix B.4.
B.5.2 Credibility of a Standard Peg
To derive the range of the random variable φ2 characterizing the second period shock for
which the exchange-rate peg is defended, we have to solve the following inequality for φ2
LPeg2 ≤ Lf2 + c . (B.92)
Using the expressions for the loss functions, just derived in the first part of appendix B.5,
we obtain the condition where the peg is defended as
R0θb(γE + F )
T˜ 2
[
k2S21 + φ
2
2S
2
2 + (pi
e
2)
2S23 + S
2
4 + 2kφ2S1S2 + 2kpi
e
2S1S3 + 2kS1S4
+2φ2pi
e
2S2S3 + 2φ2S2S4 + pi
e
2S3S4] + c
Peg
− 1
D2
[
k2P 21 + φ
2
2P
2
2 + (pi
e
2)
2P 23 + P
2
4 + 2kφ2P1P2 + 2kpi
e
2P1P3 + 2kP1P4
+2φ2pi
e
2P2P3 + 2φ2P2P4 + pi
e
2P3P4
θpi(k
2P 25 + φ
2
2P
2
6 + (pi
e
2)
2P 27 + P
2
8 + 2kφ2P5P6 + 2kpi
e
2P5P7 + 2kP5P8
+2φ2pi
e
2P6P7 + 2φ2P6P8 + pi
e
2P7P8)
θb(k
2P 29 + φ
2
2P
2
10 + (pi
e
2)
2P 211 + P
2
12 + 2kφ2P9P10 + 2kpi
e
2P9P11 + 2kP9P12
+2φ2pi
e
2P10P11 + 2φ2P10P12 + pi
e
2P11P12)] ≥ 0 .
(B.93)
We focus on deriving mathematical expressions for the boundaries of the “defending-
interval” in case of a standard-peg regime, which can be determined if (B.93) holds with
equality. The boundaries itself are functions which depend on expected inflation pie2 and
on the parameters k, q, b1, ηφ1, κ, β, c
f , θb, θpi. We denote the set of parameters by S for
reasons of clarity. Therefore, solving (B.93) for φ2, we get the interval in which the
standard peg is defended as
[φl,Peg(pie2;S), φu,Peg(pie2;S)] . (B.94)
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Note that we set the probability of maintaining the standard peg equal to zero, if by
solving the quadratic equation, which results from a comparison of the loss function for
φ2, the discriminant becomes negative. If we assume that the new shock u2 is uniformly
distributed with zero mean and standard deviation σu > 0, we obtain the boundaries of
the interval of possible realizations of the second period shock φ2 by
4
φ
2
= ηφ1 − σu
√
3 (B.95)
φ2 = ηφ1 + σu
√
3 . (B.96)
For the comparison of the standard peg and the currency board system, we define the
credibility of both systems as the probability of maintaining the first-period exchange-
rate systems also in the second period (see also Feuerstein and Grimm, 2006b). The
probability of defending the exchange rate under a standard peg in period 2 for a given
realization of φ1 equals
Prob(maintain Peg|φ1) = max
[
min(φ2, φ
u,Peg
2 (pi
e
2;S))−max(φ2, φ
l,Peg
2 (pi
e
2;S))
φ2 − φ2
, 0
]
.
(B.97)
To avoid an unfair comparison due to the different timing of decision-making in the
standard peg and the currency board system caused by a particular choice of φ1, we
calculate the probability of maintaining the peg as an average over all possible realizations
of φ1, given by
Prob(maintain Peg) =
∫ φ1
φ
1
Prob (maintain Peg|φ1) dφ1 . (B.98)
Due to the assumption of a uniform distribution, we can approximate the probability by
Prob(maintain Peg) ≈ 1
N
N∑
n=0
Prob
(
maintain Peg
∣∣∣φ1 = n
N
φ
1
+
N − n
N
φ1
)
. (B.99)
In our numerical examples of section 4.6, we usedN = 50 “drawings” from the distribution
of φ1.
4The expected value of a uniformly distributed random variable u is given by µu = (φ+ φ)/2 and the
variance is given by σ2u = (φ−φ)2/12. Using both equations, we can compute the support of u explicitly.
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B.5.3 Credibility of a Currency Board
To compare the standard peg system with that of a currency board, we have now to define
how to measure the probability of maintaining the currency board. As decision-making
under a currency board arrangement takes place in the first period, the maintaining-
interval depends on the first period shock φ1. Due to the assumption of a uniformly
distributed shock, the support of φ1 is given by
[φ
1
, φ1] = [−σu
√
3, σu
√
3].
In this context, remember the assumption already made in section 4.4 saying that φ0 = 0,
which means that there is no inherited shock from period 0.
In the currency board case, multiple equilibria cannot occur due to the time structure
assumed in the model. Therefore, we can insert the unique equilibrium value for pie2 into
the expected loss functions (see appendix B.4). To find the boundaries of the interval, in
which the monetary authority announces the continuity of the currency board, we have
to solve
E(LCB2 ) = E(L
f
2) + c
CB
for φ1. We obtain two solutions, which determine the lower and upper boundaries of
the maintaining-interval. They depend on the parameter set k, q, b1, σu, κ, β, c
f , θb, θpi,
summarized by R, henceforth. Analogically to the proceedings in the peg-case, we set the
probability of maintaining the currency board equal to zero if the discriminant by solving
the quadratic equation for φ2 becomes negative. Then, the probability of announcing to
maintain the peg can be calculated by
Prob(maintain CB) = max
[
min(φ1, φ
u,CB
1 (R))−max(φ1, φ
l,CB
1 (R))
φ1 − φ1
, 0
]
. (B.100)
Appendix C
Supplements to Chapter 7
In this part of the appendix, we show the analytical solution of the fiscal and monetary
authorities’ optimization problem for two representative scenarios. The simulations in
section 7.2 are based on these results: We show how to determine the equilibrium in the
Nash scenario, where all policy makers act simultaneously without coordinating, and in
the sequential game in which fiscal policies are Stackelberg leader but do not cooperate.
We only sketch the solution of these two scenarios, because the other scenarios considered
in our model follow the same pattern.
We, again, exhibit the main model equations, which were derived in the sections 6.1 and
6.2:
Output equation:
yA = y¯A + a
AτA + a
ABτB + b
A(piA − pieA) + κA(piB − piA) (C.1)
yB = y¯B + a
BτB + a
BAτA + b
B(piB − pieB) + κB(piA − piB) . (C.2)
(C.3)
Inflation equation:
piA = µ+ c
AτA + c
ABτB (C.4)
piB = µ+ c
BτB + c
BAτA . (C.5)
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Basic loss functions:
LM =
n
2
[(piA − piAM)2 + θAM(yA − yAM)2]
+
1− n
2
[(piB − piBM)2 + θBM(yB − yBM)2] (C.6)
LAF =
1
2
[
(piA − piAF )2 + θAF (yA − yAF )2
]
(C.7)
LBF =
1
2
[
(piB − piBF )2 + θBF (yB − yBF )2
]
. (C.8)
(C.9)
C.1 A Simultaneous Scenario: Nash Behavior
In the Nash scenario every policy maker optimizes her own loss function with respect to
her policy variable while taking the other policy maker’s reaction into account. Using
equations (C.1) to (C.5) as well as the definitions of total output and total inflation, we
obtain the following first-order conditions:
∂LM
∂µ
= (pi − piM) + nθAMbA(yA − yM) + (1− n)θBMbB(yB − yM) = 0 (C.10)
∂LAF
∂τA
= (piA − piAF )cA + θAF (yA − yAF )(aA + bAcA − κAcA) = 0 (C.11)
∂LBF
∂τB
= (piB − piBF )cB + θBF (yB − yBF )(aB + bBcB − κBcB) = 0 . (C.12)
Inserting (C.1) to (C.5) into the first-order conditions results in three equations in the
variables µ, τA and τB. In the order monetary policy, fiscal policy A, and fiscal policy B,
the first-order conditions are rewritten as
0 = α1µ+ α2τA + α3τB + α4 (C.13)
0 = α5µ+ α6τA + α7τB + α8 (C.14)
0 = α9µ+ α10τA + α11τB + α12 , (C.15)
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where the parameters αi are given by
α1 = 1 + nθ
A
M(b
A)2 + (1− n)θBM(bB)2
α2 = nc
A + (1− n)cBA + nθAMbA(aA + bAcA + κA(cBA − cA))
+(1− n)θBMbB(aBA + bBcBA + κB(cA − cBA))
α3 = nc
AB + (1− n)cB + nθAMbA(aAB + bAcAB + κA(cB − cAB))
+(1− n)θBMbB(aB + bBcB + κB(cAB − cB))
α4 = −piM + nθAMbA(y¯A − bApieA − yAM + φA)
+(1− n)θBMbB(y¯B − bBpieB − yBM + φB)
α5 = c
A + θAF b
A[aA + bAcA + κA(cBA − cA)]
α6 = (c
A)2 + θAF [a
A + bAcA + κA(cBA − cA)]2
α7 = c
ABcA + θAF [a
A + bAcA + κA(cBA − cA)][aAB + bAcAB + κA(cB − cAB)]
α8 = −piAF cA + θAF [aA + bAcA + κA(cBA − cA)][y¯A − bApieA − yAF ]
α9 = c
B + θBF b
B[aB + bBcB + κB(cAB − cB)]
α10 = c
BAcB + θBF [a
B + bBcB + κB(cAB − cB)][aBA + bBcBA + κB(cA − cBA)]
α11 = (c
B)2 + θBF [a
B + bBcB + κB(cAB − cB)]2
α12 = −piBF cB + θBF [aB + bBcB + κB(cAB − cB)][y¯B − bBpieB − yBF ] .
The (three-)equation-system is then solved for µ, τA and τB. The according equilibrium
values for yi and pii can be obtained by inserting the optimal values of the fiscal and
monetary authorities’ policy variable (C.1) to (C.5).1
C.2 A Sequential Scenario: Fiscal Leadership
When fiscal policies make their decisions before the common central bank chooses its
policy, they set their τi before monetary policy chooses µ.
We obtain the leadership-equilibrium by backward induction. The central bank op-
timizes its policy given the fiscal policy choices τA and τB.
∂LM
∂µ
equals equation (C.10),
which is rearranged in equation (C.13).
Rearranging further, µ can be written as
µ = −α2
α1
τA − α3
α1
τB − α4
α1
, (C.16)
1Note that the expected inflation rates are here taken as given. The rational expectations of inflation
are determined in our simulations by iteration.
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which is the monetary policy’s reaction function depending on τA and τB.
Now, the fiscal first-order conditions can be determined, taking the monetary reaction
function into account:
∂LAF
∂τA
= β1(piA − piAF ) + β2θAF (yA − yAF ) = 0 (C.17)
∂LBF
∂τB
= β3(piB − piBF ) + β4θBF (yB − yBF ) = 0 , (C.18)
where
β1 = c
A − α2
α1
(C.19)
β2 = a
A + bA
(
cA − α2
α1
)
+ κA(cBA − cA) (C.20)
β3 = c
B − α3
α1
(C.21)
β4 = a
B + bB
(
cB − α3
α1
)
+ κB(cAB − cB) . (C.22)
Inserting (C.1) to (C.5) and (C.16) into (C.17) and (C.18) results in
0 = β5τA + β6τB + β7 (C.23)
0 = β8τA + β9τB + β10 , (C.24)
where
β5 = β
2
1 + β
2
2θ
A
F
β6 = β1
(
cAB − α3
α1
)
+ β2θ
A
F
[
aAB + bA
(
cAB − α3
α1
)
+ κA
(
cB − cAB)]
β7 = β1
(
−piAF −
α4
α1
)
+ β2θ
A
F
[
y¯A + b
A
(
−pieA −
α4
α1
)
− yAF
]
β8 = β3
(
cBA − α3
α1
)
+ β4θ
B
F
[
aBA + bB
(
cBA − α2
α1
)
+ κB
(
cA − cBA)]
β9 = β
2
3 + β
2
4θ
B
F
β10 = β3
(
−piBF −
α4
α1
)
+ β4θ
B
F
[
y¯B + b
B
(
−pieB −
α4
α1
)
− yBF
]
.
This (two)-equation-system can be solved for τA and τB, where µ is replaced by the
reaction function of monetary policy, which is given by equation (C.16).
Appendix D
MATLAB Codes used in Chapter 7
In this part of the appendix, we list the MATLAB-codes which are used for obtaining the
simulation results in section 7.2. We begin with the calibration and the simulation file
for supply-side policy, and abstain from showing the files for demand-side policy, because
they have the same structure. After that we list the policy scenario files, in which the
analytical solution of the particular scenarios are determined. The scenario files are loaded
in the simulation files.
D.1 The Calibration Files: grmp22.m
There are four different files that are at the beginning of the MATLAB calculations: For
the baseline model and for the supply-side model each one symmetric and one asymmetric
case. As an example for these, we add the code for the asymmetric case of the baseline
model.
% GR Main (Structural) Parameter file for the asymmetric case 2 and fiscal policy 2
% created Dec 2, 2006 by SR
disp(’ ’); close all; %clear all; %clc;
disp(’Grimm Ried 2006: Results for the asymmetric case 2 with fiscal
policy 2 (subsidies) are calculated. Please wait.’);
disp(’ Region B is assumed to stand for the new EU members,
with smaller size, lower taxes and more rigid prices.’);
% This file is used to evaluate the parameters of the Grimm and Ried (2006) paper.
% We give values to the structural parameters and calculate the resulting
% parameters in the macro model.
% Baseline structural parameters to be calibrated:
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if exist(’n’)~=1, n = 0.7; end; % Size of region H; between 0 and 1
if exist(’nu’)~=1, nu = 0.8; end; % Home bias parameter;
% between 0.5 and 1
if exist(’emdl’)~=1, emdl = .45; end; % Elasticity of marginal disutility
% of labor; between 0 and 0.45, perhaps
% up to 1
if exist(’Phi’)~=1, Phi = 0.5; end; % Calvo stickiness parameter:
% fraction of firms which cannot
% readjust prices
if exist(’Phiast’)~=1, Phiast = 0.58; end;% We assume the same Calvo stickiness
% for both regions, Phi = 0.01:.1:1
if exist(’theta’)~=1, theta = 11; end; % elasticity of substitution
% between goods;
% between 1 and 25
if exist(’dH’)~=1, dH = 1; end; % disutility of labor; includes
% technology shock;
if exist(’eta’)~=1, eta = 0.98;end; % subjective discount factor;
% between 0.5 and 1
if exist(’tauHbar’)~=1, tauHbar = 1/(1-theta); end; %Steady state value for
% subsidies; set optimally to offset
% the monopolistic dist.
% for tauHbar =.01:.1:1
if exist(’tauFbar’)~=1, tauFbar = 1/(1-theta); end; %Steady state value for subsidies;
% set optimally to offset the monopolistic
% dist.
% Simple implications used here:
nuast = nu; % We assume the same home bias for both regions
betta = 1+(1/emdl); % disutility of labor, 2 implies unit wage elasticity
dF = dH; % disutility of labor; we assume identical values,
%except for the stochastic part of this
yHbar = 0; yFbar = 0; % fixed by the microfounded model
gamma = 0.8; % share of consumption relative to real money balances
% in the utility
% Resulting parameters defined in the paper, together with their definitions
rho = Phi*[1+(1-Phi)*eta];
rhoast = Phiast*[1+(1-Phiast)*eta];
aH = [[(1-theta)/[2*[1+theta*(betta-1)]]]-1/[2*(betta-1)]]*tauHbar;
aHF = - [[(1-theta)/[2*[1+theta*(betta-1)]]]+1/[2*(betta-1)]]*tauFbar;
aF = [[(1-theta)/[2*[1+theta*(betta-1)]]]-1/[2*(betta-1)]]*tauFbar;
aFH = - [[(1-theta)/[2*[1+theta*(betta-1)]]]+1/[2*(betta-1)]]*tauHbar;
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bH = 2*betta*rho/[(betta-1)*(1-rho)];
bF = 2*betta*rhoast/[(betta-1)*(1-rhoast)];
kappaH = 0.5*bH;
kappaF = 0.5*bF;
thetaH = eta*Phi*(betta-1)/[[(1-eta*Phi)*theta*[1+theta*(betta-1)]]];
thetaF = eta*Phiast*(betta-1)/[[(1-eta*Phiast)*theta*[1+theta*(betta-1)]]];
omH = 1 - gamma * [nu/n + (1-nu)/(1-n)];
% The following parameters depend on fiscal policy 2!
omF = 1 - gamma * [nu/(1-n) + (1-nu)/(n)];
om1H = tauHbar/[1+theta*(betta-1)];
om1F = tauFbar/[1+theta*(betta-1)];
om2 = 0;
om3H = 1-[(betta-1)/[1+theta*(betta-1)]]*[gamma*(1-nu)/[omH*(1-n)]];
om3F = 1-[(betta-1)/[1+theta*(betta-1)]]*[gamma*(1-nu)/[omF*(n)]];
om4H = 1-om3H;
om4F = 1-om3F;
OmH = [1-(1-rho)*om3H]/[[1-(1-rho)*om3H]^2-[(1-rho)*om4H]^2];
OmF = [1-(1-rhoast)*om3F]/[[1-(1-rhoast)*om3F]^2-[(1-rhoast)*om4F]^2];
cH = OmH*(1-rho)*om1H;
cHF = OmH*(1-rho)*[(1-rho)*om4H*om1H]/[1-(1-rho)*om3H];
cF = OmF*(1-rhoast)*om1F;
cFH = OmF*(1-rhoast)*[(1-rhoast)*om4F*om1F]/[1-(1-rhoast)*om3F];
% Output:
disp(’----------------------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Asymmetric Fiscal Policy 1 Case’);
disp(sprintf(’%s \t\t’, ’a^H ’, ’a^F ’, ’a^HF’, ’a^FH’, ’b^H’, ’b^F’, ’kapa^H’,...
... ’kapa^F’, ’c^H’, ’c^F’, ’c^HF’, ’c^FH’, ’theta_H’, ’theta_F’));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, aH, aF, aHF, aFH, bH, bF, kappaH, kappaF, cH, cF, cHF,...
... cFH, thetaH, thetaF));
disp(’----------------------------------------------------------------------’);
% Transfer to the notation used in the macromodel and in the grmm
% (or, older, grmr) files:
aa = aH; ab = aF; aab = aHF; aba = aFH; ba = bH; bb = bF; ka = kappaH;
kb = kappaF; ca = cH; cb = cF; cab = cHF; cba = cFH;
thetama = thetaH; thetamb = thetaF; ybara = yHbar; ybarb = yFbar;
% Setting the remaining macro parameters:
% For the union: For region A: For region B:
% Target values for inflation and output for the different players and scenarios:
pim = 0.00; pima = 0.00; pimb = 0.00;
ym = 0.00; yma = 0.00; ymb = 0.00;
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delta = 0.00; if exist(’thetafa’)~=1, thetafa = 1.00; end;
if exist(’thetafb’)~=1, thetafb = 1.25; end;
if exist(’yfa’)~=1, yfa = 0.015; end;
if exist(’yfb’)~=1, yfb = 0.030; end;
if exist(’pifa’)~=1, pifa = 0.02; end;
if exist(’pifb’)~=1, pifb = 0.03; end;
% Country-Specific Social Optimum in the Symmetric Case
% (identical with central bank’s targets)
piaso = 0.0; pibso = 0.0;
yaso = 0; ybso = 0;
%The Cooperation Case:
thetajca= thetama; thetajcb= thetamb;
pifjc = pim; %pifjca = 0.03; pifjcb = 0.03;
yfjc = ym; %yfjca = 0.04; yfjcb = 0.04;
%The Fiscal Cooperation Case:
thetaafc= thetafa; thetabfc= thetafb;
%The Stackelberg Fiscal Cooperation Case: inserting yaffc, piaffc, ybffc and pibffc
piaffc = pifa; pibffc = pifb;
yaffc = yfa; ybffc = yfb;
% Starting values for the rational inflation expectation algorithm:
piean = 0.0; piebn = 0.0; %SV Nash
pieastf = 0.0; piebstf = 0.0; %SV Stackelberg Fiscal Leader
pieastm = 0.0; piebstm = 0.0; %SV Stackelberg Monetary Leader
pieans = 0.0; piebns = 0.0; %SV Non-Strategic Fiscal Policy
pieajc = 0.0; piebjc = 0.0; %SV Joint Collusion
pieafc = 0.0; piebfc = 0.0; %SV Fiscal Collusion
pieafcstm = 0.0; piebfcstm = 0.0; %SV Fiscal Collusion Monetary Leadership
pieafcstf = 0.0; piebfcstf = 0.0; %SV Fiscal Collusion Fiscal Leadership
% Calling the file grmm.m that calculates the results and gives the resulting tables:
grmm; % Note that grmm now replaces grmr1
% for the symmetric and grmr2 for the asymmetric case.
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D.2 The Rational Expectations and Stochastic Sim-
ulations File: grmm.m
This file is used to evaluate the rational expectations for the inflation rates and to simulate
the stochastics of the model.
% GR Main InterMediate File for all cases: This file is called by the grmp files.
% It calls all other files.
% Grimm Ried 2005: Main Program File that calls all the other files
% This is GRmainrational1 with correct calculation of inflation
% expectations.
% Loss is multiplied by 10^5 for a better overview.
mnvek=[]; xanvek=[]; xbnvek=[]; pianvek=[]; pibnvek=[]; pinvek =[];
yanvek =[]; ybnvek =[]; ynvek =[]; lfanvek=[]; lfbnvek =[]; lmnvek =[];
lnsoavek =[]; lnsobvek =[]; cnsoavek=[]; cnsobvek=[]; lfanpolvek =[];
lfbnpolvek =[];
mstmvek=[]; xastmvek=[]; xbstmvek=[]; piastmvek=[]; pibstmvek=[]; pistmvek =[];
yastmvek =[]; ybstmvek =[]; ystmvek =[]; lfastmvek =[]; lfbstmvek =[]; lmstmvek =[];
lstmsoavek =[]; lstmsobvek =[]; cstmsoavek=[]; cstmsobvek=[]; lfastmpolvek =[];
lfbstmpolvek =[];
mstfvek=[]; xastfvek=[]; xbstfvek=[]; piastfvek=[]; pibstfvek=[]; pistfvek =[];
yastfvek =[]; ybstfvek =[]; ystfvek = []; lfastfvek =[]; lfbstfvek = [];lmstfvek = [];
lstfsoavek =[]; lstfsobvek =[]; cstfsoavek=[]; cstfsobvek=[]; lfastfpolvek =[];
lfbstfpolvek =[];
mjcvek=[]; xajcvek=[]; xbjcvek=[]; piajcvek=[]; pibjcvek=[]; pijcvek =[];
yajcvek =[]; ybjcvek =[]; yjcvek = []; lfajcvek =[]; lfbjcvek = []; lmjcvek = [];
ljcsoavek =[]; ljcsobvek =[]; cjcsoavek=[]; cjcsobvek=[]; lfajcpolvek =[];
lfbjcpolvek =[];
mfcvek=[]; xafcvek=[]; xbfcvek=[]; piafcvek=[]; pibfcvek=[]; pifcvek =[];
yafcvek =[]; ybfcvek =[]; yfcvek = []; lfafcvek =[]; lfbfcvek = []; lmfcvek = [];
lfcsoavek =[]; lfcsobvek =[]; cfcsoavek=[]; cfcsobvek=[]; lfafcpolvek =[];
lfbfcpolvek =[];
%Sequential Fiscal Collusion Cases
mfcstfvek=[]; xafcstfvek=[]; xbfcstfvek=[]; piafcstfvek=[];
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pibfcstfvek=[]; pifcstfvek =[]; yafcstfvek =[]; ybfcstfvek =[];
yfcstfvek = []; lfafcstfvek =[]; lfbfcstfvek = []; lmfcstfvek = [];
lfcstfsoavek =[]; lfcstfsobvek =[]; cfcstfsoavek=[]; cfcstfsobvek=[];
lfafcstfpolvek =[]; lfbfcstfpolvek =[];
mfcstmvek=[]; xafcstmvek=[]; xbfcstmvek=[]; piafcstmvek=[];
pibfcstmvek=[]; pifcstmvek =[]; yafcstmvek =[]; ybfcstmvek =[];
yfcstmvek = []; lfafcstmvek =[]; lfbfcstmvek = []; lmfcstmvek = [];
lfcstmsoavek =[]; lfcstmsobvek =[]; cfcstmsoavek=[]; cfcstmsobvek=[];
lfafcstmpolvek =[]; lfbfcstmpolvek =[];
lcsoavek =[]; lcsobvek =[]; ccsoavek=[]; ccsobvek=[]; lfacpolvek =[];
lfbcpolvek =[];
phiavek = []; phibvek = []; zahl=-1; % zahl starts with -1 as it counts only the
% stochastic loops
% Averages:
b = n * ba + (1-n) * bb;
yf = n * yfa + (1-n) * yfb;
ybar = n * ybara + (1-n) * ybarb;
pif = n * pifa + (1-n) * pifb;
pien = n * piean + (1-n) * piebn; %Nash Case !!!
% Shock starting values (If you do not want shocks, then set
% at the beginning of line 83.)
phia = 0; phib=0;
% Algorithm for rational inflation expectations:
expectationlooplength = 0; expectationloopcriterion = 1;
expectationlooptolerance = 0.00000000001;
while expectationloopcriterion > expectationlooptolerance
expectationlooplength = expectationlooplength+1;
% Counter for the number of loops
% Calculating the unionwide averages: % THE OLD FOR LOOP FOR EXPECTATIONS LOOKED
% AS FOLLOWS: for j = 1:1:10; %for pie
pif = n * pifa + (1-n) * pifb;
pien = n * piean + (1-n) * piebn;
piestm = n * pieastm + (1-n) * piebstm;
piestf = n * piebstf + (1-n) * piebstf;
piejc = n * pieajc + (1-n) * piebjc;
piefc = n * pieafc + (1-n) * piebfc;
piefcstm = n * pieafcstm + (1-n) * piebfcstm; %Sequential Fiscal Collusion Cases
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piefcstf = n * pieafcstf + (1-n) * piebfcstf; %Sequential Fiscal Collusion Cases
% Starting the actual calculations of the results:
GRNasheval1;
GRStackeval1;
GRCollusioneval1;
GRFiscalcollusioneval1;
GRFCMonLeadershipEval1; %Sequential Fiscal Collusion Cases
GRFCFiscLeadershipEval1;%Sequential Fiscal Collusion Cases
% Calculating the current expectation loop criterion
expectationloopcriterion = (piean-pian)^2 +(piebn-pibn)^2 ...
+(pieastf-piastf)^2 +(piebstf-pibstf)^2 +(pieastm-piastm)^2 ...
+(piebstm-pibstm)^2 +(pieajc-piajc)^2 +(piebjc-pibjc)^2 ...
+(pieafc-piafc)^2 +(piebfc-pibfc)^2 +(pieafcstm-piafcstm)^2 ...
+(piebfcstm-pibfcstm)^2 +(pieafcstf-piafcstf)^2 +(piebfcstf-pibfcstf)^2;
% Fixing the inflation expectation in each round to the actual inflation
piean = pian; piebn = pibn;
pieastf = piastf; piebstf = pibstf;
pieastm = piastm; piebstm = pibstm;
pieajc = piajc; piebjc = pibjc;
pieafc = piafc; piebfc = pibfc;
pieafcstm = piafcstm; piebfcstm = pibfcstm; %Sequential Fiscal Collusion Cases
pieafcstf = piafcstf; piebfcstf = pibfcstf; %Sequential Fiscal Collusion Cases
end;
disp(sprintf(’It took %u repetition(s) until the expectations converge to the true value.’...
, expectationlooplength));
% Simulation of length k with stochastic shocks of size such that output gap variance
% is about plus minus 6 percent
for k = 1:1:100000; %for shocks
if k==1
phia = 0; phib = 0;
else
phia = (randn/10000)*6; phib = (randn/10000)*6;
% Set a % at the beginning of this line if no random shocks wanted.
end;
phi=n*phia+(1-n)*phib;
GRNasheval1;
GRStackeval1;
GRCollusioneval1;
GRFiscalcollusioneval1;
GRFCMonLeadershipEval1; %Sequential Fiscal Collusion Cases
GRFCFiscLeadershipEval1;%Sequential Fiscal Collusion Cases
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% GRCommitmenteval1;
%Nash Case
mnvek=[mnvek ; mn]; xanvek=[xanvek ;xan]; xbnvek=[xbnvek ;xbn];
pianvek=[pianvek ; pian]; pibnvek=[pibnvek ; pibn]; pinvek =[ pinvek ; pin];
yanvek =[ yanvek ; yan]; ybnvek =[ ybnvek ; ybn]; ynvek =[ ynvek ;yn];
lfanvek =[lfanvek ;lfan]; lfbnvek =[ lfbnvek;lfbn]; lmnvek =[ lmnvek;lmn];
lnsoavek =[lnsoavek;lnsoa]; lnsobvek =[lnsobvek; lnsob]; cnsoavek=[cnsoavek;cnsoa];
cnsobvek=[cnsobvek;cnsob]; lfanpolvek =[lfanpolvek;lfanpol]; lfbnpolvek =[lfbnpolvek;lfbnpol];
%Stackelberg Monetary Leadership Case
mstmvek=[mstmvek ; mstm]; xastmvek=[xastmvek ;xastm];
xbstmvek=[xbstmvek ;xbstm];
piastmvek=[piastmvek ; piastm]; pibstmvek=[pibstmvek ; pibstm];
pistmvek =[ pistmvek ; pistm];
yastmvek =[ yastmvek ; yastm]; ybstmvek =[ ybstmvek ; ybstm];
ystmvek =[ ystmvek ;ystm];
lfastmvek =[lfastmvek ;lfastm]; lfbstmvek =[ lfbstmvek;lfbstm];
lmstmvek =[ lmstmvek;lmstm];
lstmsoavek =[lstmsoavek;lstmsoa]; lstmsobvek =[lstmsobvek; lstmsob];
cstmsoavek=[cstmsoavek;cstmsoa];
cstmsobvek=[cstmsobvek;cstmsob]; lfastmpolvek =[lfastmpolvek;lfastmpol];
lfbstmpolvek =[lfbstmpolvek;lfbstmpol];
%Stackelberg Fiscal Leadership Case
mstfvek=[mstfvek ; mstf]; xastfvek=[xastfvek ;xastf];
xbstfvek=[xbstfvek ;xbstf];
piastfvek=[piastfvek ; piastf]; pibstfvek=[pibstfvek ; pibstf];
pistfvek =[ pistfvek ; pistf];
yastfvek =[ yastfvek ; yastf]; ybstfvek =[ ybstfvek ; ybstf];
ystfvek =[ ystfvek ;ystf];
lfastfvek =[lfastfvek ;lfastf]; lfbstfvek =[ lfbstfvek;lfbstf];
lmstfvek =[ lmstfvek;lmstf];
lstfsoavek =[lstfsoavek;lstfsoa]; lstfsobvek =[lstfsobvek; lstfsob];
cstfsoavek=[cstfsoavek;cstfsoa];
cstfsobvek=[cstfsobvek;cstfsob]; lfastfpolvek =[lfastfpolvek;lfastfpol];
lfbstfpolvek =[lfbstfpolvek;lfbstfpol];
%Joint Collusion
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mjcvek=[mjcvek ; mjc]; xajcvek=[xajcvek ;xajc];
xbjcvek=[xbjcvek ;xbjc];
piajcvek=[piajcvek ; piajc]; pibjcvek=[pibjcvek ; pibjc];
pijcvek =[ pijcvek ; pijc];
yajcvek =[ yajcvek ; yajc]; ybjcvek =[ ybjcvek ; ybjc];
yjcvek =[ yjcvek ;yjc];
lfajcvek =[lfajcvek ;lfajc]; lfbjcvek =[ lfbjcvek;lfbjc];
lmjcvek =[ lmjcvek;lmjc];
ljcsoavek =[ljcsoavek;ljcsoa]; ljcsobvek =[ljcsobvek; ljcsob];
cjcsoavek=[cjcsoavek;cjcsoa];
cjcsobvek=[cjcsobvek;cjcsob]; lfajcpolvek =[lfajcpolvek;lfajcpol];
lfbjcpolvek =[lfbjcpolvek;lfbjcpol];
%Simulataneous Fiscal Collusion
mfcvek=[mfcvek ; mfc]; xafcvek=[xafcvek ;xafc];
xbfcvek=[xbfcvek ;xbfc];
piafcvek=[piafcvek ; piafc]; pibfcvek=[pibfcvek ; pibfc];
pifcvek =[ pifcvek ; pifc];
yafcvek =[ yafcvek ; yafc]; ybfcvek =[ ybfcvek ; ybfc];
yfcvek =[ yfcvek ;yfc];
lfafcvek =[lfafcvek ;lfafc]; lfbfcvek =[ lfbfcvek;lfbfc];
lmfcvek =[ lmfcvek;lmfc];
lfcsoavek =[lfcsoavek;lfcsoa]; lfcsobvek =[lfcsobvek; lfcsob];
cfcsoavek=[cfcsoavek;cfcsoa];
cfcsobvek=[cfcsobvek;cfcsob]; lfafcpolvek =[lfafcpolvek;lfafcpol];
lfbfcpolvek =[lfbfcpolvek;lfbfcpol];
%Sequential Fiscal Collusion Cases
mfcstmvek=[mfcstmvek ; mfcstm]; xafcstmvek=[xafcstmvek ; xafcstm];
xbfcstmvek=[xbfcstmvek ;xbfcstm];
piafcstmvek=[piafcstmvek ; piafcstm]; pibfcstmvek=[pibfcstmvek ; pibfcstm];
pifcstmvek =[ pifcstmvek ; pifcstm];
yafcstmvek =[ yafcstmvek ; yafcstm]; ybfcstmvek =[ ybfcstmvek ; ybfcstm];
yfcstmvek =[ yfcstmvek ;yfcstm];
lfafcstmvek =[lfafcstmvek ;lfafcstm]; lfbfcstmvek =[ lfbfcstmvek;lfbfcstm];
lmfcstmvek =[ lmfcstmvek;lmfcstm];
lfcstmsoavek =[lfcstmsoavek;lfcstmsoa]; lfcstmsobvek =[lfcstmsobvek; lfcstmsob];
cfcstmsoavek=[cfcstmsoavek;cfcstmsoa];
cfcstmsobvek=[cfcstmsobvek;cfcstmsob]; lfafcstmpolvek =[lfafcstmpolvek;lfafcstmpol];
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lfbfcstmpolvek =[lfbfcstmpolvek;lfbfcstmpol];
mfcstfvek=[mfcstfvek ; mfcstf]; xafcstfvek=[xafcstfvek ; xafcstf];
xbfcstfvek=[xbfcstfvek ;xbfcstf];
piafcstfvek=[piafcstfvek ; piafcstf]; pibfcstfvek=[pibfcstfvek ; pibfcstf];
pifcstfvek =[ pifcstfvek ; pifcstf];
yafcstfvek =[ yafcstfvek ; yafcstf]; ybfcstfvek =[ ybfcstfvek ; ybfcstf];
yfcstfvek =[ yfcstfvek ;yfcstf];
lfafcstfvek =[lfafcstfvek ;lfafcstf]; lfbfcstfvek =[ lfbfcstfvek;lfbfcstf];
lmfcstfvek =[ lmfcstfvek;lmfcstf];
lfcstfsoavek =[lfcstfsoavek;lfcstfsoa]; lfcstfsobvek =[lfcstfsobvek; lfcstfsob];
cfcstfsoavek=[cfcstfsoavek;cfcstfsoa];
cfcstfsobvek=[cfcstfsobvek;cfcstfsob]; lfafcstfpolvek =[lfafcstfpolvek;lfafcstfpol];
lfbfcstfpolvek =[lfbfcstfpolvek;lfbfcstfpol];
phiavek =[ phiavek ;phia]; phibvek =[ phibvek ;phib];
zahl=zahl+1; % For zahl, only stochastic simulations (k>0) count
end;
% Obtaining the expected values for all the results by using the nonstochastic
% first loop, k=0:
%Nash Case
mne=mnvek(1); xane=xanvek(1); xbne=xbnvek(1);
piane=pianvek(1); pibne=pibnvek(1); pine = pinvek(1);
yane = yanvek(1); ybne = ybnvek(1); yne = ynvek(1);
lfane =lfanvek(1); lfbne = lfbnvek(1); lmne = lmnvek(1);
lnsoae = lnsoavek(1); lnsobe = lnsobvek(1); cnsoae = cnsoavek(1);
cnsobe = cnsobvek(1); lfanpole = lfanpolvek(1); lfbnpole = lfbnpolvek(1);
%Monetary Leadership
mstme=mstmvek(1); xastme=xastmvek(1); xbstme=xbstmvek(1);
piastme=piastmvek(1); pibstme=pibstmvek(1); pistme = pistmvek(1);
yastme = yastmvek(1); ybstme = ybstmvek(1); ystme = ystmvek(1);
lfastme =lfastmvek(1); lfbstme = lfbstmvek(1); lmstme = lmstmvek(1);
lstmsoae = lstmsoavek(1); lstmsobe = lstmsobvek(1); cstmsoae = cstmsoavek(1);
cstmsobe = cstmsobvek(1); lfastmpole = lfastmpolvek(1); lfbstmpole = lfbstmpolvek(1);
%Fiscal Leadership
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mstfe=mstfvek(1); xastfe=xastfvek(1); xbstfe=xbstfvek(1);
piastfe=piastfvek(1); pibstfe=pibstfvek(1); pistfe = pistfvek(1);
yastfe = yastfvek(1); ybstfe = ybstfvek(1); ystfe = ystfvek(1);
lfastfe =lfastfvek(1); lfbstfe = lfbstfvek(1); lmstfe = lmstfvek(1);
lstfsoae = lstfsoavek(1); lstfsobe = lstfsobvek(1); cstfsoae = cstfsoavek(1);
cstfsobe = cstfsobvek(1); lfastfpole = lfastfpolvek(1); lfbstfpole = lfbstfpolvek(1);
%Joint Collusion
mjce=mjcvek(1); xajce=xajcvek(1); xbjce=xbjcvek(1);
piajce=piajcvek(1); pibjce=pibjcvek(1); pijce = pijcvek(1);
yajce = yajcvek(1); ybjce = ybjcvek(1); yjce = yjcvek(1);
lfajce =lfajcvek(1); lfbjce = lfbjcvek(1); lmjce = lmjcvek(1);
ljcsoae = ljcsoavek(1); ljcsobe = ljcsobvek(1); cjcsoae = cjcsoavek(1);
cjcsobe = cjcsobvek(1); lfajcpole = lfajcpolvek(1); lfbjcpole = lfbjcpolvek(1);
%Simultaneous Fiscal Collusion
mfce=mfcvek(1); xafce=xafcvek(1); xbfce=xbfcvek(1);
piafce=piafcvek(1); pibfce=pibfcvek(1); pifce = pifcvek(1);
yafce = yafcvek(1); ybfce = ybfcvek(1); yfce = yfcvek(1);
lfafce =lfafcvek(1); lfbfce = lfbfcvek(1); lmfce = lmfcvek(1);
lfcsoae = lfcsoavek(1); lfcsobe = lfcsobvek(1); cfcsoae = cfcsoavek(1);
cfcsobe = cfcsobvek(1); lfafcpole = lfafcpolvek(1); lfbfcpole = lfbfcpolvek(1);
%Sequential Fiscal Collusion Cases
mfcstme=mfcstmvek(1); xafcstme=xafcstmvek(1);
xbfcstme=xbfcstmvek(1);
piafcstme=piafcstmvek(1); pibfcstme=pibfcstmvek(1);
pifcstme = pifcstmvek(1);
yafcstme = yafcstmvek(1); ybfcstme = ybfcstmvek(1);
yfcstme = yfcstmvek(1);
lfafcstme =lfafcstmvek(1); lfbfcstme = lfbfcstmvek(1);
lmfcstme = lmfcstmvek(1);
lfcstmsoae = lfcstmsoavek(1); lfcstmsobe = lfcstmsobvek(1);
cfcstmsoae = cfcstmsoavek(1);
cfcstmsobe = cfcstmsobvek(1); lfafcstmpole = lfafcstmpolvek(1);
lfbfcstmpole = lfbfcstmpolvek(1);
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mfcstfe=mfcstfvek(1); xafcstfe=xafcstfvek(1);
xbfcstfe=xbfcstfvek(1);
piafcstfe=piafcstfvek(1); pibfcstfe=pibfcstfvek(1);
pifcstfe = pifcstfvek(1);
yafcstfe = yafcstfvek(1); ybfcstfe = ybfcstfvek(1);
yfcstfe = yfcstfvek(1);
lfafcstfe =lfafcstfvek(1); lfbfcstfe = lfbfcstfvek(1);
lmfcstfe = lmfcstfvek(1);
lfcstfsoae = lfcstfsoavek(1); lfcstfsobe = lfcstfsobvek(1);
cfcstfsoae = cfcstfsoavek(1);
cfcstfsobe = cfcstfsobvek(1); lfafcstfpole = lfafcstfpolvek(1);
lfbfcstfpole = lfbfcstfpolvek(1);
% Obtaining the averages of the stochastic results:
mn=(1/zahl)*sum(mnvek(2:k)); xan=(1/zahl)*sum(xanvek(2:k));
xbn=(1/zahl)*sum(xbnvek(2:k));
pian=(1/zahl)*sum(pianvek(2:k)); pibn=(1/zahl)*sum(pibnvek(2:k));
pin = (1/zahl)*sum(pinvek(2:k));
yan = (1/zahl)*sum(yanvek(2:k)); ybn = (1/zahl)*sum(ybnvek(2:k));
yn = (1/zahl)*sum(ynvek(2:k));
lfan = (1/zahl)*sum(lfanvek(2:k)); lfbn = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbnvek(2:k));
lmn = (1/zahl)*sum(lmnvek(2:k));
lnsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(lnsoavek(2:k)); lnsob = (1/zahl)*sum(lnsobvek(2:k));
cnsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(cnsoavek(2:k));
cnsob = (1/zahl)*sum(cnsobvek(2:k)); lfanpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfanpolvek(2:k));
lfbnpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbnpolvek(2:k));
mstm=(1/zahl)*sum(mstmvek(2:k)); xastm=(1/zahl)*sum(xastmvek(2:k));
xbstm=(1/zahl)*sum(xbstmvek(2:k));
piastm=(1/zahl)*sum(piastmvek(2:k)); pibstm=(1/zahl)*sum(pibstmvek(2:k));
pistm = (1/zahl)*sum(pistmvek(2:k));
yastm = (1/zahl)*sum(yastmvek(2:k)); ybstm = (1/zahl)*sum(ybstmvek(2:k));
ystm = (1/zahl)*sum(ystmvek(2:k));
lfastm =(1/zahl)*sum(lfastmvek(2:k)); lfbstm = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbstmvek(2:k));
lmstm = (1/zahl)*sum(lmstmvek(2:k));
lstmsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(lstmsoavek(2:k)); lstmsob = (1/zahl)*sum(lstmsobvek(2:k));
cstmsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(cstmsoavek(2:k));
cstmsob = (1/zahl)*sum(cstmsobvek(2:k)); lfastmpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfastmpolvek(2:k));
lfbstmpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbstmpolvek(2:k));
mstf=(1/zahl)*sum(mstfvek(2:k)); xastf=(1/zahl)*sum(xastfvek(2:k));
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ystf = (1/zahl)*sum(ystfvek(2:k));
lfastf =(1/zahl)*sum(lfastfvek(2:k)); lfbstf = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbstfvek(2:k));
lmstf = (1/zahl)*sum(lmstfvek(2:k));
lstfsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(lstfsoavek(2:k)); lstfsob = (1/zahl)*sum(lstfsobvek(2:k));
cstfsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(cstfsoavek(2:k));
cstfsob = (1/zahl)*sum(cstfsobvek(2:k)); lfastfpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfastfpolvek(2:k));
lfbstfpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbstfpolvek(2:k));
mjc=(1/zahl)*sum(mjcvek(2:k)); xajc=(1/zahl)*sum(xajcvek(2:k));
xbjc=(1/zahl)*sum(xbjcvek(2:k));
piajc=(1/zahl)*sum(piajcvek(2:k)); pibjc=(1/zahl)*sum(pibjcvek(2:k));
pijc = (1/zahl)*sum(pijcvek(2:k));
yajc = (1/zahl)*sum(yajcvek(2:k)); ybjc = (1/zahl)*sum(ybjcvek(2:k));
yjc = (1/zahl)*sum(yjcvek(2:k));
lfajc =(1/zahl)*sum(lfajcvek(2:k)); lfbjc = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbjcvek(2:k));
lmjc = (1/zahl)*sum(lmjcvek(2:k));
ljcsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(ljcsoavek(2:k)); ljcsob = (1/zahl)*sum(ljcsobvek(2:k));
cjcsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(cjcsoavek(2:k));
cjcsob = (1/zahl)*sum(cjcsobvek(2:k)); lfajcpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfajcpolvek(2:k));
lfbjcpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbjcpolvek(2:k));
mfc=(1/zahl)*sum(mfcvek(2:k)); xafc=(1/zahl)*sum(xafcvek(2:k));
xbfc=(1/zahl)*sum(xbfcvek(2:k));
piafc=(1/zahl)*sum(piafcvek(2:k)); pibfc=(1/zahl)*sum(pibfcvek(2:k));
pifc = (1/zahl)*sum(pifcvek(2:k));
yafc = (1/zahl)*sum(yafcvek(2:k)); ybfc = (1/zahl)*sum(ybfcvek(2:k));
yfc = (1/zahl)*sum(yfcvek(2:k));
lfafc =(1/zahl)*sum(lfafcvek(2:k)); lfbfc = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbfcvek(2:k));
lmfc = (1/zahl)*sum(lmfcvek(2:k));
lfcsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(lfcsoavek(2:k)); lfcsob = (1/zahl)*sum(lfcsobvek(2:k));
cfcsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(cfcsoavek(2:k));
cfcsob = (1/zahl)*sum(cfcsobvek(2:k)); lfafcpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfafcpolvek(2:k));
lfbfcpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbfcpolvek(2:k));
%Sequential Fiscal Collusion Cases
mfcstm=(1/zahl)*sum(mfcstmvek(2:k)); xafcstm=(1/zahl)*sum(xafcstmvek(2:k));
xbfcstm=(1/zahl)*sum(xbfcstmvek(2:k));
piafcstm=(1/zahl)*sum(piafcstmvek(2:k)); pibfcstm=(1/zahl)*sum(pibfcstmvek(2:k));
pifcstm = (1/zahl)*sum(pifcstmvek(2:k));
yafcstm = (1/zahl)*sum(yafcstmvek(2:k)); ybfcstm = (1/zahl)*sum(ybfcstmvek(2:k));
yfcstm = (1/zahl)*sum(yfcstmvek(2:k));
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lfafcstm =(1/zahl)*sum(lfafcstmvek(2:k)); lfbfcstm = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbfcstmvek(2:k));
lmfcstm = (1/zahl)*sum(lmfcstmvek(2:k));
lfcstmsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(lfcstmsoavek(2:k)); lfcstmsob = (1/zahl)*sum(lfcstmsobvek(2:k));
cfcstmsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(cfcstmsoavek(2:k));
cfcstmsob = (1/zahl)*sum(cfcstmsobvek(2:k));
lfafcstmpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfafcstmpolvek(2:k));
lfbfcstmpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbfcstmpolvek(2:k));
mfcstf=(1/zahl)*sum(mfcstfvek(2:k)); xafcstf=(1/zahl)*sum(xafcstfvek(2:k));
xbfcstf=(1/zahl)*sum(xbfcstfvek(2:k));
piafcstf=(1/zahl)*sum(piafcstfvek(2:k)); pibfcstf=(1/zahl)*sum(pibfcstfvek(2:k));
pifcstf = (1/zahl)*sum(pifcstfvek(2:k));
yafcstf = (1/zahl)*sum(yafcstfvek(2:k)); ybfcstf = (1/zahl)*sum(ybfcstfvek(2:k));
yfcstf = (1/zahl)*sum(yfcstfvek(2:k));
lfafcstf =(1/zahl)*sum(lfafcstfvek(2:k)); lfbfcstf = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbfcstfvek(2:k));
lmfcstf = (1/zahl)*sum(lmfcstfvek(2:k));
lfcstfsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(lfcstfsoavek(2:k)); lfcstfsob = (1/zahl)*sum(lfcstfsobvek(2:k));
cfcstfsoa = (1/zahl)*sum(cfcstfsoavek(2:k));
cfcstfsob = (1/zahl)*sum(cfcstfsobvek(2:k));
lfafcstfpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfafcstfpolvek(2:k));
lfbfcstfpol = (1/zahl)*sum(lfbfcstfpolvek(2:k));
phia = (1/zahl)*sum(phiavek(2:k)); phib = (1/zahl)*sum(phibvek(2:k));
% Calculating the statistics: standard deviations, indicated by first letter s
smn=std(mnvek(2:k)); sxan=std(xanvek(2:k));
sxbn=std(xbnvek(2:k));
spian=std(pianvek(2:k)); spibn=std(pibnvek(2:k));
spin = std(pinvek(2:k));
syan = std(yanvek(2:k)); sybn = std(ybnvek(2:k));
syn = std(ynvek(2:k));
slfan =std(lfanvek(2:k)); slfbn = std(lfbnvek(2:k));
slmn = std(lmnvek(2:k));
slnsoa = std(lnsoavek(2:k)); slnsob = std(lnsobvek(2:k));
scnsoa = std(cnsoavek(2:k));
scnsob = std(cnsobvek(2:k)); slfanpol = std(lfanpolvek(2:k));
slfbnpol = std(lfbnpolvek(2:k));
smstm=std(mstmvek(2:k)); sxastm=std(xastmvek(2:k));
sxbstm=std(xbstmvek(2:k));
spiastm=std(piastmvek(2:k)); spibstm=std(pibstmvek(2:k));
spistm = std(pistmvek(2:k));
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syastm = std(yastmvek(2:k)); sybstm = std(ybstmvek(2:k));
systm = std(ystmvek(2:k));
slfastm =std(lfastmvek(2:k)); slfbstm = std(lfbstmvek(2:k));
slmstm = std(lmstmvek(2:k));
slstmsoa = std(lstmsoavek(2:k)); slstmsob = std(lstmsobvek(2:k));
scstmsoa = std(cstmsoavek(2:k));
scstmsob = std(cstmsobvek(2:k)); slfastmpol = std(lfastmpolvek(2:k));
slfbstmpol = std(lfbstmpolvek(2:k));
smstf=std(mstfvek(2:k)); sxastf=std(xastfvek(2:k));
sxbstf=std(xbstfvek(2:k));
spiastf=std(piastfvek(2:k)); spibstf=std(pibstfvek(2:k));
spistf = std(pistfvek(2:k));
syastf = std(yastfvek(2:k)); sybstf = std(ybstfvek(2:k));
systf = std(ystfvek(2:k));
slfastf =std(lfastfvek(2:k)); slfbstf = std(lfbstfvek(2:k));
slmstf = std(lmstfvek(2:k));
slstfsoa = std(lstfsoavek(2:k)); slstfsob = std(lstfsobvek(2:k));
scstfsoa = std(cstfsoavek(2:k));
scstfsob = std(cstfsobvek(2:k)); slfastfpol = std(lfastfpolvek(2:k));
slfbstfpol = std(lfbstfpolvek(2:k));
smjc=std(mjcvek(2:k)); sxajc=std(xajcvek(2:k));
sxbjc=std(xbjcvek(2:k));
spiajc=std(piajcvek(2:k)); spibjc=std(pibjcvek(2:k));
spijc = std(pijcvek(2:k));
syajc = std(yajcvek(2:k)); sybjc = std(ybjcvek(2:k));
syjc = std(yjcvek(2:k));
slfajc =std(lfajcvek(2:k)); slfbjc = std(lfbjcvek(2:k));
slmjc = std(lmjcvek(2:k));
sljcsoa = std(ljcsoavek(2:k)); sljcsob = std(ljcsobvek(2:k));
scjcsoa = std(cjcsoavek(2:k));
scjcsob = std(cjcsobvek(2:k)); slfajcpol = std(lfajcpolvek(2:k));
slfbjcpol = std(lfbjcpolvek(2:k));
smfc=std(mfcvek(2:k)); sxafc=std(xafcvek(2:k));
sxbfc=std(xbfcvek(2:k));
spiafc=std(piafcvek(2:k)); spibfc=std(pibfcvek(2:k));
spifc = std(pifcvek(2:k));
syafc = std(yafcvek(2:k)); sybfc = std(ybfcvek(2:k));
syfc = std(yfcvek(2:k));
slfafc =std(lfafcvek(2:k)); slfbfc = std(lfbfcvek(2:k));
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slmfc = std(lmfcvek(2:k));
slfcsoa = std(lfcsoavek(2:k)); slfcsob = std(lfcsobvek(2:k));
scfcsoa = std(cfcsoavek(2:k));
scfcsob = std(cfcsobvek(2:k)); slfafcpol = std(lfafcpolvek(2:k));
slfbfcpol = std(lfbfcpolvek(2:k));
%Sequential Fiscal Collusion Cases
smfcstm=std(mfcstmvek(2:k)); sxafcstm=std(xafcstmvek(2:k));
sxbfcstm=std(xbfcstmvek(2:k));
spiafcstm=std(piafcstmvek(2:k)); spibfcstm=std(pibfcstmvek(2:k));
spifcstm = std(pifcstmvek(2:k));
syafcstm = std(yafcstmvek(2:k)); sybfcstm = std(ybfcstmvek(2:k));
syfcstm = std(yfcstmvek(2:k));
slfafcstm =std(lfafcstmvek(2:k)); slfbfcstm = std(lfbfcstmvek(2:k));
slmfcstm = std(lmfcstmvek(2:k));
slfcstmsoa = std(lfcstmsoavek(2:k)); slfcstmsob = std(lfcstmsobvek(2:k));
scfcstmsoa = std(cfcstmsoavek(2:k));
scfcstmsob = std(cfcstmsobvek(2:k)); slfafcstmpol = std(lfafcstmpolvek(2:k));
slfbfcstmpol = std(lfbfcstmpolvek(2:k));
smfcstf=std(mfcstfvek(2:k)); sxafcstf=std(xafcstfvek(2:k));
sxbfcstf=std(xbfcstfvek(2:k));
spiafcstf=std(piafcstfvek(2:k)); spibfcstf=std(pibfcstfvek(2:k));
spifcstf = std(pifcstfvek(2:k));
syafcstf = std(yafcstfvek(2:k)); sybfcstf = std(ybfcstfvek(2:k));
syfcstf = std(yfcstfvek(2:k));
slfafcstf =std(lfafcstfvek(2:k)); slfbfcstf = std(lfbfcstfvek(2:k));
slmfcstf = std(lmfcstfvek(2:k));
slfcstfsoa = std(lfcstfsoavek(2:k)); slfcstfsob = std(lfcstfsobvek(2:k));
scfcstfsoa = std(cfcstfsoavek(2:k));
scfcstfsob = std(cfcstfsobvek(2:k)); slfafcstfpol = std(lfafcstfpolvek(2:k));
slfbfcstfpol = std(lfbfcstfpolvek(2:k));
%Beginning of the table of results
disp(’-------- Grimm Ried (2006): Table of Results: Values, Standard Deviations
----------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(sprintf(’%s \t\t’, ’m ’, ’xa ’, ’xb ’, ’pia’, ’pib’, ’pi ’, ’ya ’, ’yb ’, ’y ’));
disp(’------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX D. MATLAB CODES USED IN CHAPTER 7 219
----------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Nash Case ’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, mn, xan, xbn, pian, pibn, pin, yan, ybn, yn));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, smn, sxan, sxbn, spian, spibn, spin, syan, sybn, syn));
disp(’------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Stackelberg Case 1: Fiscal Policies move first’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, mstf, xastf, xbstf, piastf, pibstf, pistf, yastf, ybstf, ystf));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, smstf, sxastf, sxbstf, spiastf, spibstf, spistf, syastf,...
...sybstf, systf));
disp(’---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Stackelberg Case 2: Monetary Policy moves first’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, mstm, xastm, xbstm, piastm, pibstm, pistm, yastm, ybstm, ystm));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, smstm, sxastm, sxbstm, spiastm, spibstm, spistm, syastm, sybstm,...
...systm));
disp(’----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Cooperation Case (with identical goals for all players)’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, mjc, xajc, xbjc, piajc, pibjc, pijc, yajc, ybjc, yjc));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, smjc, sxajc, sxbjc, spiajc, spibjc, spijc, syajc, sybjc, syjc));
disp(’---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Fiscal Cooperation Case (with identical goals for the fiscal players)’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, mfc, xafc, xbfc, piafc, pibfc, pifc, yafc, ybfc, yfc));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, smfc, sxafc, sxbfc, spiafc, spibfc, spifc, syafc, sybfc, syfc));
disp(’---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’The Case of non-strategic fiscal policy’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, mnsf, xansf, xbnsf, piansf, pibnsf, pinsf, yansf, ybnsf, ynsf));
disp(’----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Fiscal Cooperation 1: Fiscal Policies move first’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, mfcstf, xafcstf, xbfcstf, piafcstf, pibfcstf, pifcstf, yafcstf,...
...ybfcstf, yfcstf));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, smfcstf, sxafcstf, sxbfcstf, spiafcstf, spibfcstf, spifcstf,...
...syafcstf, sybfcstf, syfcstf));
disp(’-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Fiscal Cooperation 2: Monetary Policy moves first’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, mfcstm, xafcstm, xbfcstm, piafcstm, pibfcstm, pifcstm, yafcstm,...
...ybfcstm, yfcstm));
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disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, smfcstm, sxafcstm, sxbfcstm, spiafcstm, spibfcstm, spifcstm,...
...syafcstm, sybfcstm, syfcstm));
disp(’------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’ ’);
disp(’ ’);
disp(’ ’);
disp(’ ’);
disp(’ ’);
disp(’----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------’);
disp(sprintf(’%s \t\t’, ’L_FA ’, ’L_FB ’, ’L_M ’, ’LSO_A’, ’LSO_B’, ’CSO_A ’, ’CSO_B ’,...
’piea ’, ’pieb ’));
disp(’----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Nash Case ’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfan, lfbn, lmn, lnsoa, lnsob, cnsoa, cnsob, piean, piebn));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfan, slfbn, slmn, slnsoa, slnsob, scnsoa, scnsob));
disp(’----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Stackelberg Case 1: Fiscal Policies move first’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfastf, lfbstf, lmstf, lstfsoa, lstfsob, cstfsoa, cstfsob,...
... pieastf, piebstf));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfastf, slfbstf, slmstf, slstfsoa, slstfsob, scstfsoa,...
... scstfsob));
disp(’----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Stackelberg Case 2: Monetary Policy moves first’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfastm, lfbstm, lmstm, lstmsoa, lstmsob, cstmsoa, cstmsob,...
... pieastm, piebstm));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfastm, slfbstm, slmstm, slstmsoa, slstmsob, scstmsoa,...
... scstmsob));
disp(’----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Cooperation Case (with identical goals for all players)’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfajc, lfbjc, lmjc, ljcsoa, ljcsob, cjcsoa, cjcsob, pieajc,...
... piebjc));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfajc, slfbjc, slmjc, sljcsoa, sljcsob, scjcsoa, scjcsob));
disp(’----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Fiscal Cooperation Case (with identical goals for the fiscal players)’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfafc, lfbfc, lmfc, lfcsoa, lfcsob, cfcsoa, cfcsob, pieafc,...
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piebfc));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfafc, slfbfc, slmfc, slfcsoa, slfcsob, scfcsoa, scfcsob));
disp(’----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’The Case of non-strategic fiscal policy’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfansf, lfbnsf, lmnsf, lnsfsoa, lnsfsob, cnsfsoa, cnsfsob));
disp(’-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Fiscal Cooperation 1: Fiscal Policies move first’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfafcstf, lfbfcstf, lmfcstf, lfcstfsoa, lfcstfsob, cfcstfsoa,...
... cfcstfsob, pieafcstf, piebfcstf));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfafcstf, slfbfcstf, slmfcstf, slfcstfsoa, slfcstfsob,...
... scfcstfsoa, scfcstfsob));
disp(’----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Fiscal Cooperation 2: Monetary Policy moves first’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfafcstm, lfbfcstm, lmfcstm, lfcstmsoa, lfcstmsob, cfcstmsoa,...
... cfcstmsob, pieafcstm, piebfcstm));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfafcstm, slfbfcstm, slmfcstm, slfcstmsoa, slfcstmsob,...
... scfcstmsoa, scfcstmsob));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, tlfafcstm, tlfbfcstm, tlmfcstm, tlfcstmsoa, tlfcstmsob,...
... tcfcstmsoa, tcfcstmsob));
disp(’-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’ ’);
disp(’ ’);
disp(’ ’);
disp(’ ’);
disp(’ ’);
disp(’ ’);
disp(’ ’);
disp(’ ’);
disp(’------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(sprintf(’%s \t\t’, ’L_FAPO’, ’L_FBPO’, ’phi_A ’, ’phi_B ’));
disp(’------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Nash Case ’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfanpol, lfbnpol, phia, phib));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfanpol, slfbnpol, sphia, sphib));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, tlfanpol, tlfbnpol, tphia, tphib));
disp(’------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Stackelberg Case 1: Fiscal Policies move first’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfastfpol, lfbstfpol, phia, phib));
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disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfastfpol, slfbstfpol, sphia, sphib));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, tlfastfpol, tlfbstfpol, tphia, tphib));
disp(’------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Stackelberg Case 2: Monetary Policy moves first’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfastmpol, lfbstmpol, phia, phib));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfastmpol, slfbstmpol, sphia, sphib));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, tlfastmpol, tlfbstmpol, tphia, tphib));
disp(’------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Cooperation Case (with identical goals for all players)’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfajcpol, lfbjcpol, phia, phib));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfajcpol, slfbjcpol, sphia, sphib));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, tlfajcpol, tlfbjcpol, tphia, tphib));
disp(’------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Fiscal Cooperation Case (with identical goals for the fiscal players)’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfafcpol, lfbfcpol, phia, phib));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfafcpol, slfbfcpol, sphia, sphib));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, tlfafcpol, tlfbfcpol, tphia, tphib));
disp(’------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’The Case of non-strategic fiscal policy’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfansfpol, lfbnsfpol, phia, phib));
%disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfansfpol, slfbnsfpol, sphia, sphib));
%disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, tlfansfpol, tlfbnsfpol, tphia, tphib));
disp(’------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Fiscal Cooperation 1: Fiscal Policies move first’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfafcstfpol, lfbfcstfpol, phia, phib));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfafcstfpol, slfbfcstfpol, sphia, sphib));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, tlfafcstfpol, tlfbfcstfpol, tphia, tphib));
disp(’------------------------------------------------------’);
disp(’Fiscal Cooperation 2: Monetary Policy moves first’);
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, lfafcstmpol, lfbfcstmpol, phia, phib));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, slfafcstmpol, slfbfcstmpol, sphia, sphib));
disp(sprintf(’%3.5f \t’, tlfafcstmpol, tlfbfcstmpol, tphia, tphib));
disp(’------------------------------------------------------’);
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D.3 Policy Scenario Files: GRNash1.m and GRNasheval1.m
These files calculate the results for Nash policies. First, the policy problem is solved.
Then, the solutions for the policy problem are calculated in the file GRNash1.m, using
MATLAB’s symbolic math toolbox. Finally, the results for output, inflation and losses
are calculated.
D.4 Policy Scenario File: GRStackeval1.m
D.5 Policy Scenario File: GRCollusioneval1.m
% Grimm Ried 2005 Jep
% Cooperation Solution for a two country setup with one monetary policy
% Sub-program, you should call GRMain1 to start the calculations
% Additional paramters to determine the Joint Loss Function
% (this is only helpful if we want to consider different thetajc for different
% countries later)
%thetajc = thetam; % This is only meaningful if A and B behave identically
%thetajca = thetajc;
%thetajcb = thetajc;
%pifjc = pim; % This is only meaningful if A and B behave identically
%pifjca = pifjc;
%pifjcb = pifjc;
%yfjc = ym; % This is only meaningful if A and B behave identically
%yfjca = yfjc;
%yfjcb = yfjc;
q1 = aa + ba*ca + ka*cba - ka*ca;
q2 = aba + bb*cba + kb*ca - kb*cba;
q3 = aab + ba*cab + ka*cb - ka*cab;
q4 = ab + bb*cb + kb*cab - kb*cb;
q5 = n * (ca + thetajca * ba*q1)...
... + (1-n) * (cba + thetajcb * bb*q2);
q6 = n * (ca^2 + thetajca * q1^2)...
... + (1-n) * (cba^2 + thetajcb * q2^2);
q7 = n * (cab*ca + thetajca * q1*q3)
... + (1-n) * (cb*cba + thetajcb * q2*q4);
q8 = n * (-pifjc*ca + thetajca * (ybara-ba*pieajc - yfjc+phia)*q1)...
... + (1-n) * (-pifjc*cba + thetajcb * (ybarb-bb*piebjc-yfjc+phib)*q2);
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q9 = n * (cab + thetajca * ba*q3)...
... + (1-n) * (cb + thetajcb * bb*q4);
q10 = n * (ca*cab + thetajca * q1*q3)...
... + (1-n) * (cba*cb + thetajcb * q2*q4);
q11 = n * (cab^2 + thetajca * q3^2)...
... + (1-n) * (cb^2 + thetajcb * q4^2);
q12 = n * (-cab*pifjc + thetajca * (ybara-ba*pieajc-yfjc+phia)*q3)...
... + (1-n) * (-cb*pifjc + thetajcb * (ybarb-bb*piebjc-yfjc+phib)*q4);
q13 = n * (1 + thetajca * ba^2)...
... + (1-n) * (1 + thetajcb * bb^2);
q14 = n * (ca + thetajca * ba * q1)...
... + (1-n) * (cba + thetajcb * bb * q2);
q15 = n * (cab + thetajca * ba * q3)...
... + (1-n) * (cb + thetajcb * bb * q4);
q16 = n * (-pifjc + thetajca * ba * (ybara - ba*pieajc - yfjc+phia))...
... + (1-n) * (-pifjc + thetajcb * bb* (ybarb - bb*piebjc - yfjc+phib));
% Collusion solution: (mjc, xajc and xbjc are obtained
% by the symbolic calculation in GRJCom1.m)
mjc = -(q10*q8*q15-q10*q7*q16+q6*q11*q16-q6*q12*q15+q7*q14*q12-q8*q14*q11)...
.../(-q6*q15*q9-q14*q5*q11+q14*q7*q9+q15*q10*q5-q13*q10*q7+q6*q13*q11);
xajc = (q5*q11*q16-q5*q12*q15-q7*q16*q9+q7*q13*q12+q8*q15*q9-q8*q13*q11)...
.../(-q6*q15*q9-q14*q5*q11+q14*q7*q9+q15*q10*q5-q13*q10*q7+q6*q13*q11);
xbjc = -(-q6*q16*q9+q14*q8*q9+q6*q13*q12+q16*q10*q5-q13*q10*q8-q14*q5*q12)/...
...(-q6*q15*q9-q14*q5*q11+q14*q7*q9+q15*q10*q5-q13*q10*q7+q6*q13*q11);
% The resulting inflation rates and output levels, obtained through eqs. (1) and (2):
piajc = mjc + ca*xajc + cab*xbjc; pibjc = mjc + cb*xbjc + cba*xajc;
yajc = ybara + aa*xajc + aab*xbjc + ba* (piajc-pieajc) + ka*(pibjc-piajc) + phia;
ybjc = ybarb + ab*xbjc + aba*xajc + bb* (pibjc-piebjc) + kb*(piajc-pibjc) + phib;
pijc = n * piajc + (1-n) * pibjc; yjc = n * yajc + (1-n) * ybjc;
lfajc = 10^5*0.5 * (n*( (piajc-pifjc)^2 + thetajca*(yajc-yfjc)^2 + 2*delta*abs(xajc))...
... +(1-n)*( (pibjc-pifjc)^2 + thetajca*(ybjc-yfjc)^2 + 2*delta*abs(xbjc)));
lfbjc = lfajc;%10^5*0.5 * ( (pibjc-pifjc)^2 + thetajca*(ybjc-yfjc)^2 + 2*delta*abs(xbjc));
lmjc = 10^5*0.5 * ( n*((piajc-pifjc)^2 + thetajca*(yajc-yfjc)^2)...
... + (1-n)*((pibjc-pifjc)^2 + thetajcb*(ybjc-yfjc)^2));
%lmjc = 0.5 * ( (pijc-pifjc)^2 + thetam*(yjc-yfjc)^2);
%Table of Results
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%Social Optimal Country-Specific Losses
ljcsoa = 10^5*0.5 * ( (piajc-piaso)^2 + thetama*(yajc-yaso)^2);
ljcsob = 10^5*0.5 * ( (pibjc-pibso)^2 + thetamb*(ybjc-ybso)^2);
%Consumption Reduction equivalent to Social Welfare Loss
cjcsoa = 100*(-1+sqrt(1+4*(1-gamma)*(ljcsoa/10^5)))/(2*(1-gamma));
cjcsob = 100*(-1+sqrt(1+4*(1-gamma)*(ljcsob/10^5)))/(2*(1-gamma));
%Losses for policymakers (own preferences according to the uncoordinated Nash Case)
lfajcpol = 10^5*0.5 * ( (piajc-pifa)^2 + thetafa*(yajc-yfa)^2) ;
lfbjcpol = 10^5*0.5 * ( (pibjc-pifb)^2 + thetafb*(ybjc-yfb)^2) ;
D.6 Policy Scenario File: GRFiscalcollusioneval1.m
%used abbreviations
q1 = aa + ba*ca + ka*cba - ka*ca;
q2 = aba + bb*cba + kb*ca - kb*cba;
q3 = aab + ba*cab + ka*cb - ka*cab;
q4 = ab + bb*cb + kb*cab - kb*cb;
%Fiscal coefficients of country A
q5 = n * (ca + thetaafc * ba*q1)...
... + (1-n) * (cba + thetabfc * bb*q2);
q6 = n * (ca^2 + thetaafc * q1^2)...
... + (1-n) * (cba^2 + thetabfc * q2^2);
q7 = n * (cab*ca + thetaafc * q1*q3)...
... + (1-n) * (cb*cba + thetabfc * q2*q4);
q8 = n * (-piaffc*ca + thetaafc * (ybara-ba*pieafc - yaffc+phia)*q1 + delta)...
... + (1-n) * (-pibffc*cba + thetabfc * (ybarb-bb*piebfc-ybffc+phib)*q2);
%Fiscal coefficients of country B
q9 = n * (cab + thetaafc * ba*q3)...
... + (1-n) * (cb + thetabfc * bb*q4);
q10 = n * (ca*cab + thetaafc * q1*q3)...
... + (1-n) * (cba*cb + thetabfc * q2*q4);
q11 = n * (cab^2 + thetaafc * q3^2)...
... + (1-n) * (cb^2 + thetabfc * q4^2);
q12 = n * (-cab*piaffc + thetaafc * (ybara-ba*pieafc-yaffc+phia)*q3)...
... + (1-n) * (-cb*pibffc + thetabfc * (ybarb-bb*piebfc-ybffc+phib)*q4 + delta);
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%Monetary Coefficients
q13 = 1+(n*thetama*ba^2+(1-n)*thetamb*bb^2);
q14 = n*ca + (1-n)*cba + thetama*(ba * n*q1 + bb*(1-n)*q2);
q15 = n*cab + (1-n)*cb + thetamb*(ba * n*q3 + bb*(1-n)*q4);
q16 = -pim + (n*thetama*ba*(ybara-ba*piean -yma +phia)...
... +(1-n)*thetamb*bb*(ybarb-bb*piebn -ymb +phib));
% Fiscal Collusion solution: (mfc, xafc and xbfc are obtained by the symbolic
% calculation in Fiscalcollusion1.m)
mfc =(q6*q11*q16-q6*q12*q15+q7*q14*q12-q7*q16*q10+q8*q15*q10-q8*q14*q11)...
... /(-q5*q15*q10+q15*q9*q6+q13*q7*q10-q13*q6*q11-q14*q9*q7+q5*q14*q11);
xafc =(q5*q11*q16-q5*q12*q15-q9*q7*q16+q12*q13*q7-q11*q13*q8+q9*q8*q15)...
... /(q5*q15*q10-q15*q9*q6-q13*q7*q10+q13*q6*q11+q14*q9*q7-q5*q14*q11);
xbfc =-1/(q5*q15*q10-q15*q9*q6-q13*q7*q10+q13*q6*q11+q14*q9*q7-q5*q14*q11)...
...*(-q13*q8*q10-q5*q14*q12+q5*q16*q10-q16*q9*q6+q13*q6*q12+q14*q9*q8);
% The resulting inflation rates and output levels, obtained through eqs. (1) and (2):
piafc = mfc + ca*xafc + cab*xbfc; pibfc = mfc + cb*xbfc + cba*xafc;
yafc = ybara + aa*xafc + aab*xbfc + ba* (piafc-pieafc) + ka*(pibfc-piafc) + phia;
ybfc = ybarb + ab*xbfc + aba*xafc + bb* (pibfc-piebfc) + kb*(piafc-pibfc) + phib;
pifc = n * piafc + (1-n) * pibfc; yfc = n * yafc + (1-n) * ybfc;
lfafc = 10^5*0.5 * ( n*((piafc-piaffc)^2 + thetaafc*(yafc-yaffc)^2...
... + 2* delta*abs(xafc))+(1-n)*((pibfc-pibffc)^2 + thetabfc*(ybfc-ybffc)^2...
... + 2* delta*abs(xbfc)));
lfbfc = lfafc;
lmfc = 10^5*0.5 * ( n*((piafc-pima)^2 + thetama*(yafc-yma)^2)...
... + (1-n)*((pibfc-pimb)^2 + thetamb*(ybfc-ymb)^2));
%Social Optimal Country-Specific Losses
lfcsoa = 10^5*0.5 * ( (piafc-piaso)^2 + thetama*(yafc-yaso)^2);
lfcsob = 10^5*0.5 * ( (pibfc-pibso)^2 + thetamb*(ybfc-ybso)^2);
%Consumption Reduction equivalent to Social Welfare Loss
cfcsoa = 100*(-1+sqrt(1+4*(1-gamma)*(lfcsoa/10^5)))/(2*(1-gamma));
cfcsob = 100*(-1+sqrt(1+4*(1-gamma)*(lfcsob/10^5)))/(2*(1-gamma));
%Losses for policymakers (own preferences according to the uncoordinated Nash Case)
lfafcpol = 10^5*0.5 * ( (piafc-pifa)^2 + thetafa*(yafc-yfa)^2) ;
lfbfcpol = 10^5*0.5 * ( (pibfc-pifb)^2 + thetafb*(ybfc-yfb)^2) ;
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D.7 Policy Scenario File: GRFCFiscLeadershipEval1.m
% Stackelberg Case: Fiscal Cooperation (1nd mover), Monetary Policy (follower)
% Calculations 23-08-2006
%2nd Stage of the game: Optimization of monetary policy
%used abbreviations
q1 = aa + ba*ca + ka*cba - ka*ca;
q2 = aba + bb*cba + kb*ca - kb*cba;
q3 = aab + ba*cab + ka*cb - ka*cab;
q4 = ab + bb*cb + kb*cab - kb*cb;
%Monetary coefficients of country A and B
q5 = n * (1 + thetama*ba^2)...
... + (1-n) * (1 + thetamb*bb^2); %for m
q6 = n * (ca + thetama*ba*q1)...
... + (1-n) * (cba + thetamb*bb*q2); %for xa
q7 = n * (cab + thetama*ba*q3)...
... + (1-n) * (cb + thetamb*bb*q4); %for xb
q8 = n * (-pima + thetama*ba*(ybara-ba*pieafcstf + phia-yma))...
... + (1-n) * (-pimb + thetamb *bb*(ybarb-bb*piebfcstf-ymb+phib)); %for parameters
% The reaction function of monetary policy to xa and xb is given by:
% mstfrf=-xa*q6/q5-xb*q7/q5-q8/q5;
% mstfrf means monetary policy reaction function
% under stackelberg leadership of fiscal policy
%1st stage of the game: optimization of fiscal policies with respect
% to the monetary reaction function:
%FOC of fiscal policy A
qq1= n*(ca^2 -ca *q6/q5+q6^2/q5^2-q6/q5*ca +thetaafc*(q1-ba*q6/q5)^2)...
... + (1-n)*(cba^2-cba*q6/q5+q6^2/q5^2-q6/q5*cba +thetabfc*(q2-bb*q6/q5)^2);
qq2= n*((ca-q6/q5) *(cab-q7/q5) + thetaafc*(q1-ba*q6/q5)*(q3-ba*q7/q5))...
... + (1-n)*((cba-q6/q5)*(cb -q7/q5) + thetabfc*(q2-bb*q6/q5)*(q4-bb*q7/q5));
qq3= n*((ca-q6/q5) *(-q8/q5-piaffc) + thetaafc*(q1-ba*q6/q5)...
... *(ybara-ba*q8/q5-ba*pieafcstf-yaffc+phia)+delta)...
... +(1-n)*((cba-q6/q5)*(-q8/q5-pibffc) + thetabfc*(q2-bb*q6/q5)...
... *(ybarb-bb*q8/q5-bb*piebfcstf-ybffc+phib));
%FOC of fiscal policy B
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qq4= n*((cab-q7/q5)*(ca-q6/q5) + thetaafc*(q1-ba*q6/q5)*(q3-ba*q7/q5))...
... + (1-n)*((cb -q7/q5)*(cba-q6/q5)+ thetabfc*(q2-bb*q6/q5)*(q4-bb*q7/q5));
qq5= n*((cab-q7/q5)^2 + thetaafc*(q3-ba*q7/q5)^2)...
... + (1-n)*((cb-q7/q5)^2 + thetabfc*(q4-bb*q7/q5)^2);
qq6= n*((cab-q7/q5) *(-q8/q5-piaffc) + thetaafc*(q3-ba*q7/q5)...
... *(ybara-ba*q8/q5-bb*piebfcstf-yaffc+phia))...
... + (1-n)*((cb-q7/q5)*(-q8/q5-pibffc) + thetabfc*(q4-bb*q7/q5)...
... *(ybarb-bb*q8/q5-bb*piebfcstf-ybffc+phib) -delta);
%note, yaffc, ybffc, piaffc and pibffc are the targets of output and
%inflation of couzntry A and B under fiscal collusion
% Fiscal Collusion solution under fiscal leadership:
% Determination of xafcstf and xbfcstf from file GRFCstf.m
%
xafcstf = (qq2*qq6-qq3*qq5)/(qq1*qq5-qq4*qq2);
xbfcstf = -1/(qq1*qq5-qq4*qq2)*(qq1*qq6-qq4*qq3);
%From the monetary reaction function, we obtain
mfcstf=-xafcstf*q6/q5-xbfcstm*q7/q5-q8/q5;
% The resulting inflation rates and output levels, obtained through eqs. (1) and (2):
piafcstf = mfcstf + ca*xafcstf + cab*xbfcstf;
pibfcstf = mfcstf + cb*xbfcstf + cba*xafcstf;
yafcstf = ybara + aa*xafcstf + aab*xbfcstf + ba* (piafcstf-pieafcstf)...
... + ka*(pibfcstf-piafcstf) + phia;
ybfcstf = ybarb + ab*xbfcstf + aba*xafcstf + bb* (pibfcstf-piebfcstf)...
... + kb*(piafcstf-pibfcstf) + phib;
pifcstf = n * piafcstf + (1-n) * pibfcstf;
yfcstf = n * yafcstf + (1-n) * ybfcstf;
lfafcstf = 10^5*0.5 * ( n*((piafcstf-piaffc)^2 + thetaafc*(yafcstf-yaffc)^2...
... + 2* delta*xafcstf)...
... +(1-n)*((pibfcstf-pibffc)^2 + thetabfc*(ybfcstf-ybffc)^2 + 2* delta*xbfcstf));
lfbfcstf = lfafcstf;
lmfcstf = 10^5*0.5 * ( n*((piafcstf-pima)^2 + thetama*(yafcstf-yma)^2)...
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... + (1-n)*((pibfcstf-pimb)^2 + thetamb*(ybfcstf-ymb)^2));
%Table of Results
%Social Optimal Country-Specific Losses
lfcstfsoa = 10^5*0.5 * ( (piafcstf-piaso)^2 + thetama*(yafcstf-yaso)^2);
lfcstfsob = 10^5*0.5 * ( (pibfcstf-pibso)^2 + thetamb*(ybfcstf-ybso)^2);
%Consumption Reduction equivalent to Social Welfare Loss
cfcstfsoa = 100*(-1+sqrt(1+4*(1-gamma)*(lfcstfsoa/10^5)))/(2*(1-gamma));
cfcstfsob = 100*(-1+sqrt(1+4*(1-gamma)*(lfcstfsob/10^5)))/(2*(1-gamma));
%Losses for policymakers (own preferences according to the uncoordinated Nash Case)
lfafcstfpol = 10^5*0.5 * ( (piafcstf-pifa)^2 + thetafa*(yafcstf-yfa)^2 );
lfbfcstfpol = 10^5*0.5 * ( (pibfcstf-pifb)^2 + thetafb*(ybfcstf-yfb)^2 );
D.8 Policy Scenario File: GRFCMonLeadershipEval1.m
% Stackelberg Case: Fiscal Cooperation (2nd mover), Monetary Policy (leader)
% Calculations 23-08-2006
% Note: Calculations of q1 - q12 like in the simultaneous case of fiscal cooperation
%2nd Stage of the game
%used abbreviations
q1 = aa + ba*ca + ka*cba - ka*ca;
q2 = aba + bb*cba + kb*ca - kb*cba;
q3 = aab + ba*cab + ka*cb - ka*cab;
q4 = ab + bb*cb + kb*cab - kb*cb;
%Fiscal coefficients of country A
q5 = n * (ca^2 + thetaafc * q1^2)...
... + (1-n) * (cba^2 + thetabfc * q2^2); %for xa
q6 = n * (ca*cab + thetaafc * q1*q3)...
... + (1-n) * (cba*cb + thetabfc * q2*q4); %for xb
q7 = n * (ca + thetaafc * ba*q1)...
... + (1-n) * (cba + thetabfc * bb*q2); %for m
q8 = n * (-piaffc*ca + thetaafc * (ybara-ba*pieafcstm - yaffc+phia)*q1 + delta)...
... + (1-n) * (-pibffc*cba + thetabfc * (ybarb-bb*piebfcstm-ybffc+phib)*q2);
%for parameters
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%Fiscal coefficients of country B
q9 = n * (ca*cab + thetaafc * q3*q1)...
... + (1-n) * (cb*cba + thetabfc * q2*q4); %for xa
q10 = n * (cab^2 + thetaafc * q3^2)...
... + (1-n) * (cb^2 + thetabfc * q4^2); %for xb
q11 = n * (cab + thetaafc * q3*ba)...
... + (1-n) * (cb + thetabfc * q4*bb); %for m
q12 = n * (-cab*piaffc + thetaafc * (ybara-ba*pieafcstm-yaffc+phia)*q3)...
... + (1-n) * (-cb*pibffc + thetabfc * (ybarb-bb*piebfcstm-ybffc+phib)*q4 + delta);
%for parameters
%note, yaffc, ybffc, piaffc and pibffc are the targets of output and inflation of
%country A and B under fiscal collusion
%Determination of the fiscal reaction functions given the monetary policy decision
%xarfml is the reaction function of fiscal policy A in the monetary leadership case
qq1=(q6*q11-q7*q10)/q10;
qq2=(q6*q12-q8*q10)/q10;
%xarfml = m*qq1 + qq2;
%xbrfml is the reaction function of fiscal policy B in the monetary leadership case
qq3=(q9*q7-q11*q5)/q5;
qq4=(q9*q8-q12*q5)/q5;
%xbrfml = m*qq3 + qq4;
%1st stage of the game: optimization of monetary policy with respect to the
%fiscal reaction functions
%FOC of monetary policy
% n*((m+ca*(m*qq1 + qq2)+cab*(m*qq3 + qq4)-pima)*(1+ca*qq1+cab*qq3)
% + thetama*(ybara+aa*(qq1*m+qq2)+aab*(qq3*m+qq4)+ba*(m+ca*(qq1*m+qq2)
% +cab*(qq3*m+qq4)-pieafcstm)+ka*(cb*(qq3*m+qq4)+cba*(qq1+qq2*m)
% -ca*(qq1*m+qq2)-cab*(qq3*m+qq4))+phia-yma)*(aa*qq1+aab*qq3
% +ba*(1+ca*qq1+cab*qq3)+ka*(cb*qq3+cba*qq1-ca*qq1-cab*qq3)))
% +(1-n)*((m+cb*(m*qq3 + qq4)+cba*(m*qq1 + qq2)-pimb)*(1+cb*qq3+cba*qq1) +
% thetamb*(ybarb+ab*(qq3*m+qq4)+aba*(qq1*m+qq2)+bb*(m+cb*(qq3*m+qq4)
% +cba*(qq1*m+qq2)-piebfcstm)+kb*(ca*(qq1*m+qq2)+cab*(qq3*m+qq4)-cb*(qq3*m+qq4)
% -cba*(qq1*m+qq2))+phib-ybm)*(ab*qq3+aba*qq1+bb*(1+cb*qq3+cba*qq1)
% +ka*(ca*qq1+cab*qq3-cb*qq3-cba*qq1)))=0;
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% Fiscal Collusion solution under monetary leadership: (mfcstm, xafcstm and xbfcstm)
%Solution obtained from File GRFCstm
mfcstm = (-n*cab*qq4-thetamb*ybarb*bb+pimb*cba*qq1+thetamb*bb^2*piebfcstm...
... -n*ca*qq2-thetamb*phib*bb+pimb*cb*qq3+n*cb*qq4+n*cba*qq2-cba^2*qq2*qq1...
... -thetamb*ybarb*bb*cb*qq3-cb^2*qq4*qq3+thetamb*ymb*bb+n*thetamb*phib*ab*qq3...
... -n*thetama*phia*ba*cab*qq3+pimb-cb*qq4-cba*qq2+n*pima+n*pima*cab*qq3+...
... n*pima*ca*qq1-n*cab^2*qq4*qq3-n*ca^2*qq2*qq1+n*thetama*yma*ba-n*thetama*ybara*ba...
... -n*thetama*phia*ba+n*thetama*ba^2*pieafcstm-cb*qq4*cba*qq1-cba*qq2*cb*qq3...
... -thetamb*bb^2*cb*qq4-thetamb*ab*qq4*bb-thetamb*phib*ab*qq3-thetamb*bb^2*cba*qq2...
... +thetamb*ymb*aba*qq1-thetamb*phib*aba*qq1-thetamb*aba*qq2*bb+thetamb*ymb*ab*qq3...
... -thetamb*ab^2*qq4*qq3-thetamb*ybarb*ab*qq3-thetamb*ybarb*aba*qq1
... -thetamb*aba^2*qq2*qq1+n*thetamb*ybarb*bb-n*pimb*cba*qq1-n*thetamb*bb^2*piebfcstm
... +n*thetamb*phib*bb-n*pimb*cb*qq3+n*cba^2*qq2*qq1+n*cb^2*qq4*qq3
... -n*thetamb*ymb*bb+n*thetama*yma*ba*cab*qq3-n*ca*qq2*cab*qq3-n*cab*qq4*ca*qq1
... -n*thetama*ba^2*cab*qq4+n*thetama*yma*aa*qq1-n*thetama*ybara*aab*qq3...
xafcstm = mfcstm*qq1 + qq2;
xbfcstm = mfcstm*qq3 + qq4;
% The resulting inflation rates and output levels, obtained through eqs. (1) and (2):
piafcstm = mfcstm + ca*xafcstm + cab*xbfcstm;
pibfcstm = mfcstm + cb*xbfcstm + cba*xafcstm;
yafcstm = ybara + aa*xafcstm + aab*xbfcstm + ba* (piafcstm-pieafcstm)...
... + ka*(pibfcstm-piafcstm) + phia;
ybfcstm = ybarb + ab*xbfcstm + aba*xafcstm + bb* (pibfcstm-piebfcstm)...
... + kb*(piafcstm-pibfcstm) + phib;
pifcstm = n * piafcstm + (1-n) * pibfcstm;
yfcstm = n * yafcstm + (1-n) * ybfcstm;
lfafcstm = 10^5*0.5 * ( n*((piafcstm-piaffc)^2 + thetaafc*(yafcstm-yaffc)^2...
... + 2* delta*xafcstm)
... +(1-n)*( (pibfcstm-pibffc)^2 + thetabfc*(ybfcstm-ybffc)^2...
... + 2* delta*xbfcstm));
lfbfcstm = 10^5*0.5 * ( n*((piafcstm-piaffc)^2 + thetaafc*(yafcstm-yaffc)^2...
... + 2* delta*xafcstm)+(1-n)*( (pibfcstm-pibffc)^2 + thetabfc*(ybfcstm-ybffc)^2...
... + 2* delta*xbfcstm));
lmfcstm = 10^5*0.5 * ( n*((piafcstm-pima)^2 + thetama*(yafcstm-yma)^2)...
... +(1-n)*( (pibfcstm-pimb)^2 + thetamb* (ybfcstm-ymb)^2 ));
%Social Optimal Country-Specific Losses
lfcstmsoa = 10^5*0.5 * ( (piafcstm-piaso)^2 + thetama*(yafcstm-yaso)^2);
lfcstmsob = 10^5*0.5 * ( (pibfcstm-pibso)^2 + thetamb*(ybfcstm-ybso)^2);
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%Consumption Reduction equivalent to Social Welfare Loss
cfcstmsoa = 100*(-1+sqrt(1+4*(1-gamma)*(lfcstmsoa/10^5)))/(2*(1-gamma));
cfcstmsob = 100*(-1+sqrt(1+4*(1-gamma)*(lfcstmsob/10^5)))/(2*(1-gamma));
%Losses for policymakers (own preferences according to the uncoordinated Nash Case)
lfafcstmpol = 10^5*0.5 * ( (piafcstm-pifa)^2 + thetafa*(yafcstm-yfa)^2 );
lfbfcstmpol = 10^5*0.5 * ( (pibfcstm-pifb)^2 + thetafb*(ybfcstm-yfb)^2 );
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